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Board involvement in Information Technology (IT) governance and the antecedents and 
consequences of such involvement are examined from both a theoretical and practical perspective. 
Practitioner and academic IT governance literature highlight the need for increased board 
involvement in IT governance; however, it seems that many corporate boards do not practice a 
formalized style of IT governance, while those that do, face significant challenges. A gap clearly is 
seen as in spite of the potential benefits of board IT governance and the costs of ineffective oversight, 
there has been little field-based research in this area, nor adequate application of theory. This research 
addresses this gap by developing and testing an exploratory multi-theoretic framework of board IT 
governance.  
Drawing upon strategic choice and institutional theories, and Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, a 
model of the antecedents (organization factors and board attributes) of board IT governance and its 
consequences (financial performance and operational performance) is both developed and tested. 
Unlike previous studies, board IT governance is designated as a central construct in this model rather 
than a secondary factor. 
Constructs of board IT governance and IT competency are explored and multi-item measures for 
both constructs are developed. Board IT governance is conceptualized as the extent of offensive and 
defensive board oversight activities, while IT competency is conceptualized as the extent of IT 
expertise (IT knowledge, experience and training) and IT governance mechanisms (structures, 
processes and relational mechanisms). Detailed interviews with board members enabled a preliminary 
examination of the theoretical framework. To further test the propositions in the theoretical 
framework and to validate the measures for the board IT governance and IT competency constructs, 
an online survey was administered to corporate directors across Canada.  
Exploratory Factor Analysis and Ordinary Least Squares multiple regression were used to analyze 
responses from 188 directors. The board IT governance and IT competency constructs were well 
supported by the data. In addition, the results show that the organizational factors explain 28% of the 
variance in board IT governance, and that board attributes explain 39% more of the variance, for a 
total explained variance in board IT governance of approximately 68%. The results also show that 
board IT governance has a positive impact on operational performance, explaining 19% of the 
variance in operational performance. However, the proposed impact of board IT governance on 
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financial performance, and the impacts of ‘fit’ between role of IT and board IT governance approach 
on financial and operational performance were not supported by the survey results. 
Overall, this research makes a theoretical contribution by: focusing on the board’s role in IT 
governance; developing a multi-theoretical model of the antecedents and consequences of board IT 
governance; developing measures of board IT governance and board IT competency, and; empirically 
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There has been increased attention to Information Technology (IT) governance by boards of directors in the 
practitioner and academic literature. Board IT governance is the provision of oversight of: business/IT 
strategic alignment; IT value delivery; IT resource management; IT risk management, and; IT performance 
management (ITGI, 2003). As with corporate governance, boards have a fiduciary duty and a duty of care in 
IT governance, they are responsible for acting honestly and in good faith and for spending time to make 
informed business judgments. However, it seems that many corporate boards do not explicitly practice a 
formalized style of IT governance while those that do, encounter significant challenges. Furthermore, in spite 
of the increased attention to potential benefits of board IT governance in the literature and the potential costs 
of ineffective oversight, there has been little field-based research in this area and little application of theory 
to examine board IT governance.  
This research attempts to partially fill the gap in the literature by developing and testing a multi-theoretic 
framework of board IT governance. Drawing upon strategic choice and institutional theories from 
organizational research and Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety from the field of cybernetics, this research 
develops and tests a model of the antecedents of board IT governance and its consequences.  
This research is informed by findings from IT governance and corporate governance literature. The 
intention is to supplement the limited amount of research on board IT governance with the extensive research 
on corporate governance in order to create a theoretical framework of board IT governance. This is done by 
building on the findings from the corporate governance literature while taking into consideration 
characteristics of IT that distinguish it from boards’ other governance responsibilities.  
Overall, this research identifies actual behaviors and actions that boards engage in to perform their key IT 
governance roles and functions, and tests the relationships between board attributes (proportion of insiders to 
outsiders, board size, IT competency), organizational factors (organization size, organization age, role of IT 
in the organization) and board IT governance. It also tests the relationship between board IT governance and 
firm performance (financial performance and operational performance), and tests whether the role of IT in 
the organization moderates this relationship. 
The objectives of this research are to investigate the following four questions: 
1. How do boards govern IT?  
2. What are the expertise areas, and governance mechanisms that represent board IT competencies? 
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3. Are there systematic relationships between board attributes (proportion of insiders, size and IT 
competency), organizational factors (size, age and role of IT) and board IT governance? 
4. Is there a relationship between IT governance and firm performance? Is the relationship between 
board IT governance and firm performance moderated by the role of IT in the organization, such 
that the relationship is significant when there is a fit between the type of board IT governance 
practiced and the role of IT in the organization, and not significant when there is not a fit? 
The theoretical framework discussed in this dissertation is exploratory in nature. It builds on findings 
reported in the literature to enable a richer understanding of the antecedents and consequences of board IT 
governance. The Critical Decision Method (CDM) and a semi-structured questionnaire were used to conduct 
interviews with corporate directors. These interviews allowed the conceptualization and measurement of two 
new constructs – board IT governance and board IT competency – that were developed further and then used 
in the subsequent survey. The interviews also enabled a preliminary examination of the theoretical 
framework. Next, an online survey was conducted to uncover relationships and effects across a larger 
number of boards.  
In summary, the research agenda was to advance and test relationships predicated by: (i) strategic choice 
theory; (ii) institutional theory, and; (iii) Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, in order to better explain why 
and how boards become involved in IT governance and the consequences of this involvement. This research 
extends prior work in four ways: 
1. focuses on the board of directors’ role in IT governance; 
2. examines antecedents and consequences of board IT governance not previously studied in the 
literature by relying on guidance from corporate and IT governance literature, and with a multi-
theoretic viewpoint;.  
3. develops measures of board IT governance and board IT competency that have not previously 
been studied, and;  
4. empirically assesses the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance. 
1.1 Board IT Governance Defined 
There remains limited understanding of the role of the board in IT governance (DeHaes and 
VanGrembergen, 2005; Huff et. al., 2006; Jordan and Musson, 2004; Trites, 2004). This limited 
understanding is exhibited by the lack of one, generally accepted, definition for IT governance (DeHaes and 




“IT governance is the responsibility of the board of directors and executive 
management. It is an integral part of enterprise governance and consists of 
the leadership and organizational structures and processes that ensure that 
the organization’s IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategies and 
objectives” (ITGI, 2003, p.10). 
This definition suggests that the board, in addition to executive management, must play an active role in 
IT governance; however, most IT governance research has not focused on board involvement and has instead 
focused on executive management’s use of organizational structures and the contingences that influence the 
choice of structure (Brown and Grant, 2005).  Researchers of board IT governance cannot rely on the 
findings at the management-level because there are distinctions between board-level and management-level 
decision-making (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). For example, the boards’ role, unlike that of management, is 
to provide oversight of strategic decisions, not to implement the decisions, also board composition is 
different than managerial groups - boards consist of outsiders and insiders, and boards meet infrequently 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999).  
The IT Governance Institute (ITGI) views stakeholder value as the driving force for all IT governance 
responsibilities and suggests that IT governance is a continuous process occurring uniquely in each 
organization and driven by the IT strategy of the organization. Thus, the board is responsible for 
understanding the importance of IT to the organization and adjusting its IT governance activities 
accordingly. The ITGI (2003) posits that the board can uncover and address problems in IT governance in 
the following areas. 
• Oversight of business/IT strategic alignment – ensure strategic integration between the current 
and future IT organization and the current and future organization; 
• IT value delivery – ensure on-time and within-budget delivery of appropriate quality; 
• IT resource management – ensure optimal investment, use and allocation of IT resources, 
including: people, applications, technology, facilities, and data; 
• IT risk management – ensure the safeguarding of IT assets and disaster recovery; 
• IT performance management – ensure project delivery and the monitoring of IT services. 
1.2 Corporate Governance vs. IT Governance 
Most of the corporate governance literature regards the key role of the board as one that allows the 
separation of oversight from management decision making, thus assuring stakeholders that the organization 
is using its resources as they intended (Johnson et al, 1996). However, the board’s role has extended beyond 
oversight and is now often looked upon to provide a central and strategic role in governance for stakeholders 
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by acting as a source of expertise to improve decision-making (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Booth and 
Deli, 1999). Although IT is not explicitly cited as an area of responsibility for corporate boards, all areas 
involve IT in some respect as IT plays an important role in virtually all businesses and thus oversight of IT 
decisions is necessary. For example, boards cannot effectively monitor a firm’s financial performance 
without also considering the IT systems upon which these financials rely. Also, business strategic planning 
cannot effectively occur without consideration of the technology (financial, personnel, etc.) to support those 
strategic plans.  
As the strategic importance of IT and the associated risks have grown so too has the need for governance 
of IT decisions. Weill and Ross (2004, pp. 14-18) suggested the following reasons why IT decision making 
requires good governance:  
• organizations with above-average IT governance performance have superior profits;  
• IT is expensive - on average greater than 4.2 percent of annual revenues;  
• governance of IT creates mechanisms to determine the value of IT;  
• success of IT depends on joint business-IT decision-making;  
• IT governance mechanisms provide a transparent IT decision-making process that is aligned with 
business strategy;  
• IT is pervasive and requires IT decision-making throughout the organization;  
• rapid introduction of new IT creates strategic threats and opportunities;  
• there is no one-size-fits-all approach to IT governance - governance decisions concerning IT 
depend on characteristics of the organization.  
Most researchers suggest that IT governance is a subset of organizational governance; however there is 
some confusion regarding where IT governance fits within the organizational governance framework. As 
Figure 1 shows, this research, following the definition of Korac-Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001), treats IT 
governance as a subset of corporate governance, and treats the IT governance responsibilities as additions to 







Figure 1 - Integration of IT Governance with Corporate Governance 
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performance, representing the
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Strategic Oversight
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IT Governance
oversight of business/IT strategic
alignment, IT value delivery, IT
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There are an extensive number of empirical studies on the antecedents and consequences of board 
involvement in corporate governance (LeBlanc, 2003); however, it is not sufficient to assume that these are 
the same for IT governance because of the differences between IT and other areas of an organization 
traditionally governed by the board (e.g. financial performance, human resources). 
In particular, the pervasiveness, complexity and rapidly changing nature of IT have changed the 
knowledge and experience required to govern an organization (Weill and Ross, 2004). The pervasive nature 
of IT systems (i.e. systems are not separate entities and span organizational functions) necessitates that they 
must be managed together with other systems and management practices. This pervasiveness may extend the 
scope of expertise needed to include multiple functions or individuals inside or outside of the organization. 
Furthermore, the complexity and rapidly changing nature of IT may also impact the knowledge and 
experience required for its governance. Complexity and rapid changes imply that directors must be able to 
quickly understand the changes in complex IT systems and how they may impact the organization’s 
operational and strategic goals. These inherent differences between IT and traditional areas of corporate 
governance necessitate the study of board IT governance. 
1.3 Outline of Dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into 9 Chapters. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research questions and theories that guide this dissertation, briefly 
defining board IT governance, and discussing the characteristics of IT that distinguish it from boards’ other 
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governance responsibilities. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the applicable IT governance literature with a 
focus on the role of the board in IT governance and highlighting the gap between practice and theory. 
Chapters 3 and 4 continue by discussing the theoretical development more thoroughly and then presenting 
this dissertation’s theoretical framework and propositions. Chapter 5 discusses an overview of the research 
methodology and analysis. This is followed by Chapter 6 which presents the methodology and findings for 
phase one - interviews with directors, and Chapter 7 which describes the data collection, measures, analysis 
and findings for phase two - survey of directors. Chapter 8 presents the overall findings of this research. 
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation by discussing the contributions of the research findings, presenting the 
limitations of this exploratory study, and discussing how future research can expand upon these findings and 





Literature Review - IT Governance 
As shown in Figure 2, the IT governance literature can be classified into two separate streams. The first 
focuses on the design of decision-making structures at the managerial level, while the second focuses on the 
role of the board. 
Figure 2 - Review of IT Governance Literature 
 
The first stream - focusing on the design of decision-making structures at the managerial level - is the 
predominant line of research in the literature. In a recent review (Brown and Grant, 2005) three categories 
focusing on the design of decision-making structures of IT governance were identified, they are: 
1. Structural forms of IT governance - centralized vs. decentralized and vertical vs. horizontal - This 
category of research focuses on the decision-making structures adopted by IT organizations, 
including traditional centralized and decentralized IT organizational structures (e.g. Jenkins and 
Santos, 1982; Olson and Chervany, 1980; Thompson, 1957), and what Brown and Grant (2005) 
coined vertical and horizontal expansion which dealt with bi-polar governance systems within the 
same organization (e.g. Boynton and Zmud, 1987; Ein-Dor and Segev, 1978; Zmud et al., 1986). 
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2. Contingencies of IT governance structural forms - This category focuses on understanding the 
factors such as organizational structure, firm size, and business strategy upon which the success of 
IT governance structures are contingent (e.g. Brown, 1997; Brown, 1999; Brown and Magill, 
1998; Ein-Dor and Segev, 1982; Sambamurthy and Zmud, 1999; Tavokolian, 1989). This category 
of research identifies contingencies that influence the adoption of particular structural forms.  
3. Weill and Ross’ IT governance Framework (2004) – Brown and Grant (2005) described this 
category of research as an extension of the two previous categories of IT governance.  The 
framework links IT governance decision-making structures to those of the organization, proposes 
different governance forms for different IT decisions, and includes contingencies - proposing that 
the governance form is contingent on factors such as strategic and performance goals, 
organizational structure, governance experience, size and diversity, and industry and regional 
differences. 
The second stream of research – focusing on the role of the board in IT governance - can be classified as 
either normative or descriptive. The normative literature (Buckby et al., 2005; ITGI, 2003; Nolan and 
McFarlan, 2005; Trites, 2004) advocates the importance of the board’s role in IT governance. A level of 
board involvement in IT governance contingent on the characteristics of the organization and its use of, and 
dependence on, IT is recommended. Nolan and McFarlan (2005) suggest that the board’s IT governance 
responsibilities depend upon the role of IT in the organization. Their IT Strategic Impact Grid (the most 
widely cited contingency view of IT governance in the literature reviewed) proposes a model of board 
involvement contingent upon the organization’s reliance on IT for operations versus competitive advantage. 
As shown in Table 1, my review of the descriptive literature revealed very few studies concentrating on 
how the board is actually involved in IT governance. Although the number of studies is relatively small, the 
consensus is that boards are not fulfilling their IT governance duties effectively. The studies imply that a gap 
exists between the normative and descriptive research, with the board’s involvement in IT governance in 
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How are boards 
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Interview 13 board members 
(with positions on 
60 boards) 
Knowledge of IT poor 
Limited experience in e-commerce 
e-commerce ventures primarily reviewed and 


















Interviewed IT and 
business managers, 
CIO, IT governance 
project manager, 
member of the 
board, executive 
committee 
Executive Committee reports to the board monthly 
on major events and projects 
IT Strategy Committee consists of 3 board members; 
however, it “did not enable a more thorough and 
ongoing involvement of boards in IT governance” 
(p.5) 
The “Board works at a very high, strategic level and 
they are consequently not the ‘steering power’ for IT 
or IT governance” (p.5) 
Huff et al., 2006 How are boards 
dealing with IT 
governance? 
Interview 17 board chairs, 
board members and 
17 CIOs in the same 
medium to large 
companies  
(half financial 
services and half 
primary resources) 
IT attention deficit in boards 
CIOs think that boards should pay more attention 
Boards pay attention to IT Risk 
Half of financial service firms and no primary 
resources companies pay attention to other IT 
governance topics  
None of the companies have board-level committees 
CIOs do not support board-level committees 
Deloitte Consulting 
LLP and Corporate 
Board Member 
Magazine, 2006 
Is the board 
involved in IT 
Strategies? 
Survey 455 directors at $1B 
public companies 
worldwide (out of 
10,000 surveys) 
Overall think IT strategy and implementation is 
important to the success of the company 
13.8% board completely and actively involved in IT 
66.5% think IT should be discussed at the board level 
56.4% of boards have 3 or more members 
knowledgeable in IT (only 8% of boards have no 
members with IT knowledge) 











84 public US 
companies with an 
IT Strategy 
Committee and a 
matched sample of 
84 companies 
without such a 
committee 
IT knowledge at top executive levels and the board is 
associated with a company's use of IT governance 
mechanisms such as CIOs and IT Strategy 
committees that lead to improved financial 
performance 
2.1 Key Findings in the Literature 
The review of the IT governance literature revealed three key findings: (1) the predominance of a 
contingency view of board IT governance; (2) the potential influence of IT expertise on board IT 
governance, and; (3) a paucity of research on board IT governance with limited theoretical basis.  
The first key finding is that the literature seems to suggest an approach to board IT governance contingent 
on the role of IT in the organization. Nolan and McFarlan (2005) suggest there is no “one-size-fits-all” 
model for board supervision of a company’s IT operations and they propose a contingency model based upon 
an organization’s operational reliance and strategic reliance on IT – the IT Strategic Impact Grid (refer to 
Figure 3). Operational reliance on IT refers to an organization’s reliance on IT for operations and thus the 
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need for reliable IT, whereas strategic reliance refers to an organization’s reliance on new IT for a 
competitive edge. 
Figure 3 – Nolan and McFarlan’s IT Strategic Impact Grid (2005) 
 
 
The Strategic Impact Grid is intended to aid board decision making by suggesting a list of questions that a 
board should ask about IT governance depending on where their organization falls in the grid. The questions 
include topics such as the strategic importance of IT, competitors’ use of IT, business continuity, and IT 
risks. Nolan and McFarlan (2005) also suggest that the board form committees depending on where the 
organization falls in the grid. They suggest that the committees aid decision making by supplementing board-
level IT expertise with individuals with the requisite IT knowledge and experience. Such committees, 
referred to as IT Governance Committees (known commonly as IT Strategy Committees), are suggested to 
be composed of board members and executives with the objective of assisting management and the board in 
IT governance decisions. Nolan advocated the use of such committees because of the lack of IT knowledge 
at the board-level and the inability of CIOs to bring technology issues to the attention of the board (2004).  
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While there has been no direct empirical testing of the IT Strategic Impact Grid, studies have found that 
boards do not appear to be following the recommended role in IT governance (e.g. DeHaes and 
VanGrembergen, 2005; Deloitte Consulting LLP and Corporate Board Member Magazine, 2006; Huff et al., 
2006; Jordan and Musson, 2004). For example, in a study of eight financial services firms a lack of 
involvement of the boards was found (Huff et al., 2006); however, according to the IT Strategic Impact Grid, 
it is firms that rely on IT for their competitive edge such as these financial services firms who should be 
paying the most attention to IT governance at the board level. Similarly, a Deloitte Consulting and Corporate 
Board Member Magazine survey (2006) found that board involvement in IT governance is not 
commensurate with the importance directors’ place on IT. Furthermore, according to a research survey 
conducted for the ITGI’s IT Governance Domain Practices and Competencies Series (2005), the 
responsibility for IT strategy is often delegated to management levels below the board. In particular, the 
survey found that fewer than 25 percent of entities engage board members directly in the IT strategy-setting 
process. In addition, the use of board-level committees to aid decision-making in IT governance has also 
been found to fall short of Nolan and McFarlan’s (2005) recommendations. An analysis of a database of 
public companies in the US1 found that only 4%, or 86 companies, had IT strategy committees (Ernst & 
Young, 2006). Similarly, in a study of 17 boards, Huff et al. (2006) found that no companies in their study 
had such board-level committees, and that the CIOs of those companies did not support such committees.  
The second key finding is the potential influence of IT expertise on board IT governance. The descriptive 
literature shows that there are conflicting results regarding boards’ knowledge of IT governance and 
subsequently their ability to effectively participate in IT governance. Most studies imply there is an IT 
governance knowledge deficit at the board level. For example, Jordan and Musson (2004) found that the 13 
board members they studied had very poor levels of IT knowledge “with most directors expressing at best 
only survival skills in IT” (p. 6). A study of more than 3,000 businesses, including the Fortune Global 500 
(Burson-Marsteller, 2005), also found this low level of IT knowledge at the board level. It revealed that few 
global companies are reserving board seats for technology experts, with only 5% having CIOs on their 
boards of directors. This same study found that Fortune Global 500 companies that have CIO board members 
tend to outperform their competitors, delivering annual returns of 9.2% above relevant indices. However, in 
contrast to the knowledge deficit noted by these studies, a Deloitte Consulting Survey (2006) found that 
56.4% of boards have three or more members knowledgeable in IT with only 8% of boards having no 
members with IT knowledge. These inconsistent findings on boards’ IT knowledge suggest that further 
research is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of the role that directors’ IT expertise plays in board IT 
                                                   
1 The Corporate Library conducted its analysis for Tapestry Networks on June 9, 2006, on a database of 
2,143 public companies that it follows. 
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governance. The literature does not look at what IT expertise is required at the board level or how it 
influences board involvement in IT governance or the decisions that are made. The theoretical framework 
proposed in this dissertation addresses this finding by operationalizing board IT expertise and 
operationalizing it in a way that measures distinct dimensions of IT expertise. 
Finally, the literature review revealed that there is a small amount of research on board IT governance and 
there is a limited theoretical basis.  
These findings provided much of the impetus for this research. Firstly, the theoretical framework 
developed in this research addresses the contingency view of board IT governance, but goes beyond the 
contingent role of IT in the organization and investigates the contingent role of board attributes and other 
organizational factors. Secondly, this research examines the potential influence of IT expertise on board IT 
governance by identifying IT expertise and IT governance mechanisms that form IT competencies, and 
examining how they influence board IT governance. Finally, the theoretical framework applies a multi-




Chapter 3  
Towards a Theoretical Framework 
As mentioned in the introduction, this research uses three theoretical perspectives to develop a theoretical 
framework of the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance: (1) strategic choice theory, (2) 
institutional theory, and (3) Ashby’s Law of Requisite variety.  
This chapter presents an overview of each of these theoretical viewpoints while Chapter 4 introduces the 
theoretical framework developed in this research. 
3.1 Strategic Choice Theory 
Strategic choice theorists focus on organizational actors and the role that they play in organizational change 
instead of focusing solely on change as a passive environmental selection process (Child, 1997). Strategic 
choice theory was first proposed by John Child in a 1972 article. Child argued that “purposeful actions 
abound in organizations and that organizational members have substantial leeway in shaping their own fates” 
(Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, p. 770). Strategic choice theory is nondeterministic in that it argues that 
individuals and groups within organizations can make proactive choices to influence organizational 
outcomes.  
When strategic choice theory was first introduced by Child in 1972 structural determinism was the 
prominent view in organizational research. Structural determinism views organizations’ design and structure 
as determined by their operational contingencies (Child, 1972). However, strategic choice theorists propose 
that this view is inadequate because it ignores the influence that leaders of organizations may have on the 
design and structure of organizations.  
In structural determinism, behavior is seen as determined by and reacting to structural constraints (Astley and 
Van de Ven, 1983). Early studies in the structural determinism perspective examined the impact of contextual 
factors such as technology (Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965) and organizational environments (Burns and 
Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) on organizational structure.  Contingency theory, another form of 
structural determinism, has more recently received considerable attention in the literature (e.g. Donaldson, 
1995; Luthans, 1992; Robbins, 1993; Vecchio, 1991). Contingency theorists view organization operations as 
bound by contextual constraints (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983).  
Structural determinism perspectives view the environment as ultimately determining organizational 
characteristics - “they stress environmental selection rather than selection of the environment” (Child, 1997, 
  
 14 
p. 45). In contrast, strategic choice theorists focus on the role of organizational leaders who have the power 
to influence the structures of their organization - “the strategic choice view draws attention to individuals, 
their interactions, social constructions, autonomy, and choices, as opposed to the constraints of their role 
incumbency and functional interrelationships in the system” (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983, p. 249). 
Strategic choice theory has undergone many changes since it was first introduced. In a 1997 article 
reviewing the literature on strategic choice theory since his 1972 article, Child identified three key issues 
with respect to strategic choice theory that mark the evolution of the theory through the years: (1) the nature 
of agency and choice; (2) the nature of environment, and; (3) the nature of the relationship between 
organizational agents and the environment.  
The first issue identified by Child (1997), the nature of agency and choice, refers to the ability of decision-
makers (agents) to make a choice regarding organizational characteristics. Whittington (1988) suggested that 
there may be two constraints on decision-makers ability to choose. He coined these constraints 
environmental determinism and action determinism. Environmental determinism refers to the idea that 
“although the actor may well select any from a range of available courses of action, in fact the environment 
ensures that only one is compatible with survival - all others lead to extinction. Choice is not meaningful 
because, in order to survive, the decision-maker can pursue only one course of action” (Whittington, 1988, p. 
523). Whittington (1998) proposed that contrary to what much of the literature had suggested to that point in 
time, external constraints (environmental determinism) were insufficient for explaining decision-makers 
capacities for exercising choice, and that one must also consider the characteristics of the decision-maker, or 
action determinism. Action determinism asserts that, “given certain drivers, the actor will select only one sort 
of action. The simple single-mindedness of the actor’s internal mechanisms denies any genuine choice 
between alternatives” (Whittington, 1988, p. 523). Therefore, contrary to environmental determinism, “for 
the action determinists it is the environment that is of secondary importance” (Whittington, 1988, p. 523).  
Child (1997) suggested that “the introduction of action determinism enriches the analysis of strategic 
choice because it focuses attention onto the characteristics of key organizational actors themselves, which 
may foreclose the degree of choice that they exercise, even in the absence of external constraints” (p. 51). 
Therefore, action determinism refocuses the attention on the characteristics of the decision-makers. 
The second issue identified by Child (1997), the nature of environment, refers to the fact that one must 
also consider the environment when considering the ability of decision-makers to make a choice, in that the 
environment limits the choices available to decision-makers. It is argued that organizational actors ‘enact’ 
their environments and according to Child (1997), “enactment in strategic choice analysis thus refers mainly 
to actions which bring certain environments into relevance” (p. 53). 
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Finally, the third issue identified by Child (1997), the nature of the relationship between organizational 
agents and the environment, refers to the fact that one must consider the relationships between environment 
and the decision-makers when considering the ability of decision-makers to make a choice. The relationships 
are a product of the environments and the decision-makers’ interpretations of the environment, that is, the 
relationships that decision-makers choose to enact depend on their interpretation of the environment. This 
view considers Simon’s bounded rationality (1976) and perceptual limits in that decision-makers’ 
perceptions of their environment may not reflect objective reality and thus they do not seek one optimal 
alternative. Instead, they may select alternatives that are satisfactory and sufficient, or “good enough”. 
The original variant of strategic choice theory proposed that the environment may constrain choice; 
however, these three issues focus attention on factors other than the environment that may constrain choice. 
They suggest that strategic choice theory has evolved to also consider the characteristics of the decision-
maker, and the relationship between the environment and the decision-maker as possible constraining 
factors. This has been an important evolution of strategic choice theory, as it no longer considers 
environmental factors as the only constraining forces on choice, but also considers characteristics of the 
decision-makers and their perceptual interpretations of the environment when explaining decision-makers 
capacities for exercising choice. 
3.2 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theorists emphasize “environmental norms and the weight of firm history as explanations of 
organizational actions” (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, p. 769). Institutional theorists view organizational 
behavior as “the product of ideas, values and beliefs” – institutional pressures – and propose that 
“organizational behaviors are responses to not only market pressures but to institutional pressures” 
(Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996, p. 1025). Furthermore, institutional theory, unlike strategic choice theory, 
is a deterministic theory that argues that organizational practices can be predicted and explained by factors 
such as cultural values, industry traditions and firm history, rather than relying on individuals and groups as 
explanations for organizational actions (Eisenhardt, 1988). Therefore, organizational convergence to an 
institutionally derived structure, rather than organizational uniqueness is stressed as the basis for 
organization structure (Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996). The four foundational works of institutional theory 
are discussed below to provide an introduction to this theory. 
In the first foundational work, Meyer and Rowan (1977), argued that “the formal structures of many 
organizations in postindustrial society dramatically reflect the myths of their institutional environments 
instead of the demands of their work activities” (p. 341) They suggested that many of the organizational 
theories were inaccurately based on the view that organizations function according to their “formal 
blueprints” (e.g. Thompson 1967; Weber, 1930, 1946, 1947; Woodward, 1965). Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
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argued that much of the empirical literature cast doubt on these theories because of the gap found between 
the formal and informal organization (e.g. Dalton, 1959; Downs, 1967; Homans, 1950), and because formal 
organizations are often loosely coupled (e.g. March and Olsen, 1976; Weick, 1976). Instead, Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) proposed that organizations should be found to adapt to environmental changes, even if no 
evidence of their effectiveness exists, and “organizations which incorporate institutionalized myths are more 
legitimate, successful, and likely to survive” (p. 361). 
The second work by Zucker (1977) proposed that there are degrees of institutionalization and investigated 
the effect of different degrees of institutionalization on cultural persistence in three distinct experiments. She 
found that the greater the degree of institutionalization, the greater the maintenance of the culture without 
direct social control, and the greater the resistance to change through personal influence. 
In the next work, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) contended that bureaucratization and other forms of 
organizational change occur as the result of processes that make organizations more similar without 
necessarily making them more efficient. They identified three mechanisms through which institutional 
isomorphic change occur – coercive, mimetic and normative and propose predictors of isomorphic changes. 
In the fourth foundational work, Scott and Meyer (1983) proposed the concept of social sector, which 
includes “all organizations within a society supplying a given type of product or service together with their 
associated organizational sets: suppliers, financiers, regulator, and so forth” (p. 129). They argued that social 
sectors differ in a number of ways and that those differences influence the structure and performance within 
each sector. For example, they proposed that regulatory process would have different effects in different 
sectors and that these differences may be due to differences not only in political processes and economic 
mechanisms, but in organizational arrangements. 
These four foundational works of institutional theory have been succeeded by a large and varied amount of 
literature which has built on and advanced this area of research. It is important to recognize the different 
variants of institutional theory in order to understand the different institutional arguments. In a review of the 
predominant variants in the literature Scott (1987) identified four such variants: (1) process of instilling 
value, (2) process of creating reality, (3) as a class of elements, and (4) as distinct societal spheres. Table 2 










1. Process of 
Instilling Value 
Selznick, 1957 Institutionalization as a means of instilling value. 
Supplying intrinsic worth to a structure or process that before institutionalization had 
only instrumental utility. 
Promotes stability – persistence of structure over time. 
Focuses on what occurs not how. 
 




Institutionalization as a social process by which individuals come to accept a shared 
definition of social reality. 
Independent of the actor’s own views or actions, but is taken for granted as defining 
the “way things are”. 
 
3. As a Class of 
Elements 
Meyer and Rowan, 
1977 
Emphasis shifts from the properties of general belief systems to the existence of a 
variety of sources of beliefs (cultural approach). 
Less emphasis on institutionalization as distinctive process – organizations conform to 
a set of institutionalized beliefs because they are rewarded for doing so. 
 




Focuses attention on the existence of a set of differentiated and specialized cognitive 
and normative systems – institutionalized logic and patterned human activities that 
arise and tend to persist in all societies. 
Studies why institutionalized forms develop. 
 
 
These variants are all similar in that they propose that institutional elements affect the structural 
characteristics of organizations; however, they differ as to in what parts of the structure such effects occur 
(Scott, 1987). The first two variants are similar in that they propose a process of generating general belief 
systems; however, they differ in why the process of generating this belief system occurs. The process of 
instilling value views institutionalization as a means of instilling value in a process in order to promote 
stability in the structure over time. Whereas the process of creating reality views institutionalization as a 
social process by which the structure becomes accepted as defining the “way things are”. The last two 
variants shift from the existence of a general belief system to the existence of diversity among belief systems. 
As a class of elements views these diverse belief systems as determining the organization structure and views 
the sources of belief systems as institutionalized. In this variant of institutional theory it is proposed that this 
process of institutionalization occurs because organizational members are “rewarded for doing so through 
increased legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities” (Scott, 1987, p. 498). The fourth variant of 
institutional theory, institutions as distinct societal spheres, shifts towards studying the different belief 
systems and why they are associated with different structures. In summary, the existence of these variants of 
institutional theory illustrates the variety of institutional processes, how and why these processes occur, and 
the range of influences of these processes on organizations.  
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3.3 Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety 
Cybernetics, the field from which Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety was derived, regards systems as 
dynamic with the ability to regulate/control their output by responding to disturbances. Control is the central 
concept of cybernetics and Ashby’s Law. Control is a regulatory process with set goals, a way of measuring 
those goals, the ability to act when goals are not achieved, and feedback to detect unwanted variances in the 
system. Control is initiated when there are unwanted deviations in the system or when performance needs to 
be corrected (Beer, 1982).  
Ashby describes the control process whereby for every disturbance the system must generate a response to 
maintain a stable output. This is known as requisite variety and is often stated as ‘only variety can destroy 
variety’ (1956). Variety is the number of possible states of a system (Ashby, 1956), and the variety of 
disturbances may originate outside or inside the system - referred to as External ( EV ) and Internal Variety 
( IV ) respectively. Achieving requisite variety necessitates that the regulator must sense the incoming variety 
and have a large enough variety of responses ( RV ) to deal with the disturbances. Mathematically, this is 
expressed as: RIE VVV ≤+ . Beer (1959) was the first to extend cybernetics to management and others have 
followed (e.g. Beer, 1985; Green and Welsh, 1988; Turnbull, 2002).  
3.4 Integration of these Theories 
This research applies strategic choice and institutional theories, and Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety in 
order to help understand the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance. The three theories 
operate under different, partially-overlapping theoretical assumptions, and thus each theory gives only a 
limited explanation of the whole phenomena regarding the antecedents to board IT governance and its 
consequences. 
Strategic choice and institutional theories offer complementary views of why boards decide to become 
involved in the governance of IT. Proponents of these theories have noted the need to apply both these 
theories together to understand organizational behavior and that one of these theories – either a purely 
deterministic or non-deterministic perspective – would be insufficient for explaining organizational behavior 
(e.g. Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Oliver, 1991). According to Oliver (1991) “The major criticisms of institutional 
theory have been its assumptions of organizational passivity and its failure to address strategic behavior and 
the exercise of influence in its conceptions of institutionalization” (p. 173). Also, as discussed in the 
overview of strategic choice, the theory has evolved from its original conception of decision-makers’ choice 
                                                                                                                                                                        
2 Adapted from Scott (1987). 
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to extend to the environment within which the organization is operating. Thus, organizational structure and 
design would be a factor of both characteristics of decision-makers’ and environmental conditions. 
Institutional and strategic choice theories have primarily been applied in the context of organizational 
structures; however, these theories have also been applied together in the context of corporate governance 
(Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). According to Judge and Zeithaml (1992), a board’s response to an environment 
depends on the institutional pressures an organization faces and the strategic judgment of top management.  
Strategic choice theory also offers a view of the consequences of board IT governance. This theory has 
been applied in the context of the performance outcomes associated with corporate governance (Judge and 
Zeithaml, 1992); however, a review of the literature did not find any studies that applied this theory to 
examine the performance outcomes of board IT governance. Additionally, this research proposes that 
strategic choice theory does not adequately consider all of the consequences of board IT governance because 
it does not incorporate the concept of ‘fit’ between role of IT and board IT governance approach into the 
extent of consequences. Therefore, this research integrates strategic choice theory with Ashby’s Law of 
Requisite Variety to study this relationship. Ashby’s Law provides a useful framework to analyze the impact 
of ‘fit’ on performance. IT governance is an evolving process and requires responses from the board 
(regulator) for the incoming disturbances from the organization, management, industry, or other parties such 
as competitors, in order to effectively govern IT and improve firm performance (requisite variety). The 
regulator is essential for the system to be able to control for a stable outcome. However, according to Ashby, 
the capacity of the regulator cannot exceed its capacity as a channel of communication (1956). This means 
that the capacity of the board to receive, interpret and communicate information determines the capacity of 
the board as a regulator. Therefore, the type and number of disturbances with respect to IT, for example in 
the case of organizations that rely strategically versus operationally on IT, determine the capacity of the 
regulator needed to achieve a stable output (i.e. enhanced firm performance). 
In summary, in this research, strategic choice theory is used to examine the relationship between board 
attributes and board IT governance, and institutional theory is used to examine the relationship between 
organization factors and board IT governance. Furthermore, strategic choice theory supports the relationship 
between board IT governance and firm performance. Finally, Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety offers 
support for why not just greater board IT governance, but more appropriate board IT governance (‘fit’), 
positively influences firm performance. These theories and how they led to the development of the 




Chapter 4  
Theoretical Framework and Propositions 
The theoretical framework developed and tested in this research is shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 4 - Theoretical Framework: Antecedents and Consequences of Board IT Governance 
 
 
This chapter discusses the four major constructs of this framework: board attributes, organization factors, 
board IT governance, and firm performance, and describes the proposed relationship among them. The 
propositions are organized into two categories: (1) the antecedents to board IT governance, and; (2) the 
consequences of board IT governance. This chapter starts by defining the board IT governance construct and 
then moves on to discuss the propositions. 
4.1 Board IT Governance 
Review of the governance literature did not find any studies that examined board IT governance directly in 
an empirical study; therefore, the more general corporate governance literature was reviewed to determine 
how boards conduct corporate governance. It was found that the majority of prior research in corporate 
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governance has focused on board and organizational attributes as proxies for board processes, and the 
relationship between these proxies and overall financial performance. Interestingly, prior research has 
seldom directly examined how boards conduct corporate governance. It has been suggested that this lack of 
attention to the processes of corporate governance may be why contradictions and unanswered questions 
appear in board research (Johnson et al, 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
A review of the corporate governance literature revealed four studies which have explored the construct of 
board involvement directly in empirical studies. In the first study Judge and Zeithaml (1992) used a multi-
item scale to measure the level of board involvement on two dimensions: the formation of new strategic 
decisions, and the evaluation of prior strategic decisions. However, this scale only operationalized board 
involvement in strategic decision making, and did not measure the oversight function of the board. In the 
second study Johnson et al. (1993) examined board involvement in corporate restructuring. A 7-point Likert 
scale was used to measure board involvement; however, their measure was limited to board involvement in 
restructuring and acquisitions. In the third study Westphal (1999) measured board involvement as the extent 
to which the board is involved in monitoring and provides advice and counsel. This appears to have been the 
first study that directly examined the boards’ oversight and strategic roles; however, this measure of board 
involvement was limited because it simply asks whether the two roles are performed by the board and what 
is meant by these functions is left up to the interpretation of the respondent. The fourth study attempted to 
alleviate these limitations by operationalizing board involvement as a multi-dimensional construct with three 
underlying dimensions: time, information and expertise (Baack, 2000). 
Building upon these studies, this research develops a board IT governance construct and generates its 
measures using actual directors’ behaviors and actions in IT strategic decision making and oversight of IT. 
By creating objective criteria for measuring board involvement, this model examines what is happening at 
the board level, rather than relying exclusively on proxy variables (e.g. board size or proportion of insiders) 
as indicators of what might or could be happening.  
Board IT governance is defined as the level of involvement in offensive and defensive governance of IT 
activities. The distinction of “offensive” versus “defensive” IT governance was introduced by Nolan and 
McFarlan’s contingency model of board IT governance (2005). Offensive IT governance is needed when the 
organization relies on IT for its competitive edge, and defensive IT governance is needed when the 
organization relies on IT for operations. For example, offensive IT governance involves ensuring that there 
are processes in place to enable the discovery and execution of any strategic IT opportunities. Whereas 




The research propositions in this dissertation are organized into two categories: (1) Antecedents to Board 
IT governance - Propositions 1-8, and; (2) Consequences of IT Governance - Propositions 9-14. 
4.2 Antecedents to Board IT Governance 
No empirical studies examining the antecedents of board IT governance were found in the literature. 
Therefore, based on findings in the normative and descriptive board IT governance and the corporate 
governance literature, and using strategic choice and institutional theories, this research examines the 
relationship between board attributes, organizational factors and board IT governance (Figure 5). 
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4.2.1 Board Attributes and Board IT Governance 
This research uses strategic choice theory to propose relationships between board attributes and board IT 
governance (Figure 5). The focus in strategic choice theory is on those in an organization who possess 
decision-making power and it is implicit that not all organizational actors have the power to affect change. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to study the board of directors as this powerful group because they have the 
authority to decide what their role will be in IT governance, and this role may ultimately impact how IT is 
governed in the organization. Although prior research has not applied this theory to IT governance, strategic 
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choice theory would suggest that board composition may influence the boards’ fulfillment of different roles 
and that boards can enhance the quality of IT governance by participating in the process and contributing 
their experience and expertise in particular areas (e.g. industry knowledge, risks, strategy and best practices 
in business and IT). 
Board attributes refer to characteristics of the board: the proportion of insiders to outsiders, board size and 
the IT competency of directors. Each of these characteristics is discussed in turn. 
4.2.1.1 Proportion of Insiders 
Inside directors are those members of the board who are employed as part of the organization’s management 
team, their subordinates, relatives, or managers of the organization’s subsidiaries. Also, these directors could 
be members of the organization’s immediate past management team (Cochrane et al, 1985).  
The proportion of inside directors appears to have been one of the most commonly studied variables in the 
corporate governance literature. Central to much of the research examining the relationship between insiders 
and board involvement and firm performance is the idea that the interests of insiders and outsiders may 
diverge. The interests of insiders are proposed to be aligned with those of management, while those of 
outsiders are aligned with stockholders. So whereas insiders may be more likely to pursue strategies 
consistent with maximizing the size and diversity of the firm, outsiders may be more likely to pursue 
strategies consistent with maximizing the long-run profitability of the firm (Hill and Snell, 1988). 
In the literature reviewed, the study of the relationship between insiders and board governance has yielded 
mixed results. Judge and Zeithaml (1992) and Baack (2000) found a negative relationship between insider 
representation and board involvement; however, Westphal (1999) found that insiders can increase board 
involvement by raising the frequency of advice and counsel interactions between CEOs and outside 
directors.  
Conflicting results have also been found in reviews of the predominant research area which has studied the 
relationship between insiders, as proxies for board involvement, and financial performance (e.g. Molz, 1988; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989). For example, in studies of 200 manufacturing firms (Vance, 1955) and 406 Fortune 
500 firms (Cochran et al, 1985) positive relationships were found between the proportion of insiders on a 
board and financial performance. However, in studies of 80 chemical companies (Schmidt, 1975), 21 pairs 
(successful/failing) of retail firms (Chaganti et al, 1985), and 100 Fortune 500 companies (Zahra and 
Stanton, 1988) no relationships were found between insiders and financial performance. In addition, 
contradictory findings have been found. In studies of 266 major corporations (Baysinger and Butler, 1985) 
and 536 firms (Schellenger et al., 1989) it was found that the proportion of outsiders on boards was 
positively related to financial performance. 
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As this review shows, it remains unclear what impact the proportion of insiders has on board involvement 
in governance. However, the use of strategic choice theory as the lens through which to study this 
relationship has made this relationship clearer. 
The literature draws attention to the relevance of information for the exercise of strategic choice and points 
to the necessity of securing relevant information that is not ambiguous. Child (1997) argued that the degree 
of strategic choice may be constrained by limited or ambiguous information. Furthermore, Judge and 
Zeithaml (1992) argued that according to strategic choice theory a large proportion of insiders may raise the 
level of information flows within the boardroom and thus enable directors to be more involved in 
governance. This research proposes that this argument holds for board IT governance, and that insiders have 
relevant knowledge of IT and business activities that allows them to notify the board about organizational 
issues that necessitate board IT governance. For example, insiders may be able to alert the board to IT risks 
that pose a threat to the organization and thus require board oversight and input. Therefore, it is proposed 
that: 
Proposition 1: Insider representation is positively related to board IT governance. 
4.2.1.2 Board Size 
Board size is another of the most commonly studied variables in the corporate governance literature. While 
board size has been the subject of extensive research, only one study could be found in the literature which 
directly studied the relationship between board size and board involvement in corporate governance. In that 
study, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) found a negative relationship between these variables. In the predominant 
research area studying the relationship between board size and firm performance, inconsistent relationships 
have been found. For example, in a study of 46 non-profit agencies Provan (1980) found that board size and 
performance were positively related; however, in a study of 100 Fortune 500 firms Zahra and Stanton (1988) 
found that board size was not associated with performance, and in a study of 452 large industrial companies 
Yermack (1996) found a negative association between board size and firm performance.  
Strategic choice theory focuses on management’s perceptions of environmental conditions and its ability 
to make decisions that cope with those conditions (Miles and Snow, 1978). With respect to IT governance, 
strategic choice theory would suggest that the degree and type of board involvement will depend on the 
ability of the board to work together to effectively debate and discuss the organization’s IT. However, group 
dynamics literature suggests larger board size impedes debate and discussion on the board (Harrison, 1987). 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggested that board size should be limited to ten directors with eight or nine 
being preferable. They argued that when a board has more than ten members it becomes more difficult for 
them to express their ideas and opinions because like any group of individuals working together they must be 
cohesive in order to be able to communicate with each other and reach consensus among the group. They 
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suggested that since boards spend a limited amount of time together, a smaller board would enable directors 
to get to know each other and encourage their contribution to deliberations. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Proposition 2: Board size is negatively related to board IT governance. 
4.2.1.3 IT Competency 
This research defines IT competency as the extent to which a board has IT expertise and uses IT governance 
mechanisms to govern IT. It is proposed that while these concepts are separate, both are required for IT 
competency.  
IT competency at the board level is examined and multi-level measures for this construct are introduced. 
The inclusion of the IT expertise construct in the theoretical framework as a dimension of IT competency is 
motivated by the IT governance literature which has suggested that many boards seem to be falling short in 
their IT governance responsibilities because of a knowledge deficit (e.g. Burson-Marsteller, 2005; Huff et 
al., 2006; Jordan and Musson, 2004; Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). The inclusion of the IT governance 
mechanisms construct as a dimension of IT competency is motivated by the IT governance literature which 
has recommended the use of such mechanisms at the board level (e.g. ITGI, 2003; Nolan and McFarlan, 
2005), and at the organizational level (e.g. DeHaes and VanGrembergen, 2005, 2008; Peterson, 2003; Weil 
and Ross, 2004). 
This section starts with a discussion of IT expertise, this is followed by a discussion of IT governance 
mechanisms, and the section concludes with a proposition on IT competency driven by the strategic choice 
perspective.  
IT Expertise – An expert is defined as “one with the special skill or knowledge representing mastery of a 
particular subject” (Merriam-Webster). Expertise refers to “the characteristics, skills, and knowledge that 
distinguish experts from novices and less experienced people” (Ericsson, 2006). The differences between 
experts’ and novices’ decision-making abilities may be most evident in the solving of ill-structured 
problems. In a review of the literature on ill-structured problems, Voss and Post (1988) suggested that 
“…many problems of the world are presented as ill-structured problems, but become well-structured in the 
hands of the problem solver” (p. 262). Thus, they emphasized the role of the solver as a provider of the 
organization and suggested that:   
“experts should excel with respect to two particular aspects of such solving 
– namely, that they should be better able than novices to decompose an ill-
structured problem into appropriate sub problems; and similarly, that they 
should be better able to select parameter values for open constraints in a 




Many of the problems faced in IT governance would be considered to be ill-structured and are 
characterized by ambiguous problem situations and where the possible responses are not known to the 
decision-maker. This research’s analysis of board-level making of ill-structured IT governance decisions will 
possibly be the first attempt at studying how directors represent such problems and search for solutions.  
The positive relationship between expertise and level of decision-making ability has been well established 
in the management literature (e.g. Liao, 2003; Wagner and Sternberg, 1985, 1991; Cianciolo et al, 2006). 
However, the research suggests that an expert who is skilled in one domain cannot transfer the skill to 
another (Glasser and Chi, 1988). This emphasizes the need for the study of experts in a particular context. 
Unfortunately, there has been limited study of expertise at the board level. In the corporate governance 
literature it seems that the study of expertise has been limited primarily to expertise of audit committee 
members (e.g. DeZoort, 1997; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001) or to high-level measures acting as a proxy for 
types of expertise, such as the ratio of insiders to outsiders on the board or the background of directors 
(Leblanc, 2003). In the IT governance literature, one study has empirically examined the relationship 
between board IT expertise and firm performance (Boritz and Lim, 2007). A positive relationship was found; 
however, that study did not use direct measures of expertise, instead using high-level measures of expertise 
obtained from proxy statements (e.g. IT-related college degrees or previous work in a public IT firm), and 
the study did not examine the relationship between expertise and board IT governance. 
IT Governance Mechanisms - The second component of board IT competency is IT governance 
mechanisms. It is proposed that IT governance mechanisms increase the capacity of the board to acquire, 
interpret and disseminate information, thus increasing the ability of the board to govern IT. While IT 
governance mechanisms have been studied at the organization level, this is the first study to 
comprehensively explore the use of IT governance mechanism at the board level. 
At the managerial level, it has been proposed that IT governance can be enacted using a variety of IT 
governance mechanisms - structures, processes and relational mechanisms (e.g. DeHaes and 
VanGrembergen, 2005, 2008; Peterson, 2003; Weil and Ross, 2004). Structures include “structural (formal) 
devices and mechanisms for connecting and enabling horizontal, or liaison, contacts between business and IT 
management (decision-making) functions” (Peterson, 2003). IT governance processes refer to “formalization 
and institutionalization of strategic IT decision making or IT monitoring procedures” (Peterson, 2003). 
Relational mechanisms refer to “the active participation of, and collaborative relationship among, corporate 
executives, IT management, and business management” (Peterson, 2003). Examples of IT governance 
mechanisms are outlined in Table 3.  
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Table 3 – IT governance mechanisms
3
 
Structures Roles and responsibilities, IT organization structure, CIO on Board, IT strategy committee, IT steering 
committee 
Processes Strategic Information Systems Planning, Balanced (IT) Scorecards, Information Economics, Service 
Level Agreements, COBIT and ITIL, IT alignment / governance maturity models 
Relational 
Mechanisms 
Active participation and collaboration between principle stakeholders, Partnership rewards and 
incentives, Business/IT co-location, Cross-functional business/IT training and rotation 
 
Literature which has focused on board-level governance has recommended a number of IT governance 
mechanisms for the board, including: forming an IT Strategy Committee; engaging outside experts; 
reviewing and critiquing IT strategy projects and IT security practices; holding sessions with the CFO, and; 
holding executive sessions with committee members (ITGI, 2003; Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). However, 
only one study was found which empirically examined two of these board-level IT governance mechanisms. 
Boritz and Lim (2007) examined the impact of the presence of a CIO and IT Strategy Committee on 
financial performance. They found that boards that had these mechanisms had superior financial 
performance. However, there is limited understanding of how or when these mechanisms are effectively 
incorporated in board decision-making. Furthermore, research has revealed that it might be necessary to 
directly measure IT governance mechanisms and to examine their influence on actual board IT governance – 
not just on financial performance – because it is unclear how these mechanisms impact board IT governance. 
For example, a field study of a Belgian financial group found that  even though the company had an IT 
Strategy Committee it “did not enable a more thorough and ongoing involvement of boards in IT 
governance” (DeHaes and VanGrembergen, 2005, p. 5).  
IT Competency and Strategic Choice Theory – As discussed in the previous chapter, external constraints 
(environmental determinism) are insufficient for explaining decision-makers capacities for exercising choice, 
and that one must also consider the characteristics of the decision-maker (action determinism) (Whittington, 
1998). Action determinism suggests that predetermined mind-sets could limit the range of strategic choices 
recognized and considered by decision-makers.  For example, Johnson (1987) found that the managers of a 
clothing firm had problems adjusting to a new competitive situation because their mind-set tended toward 
stability, and thus this inhibited their ability to make strategic choices that were necessary for a new 
situation. Dutton (1993) coined this “automatic strategic issue diagnosis” and suggested that decision-makers 
activate ready-made categories for issues and they respond with ready-made responses based upon issues 
they have encountered in the past. This places emphasis on the importance of the cognition of decision-
makers when considering the extent of strategic choice. For example, Wiersema and Bantel (1992) found 
that top management teams with higher educational levels and training, among other characteristics were 
                                                   
3 Adapted from Peterson (2003). 
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more likely to exercise strategic choice by undergoing changes in corporate strategy. Therefore according to 
action determinism, IT expertise may push back limits on the exercise of choice by decision-makers. 
In addition to IT expertise, IT governance mechanisms may also impact strategic choice because “strategic 
choice is recognized and realized through a process whereby those with the power to make decisions for the 
organization interact among themselves … with other organizational members and with external parties” 
(Child, 1997, p. 60). Child (1997) argued that the possibilities for interactions are framed by existing 
structures, both within and without the organization and thus have “structured limits”. Furthermore, strategic 
choice theorists suggest that social networks enable the acquisition of knowledge by organizations and the 
exchange of information. Therefore, structures, processes and relational mechanism may enable decision-
makers to access relevant information in a timely fashion, and expertise may enable the decision-makers to 
deal with the information when making strategic choices. 
In summary, board decisions are strategic in nature and when faced with such decisions, decision makers 
typically perceive only selected alternatives and adopt a simplified model of the situation which is largely 
shaped by their prior knowledge and experience (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). Accordingly, from a 
strategic choice perspective, broad-based and firm-specific IT expertise provides directors with the 
knowledge and experience needed to determine what IT activities should be governed and how they should 
be governed. It is proposed that as directors develop IT expertise they are likely to also enhance their ability 
to challenge, question, or probe management regarding IT activities, and that IT expertise enables directors 
to know what questions to ask and to understand the response. However, it is proposed that IT expertise is 
not sufficient for IT governance because it is likely that a particular board decision has never previously been 
addressed and in the face of uncertainty directors may need to seek the advice of other directors, 
management or other advisors through established IT governance mechanisms or may need to use 
established processes to provide oversight of IT activities and input into strategic decision making. This 
research proposes that IT governance mechanism increase the information sources thereby enabling directors 
to obtain more IT information both inside and outside of the organization, and thus increase the board’s 
capacity to govern IT. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Proposition 3: IT competency is positively related to board IT governance. 
4.2.2 Organization Factors and Board IT Governance 
This research uses institutional theory to propose relationships between organizational factors and board IT 
governance (Figure 5). It is proposed that, in addition to rational pressures, institutional factors have an 
influence on board involvement in IT governance. 
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Organizational factors refer to the size of the organization, the age of the organization and the role of IT in 
the organization. Each of these factors is discussed in turn.  
4.2.2.1 Organization Size 
The relationship between organization size and board involvement does not appear to have been studied in 
IT governance; however, it has been studied in the corporate governance literature. Baack (2000) found a 
positive relationship between organization size and board involvement in corporate governance. In another 
study, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) examined the relationship between the structural differentiation of 
organizations and board involvement in corporate governance. This is relevant because larger organization 
size has been suggested to be associated with increased structural differentiation (Blau, 1970). Judge and 
Zeithaml (1992) found that increased differentiation was negatively associated with board involvement. 
They used institutional theory to explain the relationship between differentiation and board involvement and 
suggested that “an organization’s level of diversification will be negatively associated with board 
involvement because isomorphic pressures should be more diffuse for diversified firms than for non-
diversified ones” (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, p. 773).  
A similar argument has been made in the organizational literature with respect to differentiated 
organizations’ resistance to institutional pressures. Oliver (1991) argued that differentiated organizations do 
not have environments that are interconnected, and this impedes the “spread of institutional consensus and 
conformity” (p. 171). Interconnectedness refers to “the density of inter-organizational relations” (Oliver, 
1991, p. 170), and institutional and resource dependence theorists suggest that interconnectedness facilitates 
the voluntary diffusion of norms, values, and shared information (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Oliver (1991) argued that “organizations are more likely to 
accede to the values or requirements of the institutional environment when this environment is highly 
interconnected….because highly interconnected environments provide relational channels through which 
institutional norms can be diffused” (p. 171).  
This research uses organization size as a proxy for level of differentiation, and thus views larger 
organizations as more differentiated. In terms of board involvement in IT governance, the larger the 
organization, and thus the more differentiated, the less the pressures to adopt any one particular IT 
governance activity. This may occur because an organization operates in more than one industry, regulatory 
or legal environment, or geographic area and it is not likely to be interconnected and have channels that 
share institutional pressures. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Proposition 4: Organization size is negatively related to board IT governance.  
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4.2.2.2 Organization Age 
It has been suggested that organizational processes reflect the practices at the time of founding because the 
organization adopts the predominant practices in that time, furthermore, since organizational processes 
change slowly many of the practices remain unchanged from the time of organization founding.  
This concept was first discussed by Stinchcombe (1965). He suggested that “the organizational inventions 
that can be made at a particular time in history depend on the social technology available at the time” (p. 
153). He commented how certain types of institutions were founded at the same time (i.e. savings bank -
1830s, universities - 1870-1900, and unions - civil war, 20th century), and that certain structural 
characteristics of a type of organization were stable over time. He found that organizations that were formed 
at one time typically had a different social structure from those formed at another time. In examination of 
industries in the United States by age of industry classification – from pre-factory to modern – he found a 
strong correlation between the age at which industries were developed and their structure at the present time. 
More recent studies have also found a relationship between time of founding and organization structure. 
For example, organization age has been shown to effect organization processes such as compensation 
practices (Eisenhardt, 1988), and amount of autonomy in choosing organizational structures (Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1983).  
According to this view, board activities, and thus board IT governance, reflect a pattern of doing things 
that evolve over time and become legitimated within the board and the organization. Board activities are then 
resistant to change even in the face of major changes in the organization, such as the emergence of the 
strategic importance of IT. Although institutional theory has not been applied to board IT governance in 
prior research, from this perspective, organization history will impact board activities, so if boards have not 
governed IT in the past then this becomes legitimated and it is less likely that they will govern IT in the 
immediate future. 
The only study found to examine the effect of organization age on board processes reported that age was 
positively related to board involvement (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). This finding is interesting because it 
was opposite to the relationship which was proposed by the authors. They proposed that because older 
organizations were formed at a time when pressures for board involvement in strategic decision making were 
weaker, institutional theory would suggest that boards of older organizations would not be as involved in 
strategic decision as boards of newer organizations. Since that study only examined 42 boards and only 
looked at one board process - involvement in strategic decision making (and not involvement in oversight) – 
further research is needed to investigate the relationship between organization age and governance. This 
research proposes that the institutional perspective holds and a board’s current practices would reflect those 
at the time of founding . Therefore, it is proposed that: 
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Proposition 5: Organization age is negatively related to board IT governance.  
4.2.2.3 Role of IT 
The normative IT governance literature recommends a view of board involvement contingent on the 
organization’s use of, and dependence on IT (ITGI, 2003; Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). Nolan and 
McFarlan’s IT Strategic Impact Grid (2005) proposes a model of board IT governance contingent upon the 
organization’s operational versus strategic reliance on IT. For example, organizations in the Strategic Mode 
(upper right-hand corner of the IT Strategic Impact Grid – Figure 3) would require more board oversight of 
IT and input into strategic decision-making than an organization in Support Mode (lower left-hand corner of 
the IT Strategic Impact Grid) because the organization in Strategic Mode would rely on IT to maintain its 
current operations and to achieve a competitive edge, whereas the organization in Support Mode would not 
significantly rely on IT for current or future operations and thus board involvement required would be 
minimal. 
It has been proposed in the literature that the level and type of reliance on IT would be relatively 
consistent across an industry. For example, financial services firms would likely have high operational and 
strategic reliance on IT (i.e. classified in the Strategic Mode); whereas, primary resources firms would likely 
have a relatively low operational and strategic reliance on IT (i.e. classified in the Support Mode). This 
industry-wide similarity in terms of degree of reliance on IT was reaffirmed in a study of eight financial 
services firms and nine primary resources companies where it was found that overall financial services firms 
had high operational and strategic reliance on IT, but primary resources firms had relatively no reliance on 
IT (Huff et al., 2006).  
Institutional theorists have suggested that organizations may seek external legitimacy by adopting the 
structural features of the industry. For example, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) found that even though 
voluntary hospitals in the US are not required to receive accreditation from the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals, most seek out such legitimization. Also, Singh et al. (1986) found that voluntary 
social service agencies who adopted external authorization mechanisms had significantly higher survival 
rates than those that did not adopt such mechanisms. 
Since institutional theory would suggest that industry norms influence organizational processes through 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and organizations with a high reliance on IT would likely be 
operating in an industry which also relies highly on IT, the industry norm would likely be higher board 
involvement in IT governance. Furthermore, industry norms in board IT governance, predicated by the role 
of IT (operational versus strategic reliance), would influence the board IT governance approach (defensive 
versus offensive). Therefore, it is proposed that: 
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Proposition 6: The operational reliance on IT in the organization is positively related to board defensive 
IT governance.  
Proposition 7: The strategic reliance on IT in the organization is positively related to board offensive IT 
governance.  
Proposition 8: The overall role of IT in the organization is positively related to board IT governance.  
4.3 Consequences of Board IT Governance 
The second category of propositions examines the performance consequences of board IT governance. 
Organizations are spending an increasing amount on IT, with the median level of spending on IT reaching 
1.8% of revenues for organizations in the US (Computer Economics, 2007); however, a large percentage of 
these IT investments fail to deliver their intended return. In recent years, studies have suggested the need for 
effective board-level IT governance in order to realize value from IT (e.g. Buckby et al., 2005; ITGI, 2003; 
Nolan and McFarlan, 2005; Trites, 2004), but the relationship between board IT governance and IT value has 
not been empirically tested until this research.  
The propositions regarding the consequences of board IT governance address two main arguments. The 
first addresses the performance consequences associated with the amount of board IT governance, and the 
second addresses the appropriateness of board IT governance.  
As shown in Figure 5, strategic choice theory is used to develop Propositions 9 and 10 regarding the 
relationship between amount of board IT governance and firm performance, and Ashby’s Law of Requisite 
Variety is used to develop Propositions 11 to 14 regarding the relationship between the appropriateness of 
board IT governance and firm performance. 
Two measures of firm performance are used: financial performance and operational performance. The 
rationale for the selection of these two measures is discussed in Chapter 7, section 7.2.3. 
4.3.1 Amount of Board IT Governance and Firm Performance 
An empirical study directly examining the consequences of board IT governance was not found during the 
literature review; however, evidence from a recent study on the relationship between proxies for board IT 
governance and performance suggests that a positive relationship does exist (Boritz and Lim, 2007). In fact, 
there is empirical support for a positive relationship between board involvement in corporate governance and 
financial performance (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992) and between proxies for board involvement in governance 
and firm performance (refer to Zahra and Pearce (1989) for a review).  
According to strategic choice theory, organizational strategy and its processes affect firm performance 
(Miles and Snow, 1978). It has been argued that increased board involvement improves organizational 
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strategy and its processes by “forcing managers to check their assumptions and do their homework before 
advancing strategic proposals”, and by “helping to challenge narrow thinking, escalating commitment, and 
weak analysis” (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, p. 775). Furthermore, there is some research that indicates when 
boards provide richer information; management is more likely to engage in behaviors that are consistent with 
stockholders interests (Richardson, 2000). Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Proposition 9: Board IT governance is positively related to financial performance.  
Proposition 10: Board IT governance is positively related to operational performance. 
4.3.2 Appropriateness of Board IT Governance and Firm Performance 
The relationship between overall board IT governance and firm performance may hold; however, it is 
proposed that this relationship may only hold under certain conditions. This research proposes that role of IT 
in the organization moderates the relationship between board IT governance and firm performance (Figure 
5). 
This part of the theoretical framework relates board IT governance to Ashby’s cybernetic concept of 
control and proposes that board IT governance impacts firm performance by increasing the board’s ability to 
respond to disturbances in the environment and therefore increases the board’s ability to control the 
organization’s outcomes. It is not sufficient to have more IT governance, but rather to have more appropriate 
IT governance, and it is proposed that the type of board IT governance needed, and thus the impact on firm 
performance, is contingent on the role of IT in the organization.  
Following Nolan and McFarlan’s IT Strategic Impact Grid (2005), this research proposes that an 
organization which relies strategically on IT should practice offensive board IT governance; whereas an 
organization which relies operationally on IT for operations should practice defensive board IT governance. 
Using Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety it is proposed that a fit between the type of board IT governance 
needed, as dictated by the role of IT in the organization, and the type of board IT governance practiced will 
positively influence performance. Expressed in terms of Ashby’s Law it is contended that the variety of IT 
governance activities available to directors, either offensive or defensive, enables them to sense a potential 
deviation from the goal (i.e. effective IT governance and improved firm performance) and to make more 
accurate and complex analyses of problems to respond to the deviation, and thus leads to an increase in 
achievement of goals. For example, the board of an insurance company that has a high reliance on IT for 
operations would need defensive board IT governance. Defensive IT governance activities could include 
oversight of the reliability, privacy and security of the systems and making sure that management has 
processes in place to ensure that IT resources are available to support IT in the organization. However, an 
organization with a similar reliance on IT, but who’s board does not practice defensive IT governance, would 
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be more likely to be in a situation where the risks associated with IT are not addressed and a problem could 
occur (e.g. proprietary information compromised). 
Since organizations vary in their IT governance needs, it follows that the impact of the type of board IT 
governance on firm performance will depend on the importance of IT to the organization. Consequently, the 
performance impacts of offensive board IT governance are amplified for organizations in which there is a 
strategic reliance on IT, and the impacts of defensive board IT governance are amplified for organization in 
which there is an operational reliance on IT. Therefore, it is proposed that:  
Proposition 11: The positive relationship between offensive board IT governance and financial 
performance will be significant in organizations characterized with high strategic reliance on IT, but not in 
organizations characterized with low strategic reliance on IT.  
Proposition 12: The positive relationship between offensive board IT governance and operational 
performance will be significant in organizations characterized with high strategic reliance on IT, but not in 
organizations characterized with low strategic reliance on IT. 
Proposition 13: The positive relationship between defensive board IT governance and financial 
performance will be significant in organizations characterized with high operational reliance on IT, but not 
in organizations characterized with low operational reliance on IT.  
Proposition 14: The positive relationship between defensive board IT governance and operational 
performance will be significant in organizations characterized with high operational reliance on IT, but not 




Research Methodology and Analysis 
5.1 Phase One – Interviews with Directors 
The first phase of the field research was qualitative, and consisted of both semi-structured questions on 
boards’ general approaches to IT governance, and a discussion of IT governance decisions with which the 
board was involved.  
The discussion of the IT governance decision was guided by the Critical Decision Method (CDM). CDM 
builds upon Flanagan’s Critical Incident Technique (1954), by not only having experts recall and retrospect 
about previously encountered critical incidents, but by also using “a set of probe questions to elicit specific 
information about the important cues, choice points, options, action plans and the role of experience in 
judgment and decision making” (Hoffman et al, 1998, p. 257). The application of CDM has been found 
effective in uncovering expert knowledge and reasoning strategies in domains from nursing to the military to 
management (Ross et al, 2006). The use of CDM enabled a preliminary investigation of the context-
dependent situation of board IT governance decision-making. Observation of study subjects making 
decisions in their natural setting is often used to study context-dependent situations such as expertise and 
decision-making; however, CDM was selected as the research method for this research instead of the 
observation method because of the difficulty of gaining access to board meetings due to confidentiality and 
other concerns. CDM was also selected because, according to Klein et al. (1989), CDM does not require an 
extensive amount of time with a domain expert to elicit knowledge, and time was at a premium given the 
schedule of the interview targets. Also, CDM, unlike other expert elicitation approaches, does not require 
extensive front-end effort in understanding the domain. This is important for elicitation of board knowledge 
because access to extensive information on the board or their activities was limited. Briefly, CDM was 
carried out as follows: (1) the critical incident was selected by the interviewee; (2) I asked for a brief 
description of the incident; (3) I used semi-structured questions to probe different aspects of the decision 
making process (e.g. cues used to make the decision) and outcomes of the decision (e.g. performance 
outcomes). 
The interviews were audio-taped, transcribed and analyzed using a consistent schema that was developed 
based upon the theoretical framework. The interview data was analyzed with respect to the variables in the 
theoretical framework in order to determine the values for each of the variables. Then the data for each of the 
variables was used to reflect upon the theoretical framework.  
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The semi-structured questions and the discussion of an IT governance decision enabled the capture of 
descriptions of how these boards actually govern IT and the antecedents and performance consequences of 
their actions. Literature findings were triangulated with the interview observations to increase the 
understanding of board IT governance and facilitate the development of measures for the study’s constructs 
and the establishment of construct validity. This phase also enabled a preliminary assessment of the 
theoretical framework.  
5.2 Phase Two - Survey of Directors 
The second phase of the field research consisted of a survey of directors. This quantitative phase was 
informed by findings from the interviews conducted in the first phase. The survey enabled analysis of broad 
relationships between the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance. 
Ordinary Least Squares multiple regression was used to analyze the results; however, since the variables 
consisted of measured and latent variables, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was first conducted on the 
latent variables to analyze the sets of items that measure those constructs. EFA is useful for data reduction by 
condensing the information contained in a number of original variables into a smaller set of new, composite 
dimensions, with a minimum loss of information (Hair et al, 1998).  
EFA based on the Maximum Likelihood Extraction method, combined with varimax rotation was used for 
each of the latent variables. Convergent and discriminatory validity tests were performed on the factors to 
assess construct validity. Convergent validity is testing whether the measures of constructs that theoretically 
should be related to each other are, in fact, observed to be related to each other. In other words, it assesses 
the degree to which multiple measures of the same concept are correlated. High correlations indicate that the 
scale is measuring its intended concept (Hair et al, 1998). It is argued that correlations above 0.4 indicate 
good convergent validity (Hayes, 1998). Discriminatory validity is testing whether measures of constructs 
that theoretically should not be related to each other are, in fact, observed to not be related to each other. In 
other words, it is the opposite of convergent validity. Therefore, both convergent and discriminatory validity 
are present when each item loads highest on its related factor and loads very low on unrelated factors. 
In addition, Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated for the factors to assess internal consistency reliability. In 
internal consistency reliability estimation, the reliability of the factors are assessed by estimating how well 
the items that reflect the same construct yield similar results. In other words, how consistent the results are 
for different items for the same construct within the measure being assessed. Cronbach's Alpha tends to be 
the most frequently used estimate of internal consistency. Values of Cronbach’s alpha range from 0 to 1, 




Overall, the combination of richer qualitative results from interviews and the objective survey results 
provided both valuable insights on how and why boards enact different types of IT governance in different 
situations and the possible resulting impacts. 
Chapter 6 discusses the interviews conducted in phase one of the data collection process, Chapter 7 then 




Chapter 6  
Phase One – Interviews with Directors 
As noted in Huff et al. (2006), there appears to be little understanding of how boards govern IT. There were 
only three academic studies found in the literature which have directly examined how boards govern IT and 
there are many unanswered questions (refer to Table 1). Therefore, 10 in-depth interviews were conducted 
with corporate directors to probe how they govern IT, what influences their involvement in IT governance, 
and what have been the performance consequences.  
The corporate directors were recruited via emails from the Director of Communications and Member 
Services at the Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD) to selected directors of its membership. The ICD 
membership consists of: directors, former directors, and aspiring directors; professionals who advise or serve 
boards such as auditors, legal counsel, pension specialists, management consultants; senior executives who 
report directly to a board member; educators in business schools and other disciplines; and others who have 
demonstrated a commitment to corporate governance. The ICD’s Director of Communications and Member 
Services randomly selected 70 directors from the ICD’s membership in the financial services industry and 35 
directors in the hi-tech and telecommunications industries, these directors were sent an initial email inviting 
them to participate in an interview, and a reminder email was sent one week later. Directors who were 
interested in participating in an interview contacted me directly. Ten directors out of the 105 contacted 
volunteered to participate in the interview process and will be given a report summarizing the main findings 
from the research. 
As shown in Figure 6, the 10 directors interviewed were on a total of 47 boards, with each director on an 
average of five boards. The boards were from a variety of industry sectors, with banks, savings and other 
financial institutions representing the largest proportion of the sample. Additionally, the directors 
interviewed had an average of 13 years experience on boards, and only three out of the 10 identified 
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Each interview took an average of 75 minutes to complete and consisted of an in-depth discussion of one 
IT governance decision and/or incident with which the director was involved while serving on a board, and a 
semi-structured questionnaire to discuss IT governance on all of the boards of which the director was a 
member (refer to Appendix A for the Interview Protocol).  
During the interview each director was asked to provide a novel IT incident with which the board was 
involved, where standard operating procedures could not be used to address the problem, and where the same 
outcome would not have occurred without board involvement. Using CDM, the incident was then discussed 
with the director focusing on understanding and disambiguating the decision-making. Specifically, the 
factors that directors used to identify an incident, such as past experience or discussions with management, 
were probed, the mechanisms used to assess the situation and generate a solution were analyzed, and the 
consequences of the incident were discussed. Finally, a semi-structured questionnaire was completed with 
the director during the interview to identify his/her boards’ general approaches to IT governance.  
6.1 Data Analysis 
The interviews were analyzed using a consistent schema that was developed based upon the theoretical 
framework. First, categories were developed for each variable, then, where necessary, sub-categories were 
developed. The sub-categories were developed for the latent (unmeasured) variables. For example, IT 
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competency was a category that consisted of the sub-categories IT expertise and IT governance mechanisms. 
These sub-categories were then further divided as needed. For example, the sub-category IT expertise was 
divided into IT knowledge, IT experience, and IT education, and the sub-category IT governance 
mechanisms was divided into structures, processes and relational mechanisms. Codes were developed for 
each sub-category and the interview data was coded and assigned to the categories. Next, the coded data for 
each respondent was organized according to the appropriate sub-category and category, and this data was 
used to assign an answer to each question used to measure the variables. The coding methodology and an 
example of the coding are found in Appendix B. Additionally, the critical incidents were analyzed according 
to the type, cause, and consequences of the incident. Finally, within-participant and cross-participant analysis 
was performed.  
The data analysis is presented as follows: 
• Section 6.1.1 Values of Variables - The interview data is analyzed to determine the values for each 
of the variables in the theoretical framework. This analysis helped to determine if the measures of 
the latent variables corroborate the measures presented in the literature. The analysis also enabled 
the further development of measures for use in the survey.  
• Section 6.1.2 Preliminary Confirmation (Disconfirmation) of Theoretical Framework - The interview 
data is analyzed in order to reflect upon the theoretical framework.  
The data analysis is summarized below with the detailed analysis presented in the following sections.  
Analysis of the interview data appeared to provide support for categorizing IT governance activities into 
offensive and defensive groupings. Offensive IT governance focuses on strategic IT issues (communication 
of IT strategy, alignment of business/IT strategies, IT governance self-assessment) versus operational issues 
(IT risk management, oversight of projects and investments) which are the focus of defensive IT governance. 
While there might be some ambiguity in separating the activities into the two groups at a managerial level, 
the separation of activities into strategic and operational at the board level was relatively straightforward. For 
example, strategic activities were future oriented, with much of the focus on planning for future IT functions; 
whereas operational activities were oriented in execution of the current IT functions. The majority of the 
boards’ overall level of offensive IT governance was at least a Medium (13/15 or 87%), with only two 
boards at a low level of offensive governance. Similarly, the majority of the boards’ overall level of 
defensive IT governance was at least a Medium (9/15 or 60%); however, a relatively large number of the 
boards received a rating of Low (6/15 or 40%).  
Analysis of the board attributes in the data revealed the following: 
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• most of the boards discussed in the interviews had a low proportion of insiders (i.e. less than one 
third of the total directors); 
• most of the boards were large (i.e. more than 8 members), and; 
• the boards were evenly split between high and low levels of IT expertise, and the boards were 
evenly split between high, medium and low levels of IT governance mechanisms 
Analysis also appeared to provide support for capturing the level of IT competency for each board using 
multiple questions to measure the presence of IT expertise and IT governance mechanisms. Broadly 
speaking, the interview data suggested that IT expertise may consist of knowledge of IT inside and outside of 
the organization. It also appears that it is possible to capture the extent to which the board receives sufficient 
information and the amount of training in IT and IT governance. Additionally, the interviews revealed that 
IT governance mechanism at the board level may in fact include structures, processes and relational 
mechanisms, and that these mechanisms are enacted inside and outside of the boardroom.  
Analysis of the data revealed the following for the organizational factors: 
• most of the directors interviewed were on boards of large organizations (i.e. greater than 500 
employees); 
• most of the organizations were formed more than 10 years ago, and; 
• most of the organizations rated the role of IT in the organization as high. 
In addition, analysis of the interview data appeared to provide support for Nolan and McFarlan’s (2005) 
categorization of the role of IT along two dimensions – operational reliance on IT and strategic reliance on 
IT.  
Furthermore, as shown in Table 4, the interview data showed mixed support for the proposed relationships 




Table 4 - Summary of Interview Data and Propositions 
Proposition Description of Interview Data Conclusion 
1 Only 47% (7/15) of the boards had the proposed positive relationship between proportion of 
insiders and board IT governance   
 
Not supported 
2 A positive relationship was suggested to exist between board size and IT governance (11/15 or 
73%) 
Contradictory 
3 A positive relationship was suggested to exist between board IT competency and board IT 
governance (12/15 or 80%) 
Supported 
4 A negative relationship was suggested to exist between organization size and board IT 
governance (10/15 or 67%) 
Supported 
5 A negative relationships was suggested to exist between organization age and IT governance 
(11/15 or 73%) 
Supported 
6 A positive relationships was suggested to exist between operational role of IT in the organization 
and defensive board IT governance (10/15 or 67%) 
Supported 
7 A positive relationships was suggested to exist between strategic role of IT in the organization 
and offensive board IT governance (11/15 or 73%) 
Supported 
8 Only 53% (8/15) of the boards tended to have a positive relationship between role of IT in the 
organization and board IT governance 
Not supported 
 
Finally, the interview data did not allow for a detailed examination of the firm performance consequences 
of board IT governance; however, data gathered during the directors’ descriptions of critical IT governance 
decisions that they faced while on boards suggested operational and strategic impacts of IT decisions and 
indicated how board governance, or lack thereof, has impacted firm performance. 
6.1.1 Values of Variables 
Some of the measures of the variables have been adapted from the research literature, and some have been 
created for this study. This section discusses the measures for each variable in the theoretical framework, and 
presents the values for each variable for each board. The discussion starts with the board IT governance 
variable and continues with the independent and dependent variables. 
The values for each variable are reported for each of the 10 directors interviewed. Each director is 
assigned a letter, A to I, to distinguish his/her responses from the others. Most directors answered the 
questions for one board, and thus have one response for each question; however, directors B and H 
responded to the questions for four and three boards respectively and thus have multiple responses for each 
question. Thus, values of the variables are reported for 15 boards based upon the responses of 10 directors. 
Refer to Appendix C for an illustration of how the data is presented. 
6.1.1.1 Board IT governance 
Board IT governance is operationalized as a multi-item involvement measure on two dimensions: offensive 
and defensive IT governance. An effort was made to include IT governance activities from prior literature 
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for each dimension (ITGI, 2003; Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). The analysis of the interview data for 
offensive and defensive IT governance are discussed in turn. 
6.1.1.1.1 Offensive IT governance 
Offensive IT governance focuses on strategic IT issues, such as IT strategy, rather than operational issues, 
such as systems reliability. Three questions were developed to assess a board’s level of offensive IT 
governance: (1) Is IT strategy adequately communicated to the board?; (2) Is business/IT strategic alignment 
adequate?, and; (3) Does the board perform IT governance self-assessment? Each director’s responses to the 
questions can be seen in Appendix C - Table 1, and a summary of the responses is provided in Figure 7 
below. 





IT strategy adequately communicated to
the board
Adequate business/IT strategic alignment




In response to the first question, most of the directors indicated that on their board(s) IT strategy is not 
adequately communicated to the board (9/15 or 60%).  However, those boards where the interviewee thought 
that IT is adequately communicated, commented that IT strategy is communicated to the board as part of the 
business strategy as opposed to separate from the business strategy. This is how one director described the 
process: 
Director E: “IT strategy is communicated to the board as part of the total 
strategy of the company, linked into the business side. So there’s a strategy 
document produced once every 3 years, it’s a 3-year rolling plan, and its 
updated and a critical component of that is, here’s what we want to do, 
here’s where we need to go and here’s what we need to do to get there, and 
IT is very much a part of that – its not a separate plan... its very clear where 
the systems parts are because they are identified in the document.” 
Furthermore, when asked how the communication of IT strategy to the board could be improved, many 
directors mentioned this joint reporting of business and IT strategy because as one director said, when the 
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strategies are presented separately it is “…up to the president and the board members to see the link between 
the IT and the business strategy” (Director B).  
In response to the second question, most of the directors indicated that their board(s) (13/15 or 87%) has 
adequate business/IT strategic alignment. Additionally, the results seem to indicate a relationship between 
joint business/IT strategy reporting and business/IT strategic alignment because all of those boards where IT 
strategy is adequately communicated to the board, the business/IT strategic alignment is also rated as High.   
In response to the third question measuring the offensive IT governance activities, all of the directors 
indicated that their board(s) did not perform an IT governance self-assessment. This is interesting given that 
the leading IT governance research (e.g. ITGI, 2003; Nolan and McFarlan, 2005) recommends that boards 
perform such assessments. 
To determine the boards’ overall practicing of offensive IT governance, each board was assigned an 
overall level of offensive governance (Appendix C – Table 2) based on analysis of the directors’ responses to 
the questions in Appendix C – Table 1.  The overall level of offensive governance is used in the assessment 
of IT governance fit in a subsequent section, and to calculate an overall level of IT governance for each 
board. The majority of the boards’ overall level of offensive IT governance was at least a Medium (13/15 or 
87%), with only two boards at a low level of offensive governance (Figure 8).  









6.1.1.1.2 Defensive IT governance 
Operational reliability is the focus of defensive IT governance. Each director’s responses to the questions 
developed to measure a board’s level of defensive IT governance can be seen in Appendix C - Table 3, and a 











Adequately briefed on IT risks
Adequately briefed on IT projects






For the first two questions, most of the directors indicated that their board(s) is adequately briefed on IT 
risks (12/15 or 80%) and IT projects (10/15 or 67%). In fact, in response to the first question only one 
director indicated that IT risks associated with current operations are not currently reported at the board level 
at all. This director explained that:  
Director J: “…those are a management responsibility, not a governance 
issue. That is the age old decision - balancing act that has to be made all the 
time is to focus the board on governance not on management. And so I will 
argue quite strongly that the direction of the company is truly a governance 
issue but the supporting systems are a management issue.” 
Those who indicated that there are ways their boards could improve the communication of IT risks and 
projects suggested that the process of reporting could be changed from ad hoc to a regular item on the 
agenda of the board. One director indicated that the briefing on IT projects was improved by instituting an 
independent review and reporting process after a major project failure where the project reporting was not 
found to be accurate (Director C). 
In response to the third question, approximately half of the boards (7/15 or 47%) have a clear view of IT 
investments. Furthermore, the results indicate that there is a relationship between an adequate briefing on IT 
risks and IT projects and having a clear view of IT investments. Six out of the nine boards who had an 
adequate briefing of IT risks and projects also had a clear view of IT investments.  It is unclear why this 
relationship does not hold for all boards (Director B – board 3, Director C and Director F), but several 
explanations were offered by directors. For example, Director B when talking about the third board he is on 
indicated that the board is adequately briefed on IT risks and IT projects, but it does not have a clear view of 
IT investments. The director suggested that this may be because the organization is a subsidiary and “…it’s 
probably the Audit Committee more than the board that’s involved in systems. I think in reality its more that 
board of the parent company has a clearer view of systems.”  Alternatively, director C attributed his board’s 
unclear view of IT investments, despite the fact that the board is adequately briefed on IT risks and projects, 
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to the difficulty in determining the business value of IT projects, and to the fact that the board is often only 
notified if an IT project is over budget or schedule, and does not necessarily receive feedback if an IT project 
fails to deliver the promised value. 
To summarize the boards practicing of defensive IT governance, each board was assigned an overall level 
of defensive IT governance (Appendix C - Table 4) based on analysis of the directors’ responses to the 
questions in Appendix C - Table 3.  Like with the overall level of defensive governance calculated 
previously, the overall level of offensive governance is used in the assessment of IT governance fit in a 
subsequent section, and to calculate an overall level of IT governance for each board. The majority (9/15 or 
60%) of the boards’ overall level of defensive IT governance was at least a Medium; however, a relatively 
large number of the boards (6/15 or 40%) received a Low (Figure 10).  









Most of the boards (10/15 or 67%) had the same levels for offensive and defensive IT governance; 
however, some boards did differ. For example, Director J’s board had a high level of offensive governance 
and a low level of defensive governance, and Director G’s second board had a medium level of offensive 
governance and a low level of defensive governance. 
6.1.1.1.3 Overall Levels of IT Governance 
Each board was assigned an overall level of IT governance (Appendix C - Table 5) based on the overall 
levels of offensive and defensive IT governance computed in Appendix C - Tables 2 and 4 respectively. This 
overall level of IT governance is used in the preliminary examination of the theoretical framework. Most of 
the boards had an overall level of IT governance of at least medium-low (13/15 or 87%), and only two of the 
boards had a low level of overall IT governance (Figure 11). 
Figure 11 - Interviews - Number of Boards at Each Level of Overall IT Governance 
2 3 4 1 5









To assess the completeness of the overall level of IT governance construct, its ability to predict the 
measured “overall IT governance effectiveness” was examined. In an additional question, directors were 
asked to assess their overall level of IT governance effectiveness (Appendix C - Table 6). The computed 
“overall level of IT governance” factor was the same as the self-assessed “overall IT governance 
effectiveness” for thirteen of the fifteen boards4 (different for boards H and I). This result indicates that the 
computed “Overall level of IT governance” construct captures the IT governance practiced by the boards. 
The following are some of the directors’ comments that were made regarding their boards’ IT governance 
effectiveness: 
Director A: “…governance on all of the boards that I sit are best-in-class…” 
Director C: “In general, in this area of their accountability [IT governance 
effectiveness is rated at] a medium, or a 3 on a 1-5 scale. So they’re not as 
effective as they might be in other areas.” 
Director D: “Marginal – it’s an area that we need to spend more time on, 
that we need to understand better and it’s one of those things - how much 
should the board know and how much they should place reliance on 
management to deal with it. So I think it’s an area that boards need to 
reassess and decide whether or not they have enough knowledge and 
understanding of the IT environment, the efficiencies, the effectiveness, the 
risks and exposures.  So I really don’t know the answer to that question. It’s 
a good question and I want to explore it some more.” 
Director E: “Top marks now [since dealing with a major project failure]… 
I’ve been so impressed on how it’s turned around and this project 
management thing that after 5 years it’s the state of the art. We’ve brought 
sophistication to it, we’ve got an IT culture there that links up with the 
business side and works effectively - I think we should outsource it.” 
Director F: “Fine at oversight. But partly because there are no problems, or 
situations where we can’t do something because of IT - [for example], 
losing competitive edge because of lack of nimbleness on the IT side - we 
just haven’t had anything like that.” 
Director G (board 3): “IT is mostly discussed at the Audit Committee and 
includes disaster recovery and privacy from a strategic stand point.” 
                                                   
4 A value of “High” or “Medium-High” for “Overall level of IT governance” was treated as Very Effective, 
“Medium” and “Medium-Low” was treated as Effective, and “Low” was treated as Not Effective in order to 
correspond to the self-effectiveness ratings of IT governance. 
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Interestingly, as shown in Figure 12 overall the directors ranked their corporate governance higher than IT 
governance (see Appendix C - Table 7 for detailed responses), and all indicated that their boards performed 
corporate governance self-assessments (whereas none performed IT governance self-assessments).  















This suggests that IT governance is an area for improvement within corporate governance. In fact, when 
asked if there are ways the board could improve IT governance, all but one of the directors (Director A) said 
yes. Areas for improvement identified by the directors included: improving collective knowledge of IT, 
increasing the business management’s ownership of IT strategy, and instituting a regular reporting process 
for IT at the board level. Some of the directors’ comments are included below: 
Director B (board 1): “I think it is critical that the members of the board and 
the Audit Committee or whatever committee is charged with overseeing the 
systems area have collective knowledge of IT systems. Because you do get 
into some technical areas at different points and there needs to be an 
appreciation – I’m not saying there needs to just be one person, I think that’s 
dangerous for only one person to have that technical knowledge… So I 
think that is how to improve is to ensure is that whether your board is 
charged or whether your committee is charged (audit committee or separate 
IT committee) then there must be people who understand different aspects 
of the systems area, otherwise you’re just blown away. There’s 
jargon…jargon can scare people, and even then you’re not going to know 
everything… And if there are boards that don’t have a collective knowledge 
either at the full board or the committee that’s charged then they are at high 
risk.” 
Director C: “…more ownership of the IT strategy by the businesses 
themselves is crucial. Because we spend a lot of time on the business 
strategy … we don’t force enough discussion by those business leaders [on 
IT strategy] …the IT strategy generally doesn’t get a high enough 
attention.” 
Director D: “Make IT a regular item [on the board agenda], establish some 
sort of a regular reporting environment that means that rather than it being a 
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haphazard report it becomes a scheduled report that is maybe part of 
enhanced risk evaluation – I’m not quite sure what form it takes, but get it 
on the regular agenda.” 
6.1.1.2 Antecedents to Board IT Governance 
The discussion of the interview data analysis now turns to the independent variables – board attributes and 
organizational factors. 
6.1.1.2.1 Board Attributes 
In the theoretical framework board attributes consist of proportion of insiders, board size and IT competency.  
The first two board attributes (Appendix C - Table 8) use common measures from the research literature. 
The proportion of insiders refers to the number of insiders to total number of directors. Most of the directors 
interviewed (11/15 or 73%) described their boards as having a low proportion of insiders (i.e. less than one 
third of the total directors). Board size refers to the number of directors on a board. Most of the boards (9/15 
or 60%) were large (i.e. more than 8 members). A summary of the responses is provided in Figure 13 below. 











The third board attribute is IT competency. The measures for this attribute were created for this research. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, IT competency consists of IT expertise and IT governance mechanisms. The level 
of IT competency for each board is captured using an index comprised of multiple items to measure the 
presence of IT expertise and IT governance mechanisms. Each of these is discussed in turn. 
IT Expertise – To assess the level of IT expertise on the board, the directors were asked to indicate if 
overall the directors of their board(s) are knowledgeable of IT, if there is IT leadership on the board, if the 
board receives sufficient information on IT, and if the board receives training in IT governance (Appendix C 






















Approximately half (8/15 or 53%) of the boards were composed of directors who overall were 
knowledgeable of IT. Commenting on the IT knowledge of their board(s), the following are some of the 
remarks that were made: 
Director A: “Most of these people are CEOs or former, so what CEO or 
former CEO didn’t have their finger in the IT pie on an ongoing basis 
because it’s so important from operational and strategic issues for a 
company.” 
Director H: “From an operational standpoint, [the directors] have 
themselves operated entities or been close to working with an IT system. So 
they understand much from an operational standpoint, but from a technical 
standpoint – less, obviously. I think that’s one of the problems, we’re not 
aware of the issues surrounding the maintenance and implementation of an 
IT system, there must be a lot of frustrated CTOs out there saying boards 
don’t understand the difficulties I face.” 
Director I: “Short of excellent, but pretty good and certainly compared to 
most companies, but you partly expect that. It’s an IT company, it’s a bunch 
of people with IT experience sitting on the board – they’re  harder to smoke 
and they waste far less time on asking questions that anybody who’s been in 
the industry is going to know the answer to.” 
More specifically, speaking about the board’s knowledge of IT strategies in the organization one director 
described it as: 
Director D: “Not better than 50-50... If you walked around the board-room 
table and asked the question, what’s the companies’ IT strategy, I don’t 
think you would get a coherent answer from more than half of the people 
around the table…[It’s a] combination of individual understanding and 
comfort level with the IT environment and then degree to which at some 
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point during the year, the IT strategy is presented to the board. That’s 
probably why you need to have IT as a regular agenda item so that maybe 
once a year somebody says to the board, this is our IT strategy. And reminds 
everybody what it is.” 
Finally, when asked to describe the characteristics of an IT knowledgeable director, one director stated 
that it includes: 
Director C: “someone who came from the industry…somebody who has 
managed major IT projects and a CFO, CEO, or unit head over major 
projects…we assume that if you’ve been the CEO or CFO of a large 
organization you’ve pretty much had some IT experience, so as an example, 
we determined 3 or 4 years ago that we didn’t have anybody that 
represented a business that made anything, all we had was financial people, 
and …so we hired [a new director].” 
Moving to the second question on IT expertise, it was indicated that IT leadership was present on 10 of the 
15 boards (67%). IT leadership refers to one or more directors on the board who lead discussions on IT 
among the board and/or with IT management. The results suggest that IT leaders in the boardroom do play 
an important role in the governance of IT. For example: 
Director A: “The chair would always have to be active, and if there are 
people on the board (and there are in just about every board that I’m on) that 
have particular expertise in IT, then they would probably take the lead in the 
questions.” 
Director C: “I would say 2 or 3 [directors lead the discussions]. The Head of 
the Audit Committee tends to be a strong view because they tend to look at 
a lot of the results, the financial part of the books; I tend to play a strong 
role because of my IT background. I was brought onto this board as an IT 
expert.” 
Director H: “Directors with IT knowledge lead discussions at [the 
company]. When they talk about “well the costs in this area should be 70% 
of revenue because other companies are doing it and I’m aware of blah, 
blah, blah, so-in-so is doing it, are we doing that?” They really put 
management’s feet to the fire. More insightive questioning. I don’t know the 
ratios, they do.” 
Moving to the third question on IT expertise, approximately half of the boards (8/15 or 53%) indicated that 
they receive sufficient information on IT. One director commented: 
Director H: “One thing I find a problem for me as a director is finding out in 
the reports from the CTO the purpose of the systems that we are 
introducing. I do find in some of the fine print that we are introducing [a 
certain type of system], but it has all kinds of letters and stuff in front of it 
and it’s hard to figure out the purpose of the system. … My first criticism 
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really is – I have difficulty about reading right through the report and really 
digging into it, and determining what on earth these systems are supposed to 
be doing.” 
Similarly, when asked why he stated that his board received insufficient information on IT, one director 
stated: 
Director C: “Most boards are very cynical when it comes to IT... projects 
fail, cost more than you expect, they’re late. The IT organization 
communicates very poorly with boards - they can’t get it in English. Its 
always in technology speak and I would say that in general there is a 
cynicism by boards that IT is not the most interesting subject to get into 
because you’re going to feel “am I going to get scammed again?”, they’re 
going to ask for a lot of money and I’m going to look back in a year and this 
project will be off track and we’ll have to do something or suck-it-up and 
pay for it.” 
One director who indicated that his board does not receive sufficient information on IT commented on the 
importance for management to provide the board with information, especially about how competitors use IT 
to support the business:  
Director D: “Boards would be as knowledgeable as what management 
brings to us. If you’re on one [company in a particular regulated industry] 
you can’t be on another one because of competitive issues, so what I see is 
the company I’m involved with. We have to rely on management to let us 
know what is happening in the industry.” 
Finally moving to the last question on IT expertise, all of the boards indicated that they had not received 
any training in IT governance. However, many of the directors indicated that such training would be 
beneficial. In fact, one director whose organization recently experienced a major IT system implementation 
failure even commented that if the board had training in IT governance before the incident it may have 
helped avoid the situation (Director E).  
Overall Level of IT Expertise - Thus when considering all four questions measuring IT expertise, an 
overall level of IT expertise was computed for each board (Appendix C - Table 10). This overall level of IT 
expertise is used to compute an overall IT Competency level which is used in the preliminary examination of 
the theoretical framework. Seven boards had a high level, one board had a medium level, and seven boards 




Figure 15 - Interviews - Number of Boards at Each Level of Overall IT Expertise 





IT Governance Mechanisms - The second item used to measure board IT competency is a board’s use of 
IT governance mechanisms - structures, processes and relational mechanisms. To measure boards’ use of 
such mechanisms, questions were asked to uncover the extent to which the types of mechanisms are used 
(Appendix C - Table 11). Relevant IT governance mechanisms from prior literature were included and to 
some extent were used to constrain the construct to items mentioned in the literature. A summary of the 
responses is provided in Figure 16 below. 
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Structures - Three questions were asked to measure the presence of IT governance structures on boards. 
The questions were: who is the key champion of IT on the board, does director recruitment considers IT 
expertise, and is there an IT Strategy Committee at the board level (Appendix C - Table 11). The responses 
to each of these questions are discussed in turn. 
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The majority of the directors interviewed identified the CIO as the key champion of IT, with some also 
identifying a key role for the CEO, for example,  
Director B: “I suppose it has to be the CIO, but with the full support and 
leadership from top-down of the CEO. The easy answer is that it always is 
the CEO, because without the CEO’s endorsement and leadership nothing 
will get done, however, there has to be a champion that can challenge the 
CEO and I would say that’s the CIO.” 
One director, G, identified himself rather than the CIO as the champion of IT for all the boards of which 
he is a member. He had extensive IT expertise in the implementation and management of IT and thus 
initiates and leads most of the discussions and questions on IT governance. 
In response to the second question, only five of the fifteen boards (33%) specifically consider IT expertise 
in the recruitment of directors. However, it was recognized as something that maybe should be considered in 
future recruitment efforts.  
One director whose board does consider IT expertise in director recruitment described the kinds of IT 
expertise they look for as follows: 
Director C: “We look for somebody who has … come from the industry ... 
somebody who has managed major IT projects and a CFO, CEO, or unit 
head over major projects. And we ask the directors to self-assess themselves 
each year we send a survey out we have these 22 competencies and we say 
do you have a 1 level skill, or 2 level, 3 being the highest, which means 
you’re quite competency. And then when we get that we look for holes as 
we have retirements. IT is one of the competencies. Because we have 22 
competencies and 17 directors you’re not expecting all of the directors to 
have IT, but we probably look for 2 or 3 and we assume that if you’ve been 
the CEO or CFO of a large organization you’ve pretty much had some IT 
experience…”  
Finally, when asked about the last IT governance structure - IT Strategy Committee - none of the boards 
had such a committee and only one board had even considered creating such a committee. However, in the 
end the board decided against it because “there was no clear direction in industry and they decided they 
wanted to involve the whole board in IT oversight” (Director B). In fact, some of the directors were strongly 
opposed to an IT Strategy Committee commenting: 
Director A: “Do you have a marketing committee of the board, do you have 
a commercial banking committee, no – you’d have 100 committees.” 
Director C: “No. Boards avoid more committees… [there] used to be lots of 
committees, most of us are spending our time shrinking such committees, as 
opposed to creating another category.” 
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Director E: “We do strategy sessions at the board level and the CTO is part 
of those strategy sessions, but no specific committee. And it wasn’t really a 
consideration. Who has time? It’s a huge problem.” 
Processes - Two questions were asked to measure the use of IT governance processes on boards: is IT a 
regular item on the board agenda, and are regular sessions held for directors to discuss IT (Appendix C - 
Table 11). 
In response to the first question, nine of the fifteen boards (60%) were identified as having IT as a regular 
item on the board agenda. Commenting on the difference between two of the boards he is on, director B said 
that IT is a regular item on the agenda of the board at one organization which relies on IT for competitive 
edge; whereas at another organization that depends on IT for operations, there is more reliance on Internal 
Audit and IT is discussed more so on the agenda of the Audit Committee. Another director commented that 
his board makes use of committees to discuss an IT issue before deciding whether a discussion is needed in 
the boardroom. For example, “…Sarbanes Oxley would have gone to the Audit Committee and Information 
Security goes through the Audit Committee” (Director C). 
Finally, in response to the second question, eight of the fifteen boards (53%) were identified as holding 
regular sessions for directors to discuss IT. For the most part it is the same boards that have IT as a regular 
item on the board agenda that hold regular sessions for directors to discuss IT. Two directors commented that 
these sessions to discuss IT are often informal occurring over dinner and consisting of “…free wheeling 
discussion about IT – much better than doing it formally…” (Director H). 
Relational Mechanisms - Two questions were asked to measure the presence of relational mechanisms on 
boards: do directors and IT management communicate between schedule meetings, and does the CIO 
regularly attend board meetings (Appendix C - Table 11). 
In response to the first question, most of the directors (9/15 or 60%) indicated that of the boards they are 
on directors and IT management do communicate between scheduled meetings. Director C indicated that 
because of his background in IT he has regular discussions with the CIO and that it could take the form of a 
pre-review before making a presentation to the board. Commenting on communications between directors 
and management outside of the boardroom, one director said: 
Director B: “The boards that I sit on the president encourages board 
members to talk with senior management and all of the boards that I’ve been 
with encourage that and management welcomes that. It’s for better 
interaction and it does happen and I think it should happen. As good 
governance it works both ways. Based on the boards perspective to get an 
understanding of the business and the issues and a better understanding of 
the people involved, because we have to assess senior management. Then 
from senior management’s perspective what’s on our minds. And so all the 
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boards I’ve sat on the CEO has encouraged us to talk to senior management 
and we get a lot of presentations by senior management by the board.” 
Conversely, the directors that indicated that their board(s) did not communicate between scheduled 
meetings (6/15 or 40%) pointed to the importance of maintaining a separation between the board and 
management. For example: 
Director A: “There’s a very important line here with boards not wanting to 
get involved in the management of the company. “ 
Director D: “No – nor should they. Why would the board meet with the 
CIO?” 
Director J: “[The board communicates with management] at board meetings 
and through the president. We’re very careful and I personally honor those 
communication lines very diligently, the board communicates through the 
board chair to the president. The president and board chair are in touch very 
frequently. And before every board meeting, the president and the board 
secretary are very careful on how to prepare and touch base with the board 
members.” 
In response to the second question measuring the use of relational mechanisms, nine of the fifteen 
directors (60%) indicated that the CIO does regularly attend their board meetings. One director noted that the 
CIO attendance at board meetings differs for organizations because of the strategic nature of IT. 
Director A: “On one board [the CIO] attends all meetings, and the 
committee meetings. On another board the CIO attends when there’s an IT 
relevance to what we’re discussing. On some of the boards they don’t show 
up at all - unless there’s an issue. Don’t show up because IT is not relevant 
to the strategic nature of the discussions of the board. It’s not that the 
governance is different; it’s just that the relevance of the IT to the strategic 
nature of the board discussions is not as high in some companies as in 
others. And so if the CIO was attending all those meetings he’d literally be 
wasting his time, whereas if IT is important, the CIO is attending strategic 
discussions, not related in any way to IT and low and behold he becomes an 
important part of the discussion.” 
The same director noted that CIO attendance at board meetings builds a relationship between directors and 
the CIO which enables the directors to accurately assess the level of comfort the directors should have in IT 
management and its decisions. The director stated: 
Director A: “The CIO attends most of the board meetings, makes 
presentations to the board meetings, so that you are able to get a good sense 
of their knowledge, what they’re doing, how they’re doing it, how they 
present what they’re doing and that person’s interaction with the CEO and 
the rest of the management team. Those kinds of judgments are some of the 
most important judgments that the board can make, not just about the CIO, 
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but they’re doing that about all the senior management who are sitting 
around the table. If you continually ask the CIO some due diligence 
questions and get four answers, then there are red lights going on all over 
the place.” 
Overall Level of IT Governance Mechanisms - When considering all questions measuring presence of IT 
governance mechanisms – structures, processes and relational mechanisms - an overall level of IT 
governance mechanism usage was computed for each board (Appendix C - Table 12). This overall level is 
combined with overall IT expertise to compute an overall IT competency level which is used in the 
preliminary examination of the theoretical framework. Two boards had a low level usage of IT governance 
mechanisms, nine had a medium level, and four boards had a high level (Figure 17).  
Figure 17 - Interviews - Number of Boards at Each Level of Use of IT Governance Mechanisms 
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Overall IT Competency - Finally, an overall IT Competency value was calculated for each board based on 
the computed overall IT Expertise and IT Governance Mechanism value for each board (Appendix C – 
Tables 10 and 12). This overall level of IT Competency (Appendix C - Table 13) is used in the preliminary 
examination of the theoretical framework in the following section. Most of the boards had an overall level of 
IT Competency of at least medium (9/15 or 60%), and only six of the boards had a medium-low or low level 
of IT Competency (40%) (Figure 18). 
Figure 18 - Interviews - Number of Boards at Each Level of Overall IT Competency 








To assess the completeness of the overall IT Competency construct (Appendix C - Table 13), its ability to 
predict a measured overall IT Competency was examined. In an additional question, participants were asked 
to assess whether the “IT Competency of the overall board meets their strategic needs” (Appendix C - Table 
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14). The computed “overall IT Competency” factor was the same as the self-assessed “IT Competency of 
overall board meets the strategic needs” for all of the boards5. 
6.1.1.2.2 Organization Factors 
The organization factors use common measures from the research literature. The first factor, organization 
size refers to the number of employees (Appendix C - Table 15). Most of the directors (10/15 or 67%) were 
on boards of large organizations (i.e. greater than 500 employees). The second factor, organization age refers 
to the number of years since the organization was founded. Most of the organizations (9/15 or 60%) were 
formed more than 10 years ago (i.e. classified as old). A summary of the responses is provided in Figure 19 
below. 










The third organization factor, role of IT is measured on two dimensions – operational reliance on IT versus 
strategic reliance on IT (Appendix C - Table 16). This is based upon Nolan and McFarlan’s IT Strategic 
Impact Grid (2005), which delineates four modes of IT reliance based on where an organization fits on the 
grid – Support, Factory, Turnaround and Strategic. A summary of the responses is provided in Figure 20 
below. 
                                                   
5 A value of “High”, “Medium-High” or “Medium” for “Overall IT Competency” was treated as equivalent 
to Yes for “IT Competency of overall board meets the strategic needs”, and “Medium-Low” or “Low” was 
treated as equivalent to No. 
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Figure 20 – Interviews – Number of Boards with Operational and Strategic Reliance on IT 
 
The results of the interviews identified organizations in each of the modes (Figure 21), with the majority, 
eight of the fifteen organizations (53%), having a high operational and strategic reliance on IT (Strategic 
Mode).  
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A director of an organization in the Strategic mode commented that IT is “…critical to your strategy and 
it’s critical to your reputation and it’s critical to your competitiveness. So it couldn’t be more critical” 
(Director A). However, a director of a company in the Support mode stated “IT just isn’t that big an issue for 
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information is just not there as long as you can recover and the strategic use of IT just isn’t that important” 
(Director I).  
Overall Role of IT in the Organization - Finally, an overall role of IT in the organization value was 
calculated for each board based on the “operational reliance on IT” and “strategic reliance on IT” value for 
each board (Appendix C - Table 16). This overall role of IT in the organization (Appendix C - Table 17) is 
used in the preliminary examination of the theoretical framework in the following section. Most of the 
organizations had an overall role of IT in the organization of at least medium (13/15 or 87%), and only two 
of the boards (13%) had a low overall role of IT (Figure 22).  
Figure 22 – Interviews – Number of Boards at Different Levels of Role of IT in the Organization 
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6.1.1.3 Consequences of Board IT Governance 
It was not possible to quantify the firm performance consequences of board IT governance with a group of 
10 directors; therefore, the data gathered during the directors’ telling of a critical IT governance decision that 
they faced while on a board was used to examine the consequences of board IT governance for specific IT 
decisions. Most of the directors (8/10) were able to identify an IT governance decision that they were 
involved with while serving on a board, and two of the directors discussed two decisions. In this section a 
brief synopsis of the 10 IT governance decisions that were discussed by the directors are presented. Then 
these decisions are grouped by cause and consequence of the problem in order to help understand the variety 
of IT decisions faced by boards and the potential operational performance outcomes of those decisions. 
A brief synopsis of the IT Governance decisions discussed by the directors is given in Table 5. The 
decisions ranged from problems with the current systems functionality, to decisions with whether to 
implement new systems, to problems with the implementation of new systems. The responses were as varied 
as the decisions. The responses ranged from the creation of new procedures to deal with this problem and 
potential future problems, such as the creation of a senior IT position, the firing of the current CIO, and the 
creation of a new process of reporting on IT projects, to the following of standard management and board 
reporting practices such as the reporting of a system failure and subsequent periodic updates on the status of 
the problem until it was resolved. 
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Table 5 - Interviews – Synopsis of Critical IT Governance Decisions 
Synopsis of IT Governance Decision 
Critical 
Decision 
Description of IT Governance 
Decision 
Board’s Response 
1. The systems “went down” and 
were not accessible to 
customers. The problem was 
reported in the media. 
 
The board was notified of the incident by the CEO within hours and held a conference 
call to discuss immediate action. Then at the next board meeting, the CIO presented 
why the incident occurred, what has been done to fix it, and why it won’t happen again. 
The board actively questioned and probed management on the incident. In the past 
when incidents like this have occurred that had a reputation impact the board has hired 
outside consultants to investigate the incident and to report to the board. The incident is 
resolved when the board has comfort that the incident won’t happen again. This 
comfort is based on the CIO’s presentation and answering of questions on the incident, 
and based on the CIO’s previous contact with the board. The comfort is also based on 
confidence in the CEO. The CIO does not just go to board meetings when there’s an 
incident to discuss, the board must see the CIO as part of the management team. 
2. A new IT product was to be 
developed for external sale – 
considered creating a new 
subsidiary to manage the new 
IT product.  
CEO recommended hiring a new VP of IT to primarily oversee the new subsidiary but 
also all the IT of the organization, including the system upgrade (see decision number 
3). The recommendation was brought to the HR Committee who brought the idea to the 
board. There used to be a senior IT position, but not as senior as this new position 
(reporting to the CEO). The board and CEO determined that there was too much risk 
involved with the new project not to have a senior management position in IT to 
manage the IT operations and strategy of the organization. 
3. Systems upgrade needed to 
make systems more robust. 
(Note: same board as number 
2). 
See board’s response for number 2. 
4. Failed IT project – system was 
unable to deliver promised 
results, it was over budget and 
over schedule. In the end after 
two years of effort, the project 
was cancelled. 
CIO would report annually to the Board on the major capital IT projects. After two 
years of reporting that everything was fine, it was discovered that the CIO was not 
reporting the problems with the project. So due to the reporting on this project status 
and other projects, the decision was made to fire the CIO, hire someone from within the 
company and then get the CFO to report on the schedule and budget of IT projects 
(with the CIO present to answer questions). Reporting on the project occurred every 
meeting and the board hired an outside consultant to review the project and report to 
the CIO and management who reported to the board. The project has since been 
cancelled. 
5. Loss of customer data creating 
privacy, information security 
concerns. The problem was 
reported in the media. 
The board was notified of the problem by the CEO who sent out an email immediately. 
He informed the board of the loss and told the board that the problem would likely be 
reported in the media. 
The board followed the incident for 6-9 months afterwards as part of every update, and 
it also employed an external consulting firm to review the information security process 
and to hold an education session for the board for an hour on the latest thinking for 
security.  
6. Systems didn’t support current 
operations and thus resulted in 
higher operation costs for 
manual labor. Also the systems 
didn’t support planned future 
business operations. Finally, 
there were control weaknesses 
with the current systems that 
had been identified by Internal 
Audit. 
Board found out about the problems from financial reporting (higher than expected 
operating costs) and internal audit at the Audit Committee reporting the control 
weaknesses. This problem went on for 2-3 years and the IT Director was promising to 
fix the problems. However the problems remained and the CEO, with input from the 
board decided to fire the IT Director and create a new CIO position, reporting to the 
CEO. The CEOs standing was increased because he recognized a weakness the IT 
Director and the need to hire a new CIO. Now the CIO reports at board meetings. 
7. System implementation 
problems were experienced. It 
was discovered that neither 
external consultants nor the VP 
of IT communicated IT project 
implementation problems with 
the board over a two year 
period. 
Board found out about the system implementation problems from the CEO and the VP 
of IT (did not report to a C-level executive) when a major part of the new system was 
missing. The CEO fired the VP of IT, the CEO did not get a bonus, and a new CTO 
was hired who reported to the CEO. The board didn’t have any input into the firing of 
the VP IT. The board told the CEO that he needed to fix what was happening, but the 
board was not involved with the creation of the CTO position– it was the CEO’s 
decision. Now the CEO is much more involved, as is the CTO. The CEO gives 
quarterly reports to the Audit and Finance committee and to the board because he gives 
the sate of the nation report. 
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Synopsis of IT Governance Decision 
Critical 
Decision 
Description of IT Governance 
Decision 
Board’s Response 
8. Need for creation of a new 
application which would 
represent a new line of 
business.  
CEO asked one of the directors to mentor the VP of Strategic Initiatives through the 
process of developing and implementing the new system. The CEO knew he had the 
skill-set at the director level so he didn’t have to hire an outside consultant. Bi-weekly 
the director met with the VP of Strategic Initiatives to guide the VP through the process 
and to put the VP in contact with others with domain expertise. 
9. Development of several new 
systems over a four to five year 
period. There were cost 
overruns and delays with the 
systems.  
The CTO proposed to the board what was going to be developed and the advantages 
that would come from introduction of the new system. The board was given a summary 
type report of the service providers who would be used, and, later on, why we’ve 
changed and who’s performing who’s not. The board approved the budget and 
approved the time schedule. The system implementation was delayed by about a year. 
Updates were given to the board about once a year and sometimes more frequently. The 
board is often updated in the budget meeting because of the high expense. All the basic 
decisions are at the board level, but maybe go to the Audit Committee first with more 
detail. The Audit Committee’s interests are in the control area, that everything is tested. 
10. Proposal for new system 
brought to the board for 
approval. 
Conventional corporate governance approaches were used. Management brought 
forward the request for a new system, brought forward the business case, and explained 
why it was a good idea. The board didn’t want to make the decision in isolation and 
decided to compare the system request with other priorities in its strategic planning 
session. The whole board was involved in the decision. 
 
The decisions can also be organized into three categories that capture the cause of the problem. As seen in 
Table 6, the three causes of the problems are: problems with IT functionality, problems caused by IT 
personnel, and problems caused by situational factors. Problems with IT functionality refer to problems that 
can be primarily attributed to technical reasons. For example, problems where the IT system went down 
(decision 1), or the system was unable to support current operations resulting in higher manual labor costs 
(decision 6). Problems caused by IT personnel include problems whereby management of the system was 
flawed in some way and was primarily responsible for the problems. For example, management did not 
adequately report problems to the board (decisions 4 and 7). Problems caused by situational factors refers to 
problems where situations outside of the current operations of the organization necessitated an IT decision at 
the board level, such as a new IT product (decision 2) or a new line of business (decision 8). 
Table 6 - Interviews – Causes of Critical IT Governance Decisions 
Cause of IT Governance Decision Critical 
Decision Problems with IT Functionality / 
Operations  
Problems Caused by IT Personnel Problems Caused by Situational 
Factors 
1. X   
2.   X 
3. X   
4.  X  
5.  X  
6. X   
7.  X  
8.   X 
9. X   




Finally, as can be seen in Table 7 the consequences of the critical IT governance decisions have been 
organized into seven categories. The IT governance decisions had operational impacts - affecting the current 
business operations, and strategic impacts - affecting future operations of the organization. Additionally, 
some of the problems had both operational and strategic impacts. Other consequences included increased 
negative reputational impacts, loss of information, increased risk exposure, project cost overruns, and failed 
projects. 
Table 7 - Interviews – Consequences of Critical IT Governance Decisions 
Consequences of IT Governance Decision Critical 











1. X  X     
2.  X   X   
3. X  X  X   
4.  X   X X X 
5. X  X X X   
6. X X  X    
7. X X     X 
8.  X      
9. X X   X X  
10. X X      
 
So while it is difficult to quantify the operational performance consequences of IT governance for the 
organizations of the directors interviewed, the sometimes far-reaching consequences of the critical IT 
governance decisions discussed by the boards do suggest the extent of the impact of IT decision and how 
board governance, or lack thereof, can influence the impacts. One of the best examples of how board IT 
governance may influence the success of IT projects and thus potentially impact operational performance is 
the systems implementation project failure (decision 7). In this example, it was discovered that neither 
external consultants nor the VP of IT communicated IT project implementation problems with the board over 
a two year period and this resulted in a $100 million project failure. As a result of this problem, the 
organization created a C-level IT position and involved the CEO and CTO in increasing information sharing 
between management and the board. As the director commented: 
“But one thing it did do at the board level was it woke the CEO up to the 
fact that there has to be a better link bringing his management team to the 
board and developing that team and creating a good atmosphere at the 
board. And the board has worked on that too… focus was put on how the 
board interacts as well as how management interacts – and we’ve had a 
couple of retreats and that’s helped and [the CEO’s] put a big focus on the 
development of [the management] team and we can see as a board some 
very positive changes in the whole thing…So the happy upside is that [the 
CEO’s] built a good team, we’re happy with that team, we interact far better 
and it’s another happy consequence of a major systems problem. On the 
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operational side we are great. Because there’s the reporting at the Audit and 
Finance Committee by the IT group – here’s our IT plan for the year, here’s 
what we’re doing, here’s what’s happening. The bigger focused picture on 
IT as an organization its better communication and its put it on the front 
burner and he’s very open and if he has a problem he tells us and explains 
why, there’s no cover ups and we ask better questions, having been burnt 
badly once we ask a lot of questions and he must get sick of it, but its part of 
the governance.” 
This organization currently is developing a new system and the process is being handled differently at the 
board level. The director described this board as now having very effective IT governance and described 
how the process is different: 
“It’s part of the strategic plan, IT has been very, very much been built into 
the strategic plan and so there’s quarterly report specific to that system, 
related to the strategic plan, and …we get more detailed hands on involved 
in, in terms of questioning.” 
Another director talked about how his board’s experience with a failed $250 million IT project that 
resulted in improvements in the board’s governance of IT (decision 4). Since this project, the board has 
instituted a third party review and reporting of IT projects, and changed the reporting structure for IT 
outsourcers, with outsourcers now reporting to management instead of the board, and management being 
ultimately responsible for the work of outsourcers. This director now describes his board’s governance of IT 
as very effective. 
6.1.2 Preliminary Confirmation (Disconfirmation) of Theoretical Framework 
The preliminary and exploratory nature of these findings is emphasized. The interviews resulted in detailed 
information on the variables in the theoretical framework for 15 boards. While a significant amount of 
qualitative data was collected, the sample is not appropriate for the use of rigorous statistical analysis; 
therefore, a simple descriptive showing the level of agreement among the boards for each independent 
variable was used.  
6.1.2.1 Antecedents to Board IT Governance 
The relationships between the board attributes, organizational factors and board IT governance were 
identified in the interview data, and then the level of agreement with the expected relationships, based upon 
the propositions, was calculated for each independent variable (Table 8).  
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Table 8 - Interviews – Preliminary Confirmation (Disconfirmation) 
  Actual Relationship with Board IT Governance  
 Expected 
Relation-
ship with:  
Director 




Relationship (# of 
boards in 
agreement / 15) 
Board Attributes 








- - - - - 
+ 
+ 
+ + - 7/15 = 47% 
P2: 
Board Size 




+ + + + - 
- 
- 
+ - + 4/15 = 27% 
P3: 
IT Competency 




+ + - + + 
+ 
+ 








+ - + + - 
- 
- 
- - - 10/15 = 67% 
P5: 
Organization Age 




+ - + + - 
- 
- 
- - - 11/15 = 73% 
P:8 
Overall Role of 
IT 




- - + - + 
+ 
- 
+ - - 8/15 = 53% 
 Defensive  
ITG 
           
P6: 
Operational 
Reliance on IT 




+ - + + + 
- 
- 
+ - + 10/15 = 67% 
 Offensive  
ITG 
           
P7: 
Strategic 
Reliance on IT  




+ + + + + 
- 
+ 
+ - - 11/15 = 73% 
Coding Scheme: 
In order to determine the direction of the relationship between the dichotomous Independent Variables (IV) - 
Proportion of Insiders, Board Size, Organization Size and Organization Age - the variable “overall level of IT 
governance” was transformed. A level of “High”, “Medium-High”, or “Medium” for “Overall level of IT 
governance” was assigned a level of High, and a level of “Medium-Low” or “Low” for “Overall level of IT 
governance” was assigned a level of Low. Then the direction of the relationship was determined. For example, a high 
proportion of insiders and a high level of overall IT governance (board H) is a positive relationship. 
 
In order to determine the direction of the relationship between the IVs with more than two possible responses – overall 
IT competency and role of IT – the following rules were used. A positive relationship was specified in the following 
cases; otherwise a negative relationship was specified. A value of “High” for level of IT governance and a level of 
“High” or “Medium-High” for the two IVs, a value of “Medium-High” for level of IT governance and a level of 
“High”, “Medium-High” or “Medium” for the IVs, a value of “Medium” for level of IT governance and a level of 
“Medium-High”, “Medium” or “Medium-Low” for the IVs, a value of “Medium-Low” for level of IT governance and 
a level of “Medium”, “Medium-Low” or “Low” for the IVs, and finally a value of “Low” for level of IT governance 
and a level of “Medium-Low” or “Low” for the IVs. For example, a level of High for overall level of IT governance 




Board Attributes and IT Governance – First, looking at the relationship between board attributes and board 
IT governance, it can be seen that there is mixed support for the variables (Table 8). The highest level of 
agreement is with IT Competency (80%), followed by Proportion of Insiders (47%), and Board Size (27%). 
The relationship between board IT competency and IT governance (Proposition 3) was the strongest out of 
all the independent variables with the proposed positive relationship not holding for only three out of the 
fifteen boards. As described previously in this chapter, there were a number of comments by directors 
indicating a positive relationship between IT competency and IT governance at the board level. Some 
additional comments that specifically speak to this relationship have been included here. Many directors 
attributed much of their board’s involvement in IT governance to the IT competencies of directors. For 
example, commenting on the IT governance at one board, Director G (org 3), who has a great deal of IT 
experience commented, “If I wasn’t there it would be nonexistent.” He went on to describe his role as a “pot-
stirrer – because I have some experience in the space I ask questions.”  
The proposed positive relationship between proportion of insiders and IT governance (Proposition 1) was 
found to be true for about half of the boards. One director indicated that insiders are usually better informed 
and more likely to be involved in governance of IT (Director I), in fact an inside director commented: 
Director G: “I’m a significant shareholder at [one organization] so I have a 
real interest in creating value for the other shareholders in that company. So 
I do think that some of the thought process that directors have to take is 
what is my responsibility to shareholders, I know the fiduciary duties to the 
company, but who owns the company? Shareholders.” 
The relationship between board size and IT governance (Proposition 2) was the weakest out of all of the 
independent variables. In fact, the results suggest that the relationship between board size and IT governance 
is opposite to that of the relationship proposed, with a positive relationship existing between board size and 
IT governance for 73% of the boards. However, some comments from directors do indicate that the proposed 
negative relationship may hold for a larger sample. For example, one board had recently undergone a review 
which resulted in the board size being reduced to half and now describes the smaller board as much more 
effective. The director (J) described the bigger board as “…unweilding and somewhat dysfunctional because 
you didn’t get a coherent thinking around the table, we also found that attendance was poor, and people who 
couldn’t attend and sent alternates, and that is no longer accepted…” 
Organizational Factors and IT Governance - Examining the relationship between organizational factors 
and overall board IT governance it can be seen that, like with board attributes, there is mixed support for all 
variables. The highest level of agreement is with Organization Age (73%), followed by Organization Size 
(67%), and Role of IT in the Organization (53%). 
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As proposed, boards of the newer organizations interviewed were more likely to be involved with IT 
governance than older organizations (Proposition 5). Similarly, as proposed, boards of smaller organizations 
tended to be more involved in IT governance (Proposition 4). Commenting on the relationship between 
organization size and board IT governance, two directors said: 
Director G: “I think this is because of the difference between the smaller 
and larger companies. I think that a small or medium-sized enterprise 
director – yes its nose in but out – you have to know when to cross the line 
and how to help in a supportive manner to the CEO recognizing that the 
CEO can’t be all things to all people, but your small or medium-sized 
enterprise may not be able to afford to do some of the things – if Royal 
Bank needs to do something, they hire IBM or McKinsey – in a small 
company sometimes the directors are the shareholders.”  
Director I: “It’s actually easier in a smaller company – I can go off, in fact 
I’ve just spent the better part of two weeks dealing with a specific issue for 
the company – its harder to do in a larger company where the lines are more 
rigid and its harder to get real-time to an issue, outside of the formal 
meetings.” 
Somewhat related to organizational size is the structure of an organization. Interviews revealed that a 
subsidiary organization may be less involved in IT strategy and strategy overall because the board of the 
parent organization would take on that strategic oversight role. For example: 
Director D: “A couple of the boards I’m on are subsidiaries of US 
companies so a lot of them have a North American strategy, and Canada’s 
strategy is set from the US and to varying degrees they ask us about our 
input on it.” 
Finally, probably the most surprising finding was that for only one-half of the boards was the overall role 
of IT in the organization positively related to overall IT governance (Proposition 8). This suggests that, as 
proposed in the theoretical framework, factors other than role of IT might in fact influence board IT 
governance.  
As previously discussed, in the interviews, many of the directors indicated that there is a relationship 
between role of IT and overall board IT governance. Some of the comments speaking directly to this 
relationship have been included below: 
Director A: “If you were interviewing someone who was on a medium-sized 
publicly traded board where IT was more operational then you might reach 
the conclusion, versus what I’m saying that “oh my god that company does 
not pay near as much attention to IT than the boards [this director] is on” but 
the answer to that is that IT is not as strategic... the more strategic the IT is 
the more attention the board pays to it….all boards don’t pay equal attention 
to it, but it’s not because there governance is different but because all boards 
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pay more attention to strategic issues whatever area they’re in, including 
IT.” 
Director B: “[This organization] is changing. Up until now most of the 
discussion certainly would be at the audit and finance committee and 
presentations would be made chiefly by the CFO, and that would be 
sufficient because really the systems that are being utilized have not been as 
sophisticated as you would get at a bank. But things are changing, this is a 
whole new topic, there is increasing investment in computer technology in 
[this industry]…So we’re spending more and more of the money on IT and 
there’s more money being put into the budget and indeed the [organization] 
has hired a person to be in charge of the systems and we’ve seen him at 
more and more executive meetings than we ever had before. So it’s in a 
process of change, we’re hearing more at the executive level and the board 
level on what we are doing with our systems, what changes are going to be 
made and how much is it going to cost.” 
Finally, examining the relationship between specific role of IT in the organization and type of IT 
governance practiced (fit) it can be seen that there is support for both types of fit. As proposed, there is a 
positive relationship between operational reliance on IT and board defensive IT governance (67%, 
Proposition 6), and there is a positive relationship between strategic reliance on IT and board offensive IT 
governance (73%, Proposition 7).  
6.1.2.2 Consequences of Board IT Governance 
While it was possible to probe the theoretical constructs related to the antecedents of IT governance via the 
interview method, it was not possible to similarly exam the theoretical aspects related to the consequences of 
board IT governance. Nonetheless, most of the organizations were able to give examples of IT decisions that 
were discussed at the board level, and as illustrated by the various quotes and examples given in the above 
subsection, many of these IT decisions resulted in negative financial consequences. The relationship between 
board IT governance and financial performance are examined in more detail in the second phase of this 
research.  
6.2 Summary 
One major outcome related to this first phase was a better understanding of board IT governance in practice. 
The interviews were transcribed and coded, and values for each independent variable in the theoretical 
framework were analyzed for each board. Finally, the relationships between the variables in the theoretical 
framework were examined.  
Results from the interview phase informed the next phase of research. The data on antecedents and 
consequences of IT governance, and the context variable measures were used to customize a survey 
instrument as described in the next chapter. Specific attention was paid to develop measures for the 
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constructs where measures have not been developed in past literature, namely board IT governance and IT 
competency. The interview results suggested that board IT governance and IT competency are multi-
dimensional constructs and should be measured as such in the survey. The transcribed interviews were used 
to augment the questions for the IT governance and IT competency constructs in the survey such that IT 
governance has two dimensions – offensive and defensive IT governance – and that IT competency has two 
dimensions – IT expertise and IT governance mechanisms. The intention was to ensure that the components 
of board IT governance and IT competency provide an adequate coverage of the constructs.  
The interview phase provided some preliminary evidence to justify the next phase of research – 
investigating the propositions in a more quantitative fashion. Specifically:  
• the preliminary data suggests support of the propositions for the relationships between IT 
competency (Proposition 3), organization size (Proposition 4), organization age (Proposition 5) 
and overall IT governance, the relationships between fit of role of IT and type of IT governance 
(Propositions 6 and 7), and the propositions for the relationship between overall board IT 
governance and firm performance (Propositions 9 and 10). 
• the unsupported relationships between proportion of insiders (Proposition 1), overall role of IT in the 
organization (Proposition 8) and board IT governance, and the contradictory relationship found 
between board size (Proposition 2) and IT governance suggest that the antecedents to board IT 
governance require further research to examine what role these variables play in influencing board 




Chapter 7  
Phase Two - Survey of Directors  
In the second phase of the field research, a survey was conducted with corporate directors to investigate the 
antecedents and consequences of board IT governance. This chapter describes: the process of collecting the 
data through an online survey, the demographics of the survey respondents, the development of measures 
using EFA for the latent variables, the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of the sample, and the 
results of the multiple regressions.  
7.1 Data Collection  
Pre-testing of the survey was conducted with the pre-test participants asked to respond to the survey 
questions and give feedback. Refer to Appendix D for the details of the pre-test and how the survey was 
redesigned to address the comments of the pre-test participants. 
An electronic survey (refer to Appendix E for the survey questions and the survey method) was 
administered to the membership of the Institute for Corporate Directors (ICD). This is the same organization 
that was involved in the recruitment of directors for the interviews conducted in phase 1 of this research.  
7.1.1 Respondent Demographics 
3200 members of the ICD were invited to complete the survey; and 193 responses were received. It is 
difficult to determine the response rate because the survey was limited to respondents who were currently 
serving on a board of directors (self identifying). The ICD’s Director of Communication indicated that 83 
percent of the membership classifies themselves as a director; however this does not necessarily mean that 
the person is currently serving on a board. Therefore, a conservative estimate of the response rate would be 7 
percent (193 out of 2656 members – 83% of 3200 members). However, it is likely that the response rate is 
higher as not all of the 2656 members that classify themselves as directors were currently serving on a board. 
A survey of directors on IT governance in the professional literature reported a response rate of 0.046% 
(Deloitte Consulting LLP and Corporate Board Member Magazine, 2006). That survey, with 455 responses, 
is the largest survey of directors on the topic of IT governance reported in the professional literature. The 
other academic studies on IT governance of boards of directors consisted of interviews of l3 (Jordan and 
Musson, 2004), 17 directors (Huff et al., 2006), a field study of one organization (DeHaes and 




Of the 193 responses to the survey, 4 responses were omitted because they contained little or no answers 
to the survey questions. One additional response was deleted because multiple regression of board attributes 
and organization factors on board involvement in IT governance revealed that the response was an influential 
outlier. Multiple regression is highly sensitive to such responses as they can overstate the coefficient of 
determination, give erroneous values for the slope and intercept and lead to false conclusions about the 
model (refer to Appendix F). Therefore, this response was deleted and 188 responses were included in the 
final analysis. 
Table 9 provides an overview of the general characteristics of the sample. Since directors often serve on 
more than one board, directors were asked to respond for the board of the largest organization they served. 
The responses were from many different industries with no industry representing more than 11.2% of the 
sample. The largest percentages of respondents were from energy/utilities (11.2%), other service company 
(10.1%), other financial services company (7.4%), insurance (6.9%), and advanced technology (6.4%). In 
addition, no one ownership type dominated the responses. Ownership of the organizations was almost evenly 
divided among non-profit (27.7%), privately (30.9%) and publicly (27.7%) held companies, with the rest of 
the responses from governmental organizations (13.3%) (Table 10).  
Table 9 – Survey Findings - Industry Composition of Survey Respondents 
Industry Number Percent Industry Number Percent 
Advanced technology 12 6.4 Healthcare provider/Managed care 10 5.3 
Agriculture 2 1.1 Industrial/Agricultural equipment 3 1.6 
Bank and Savings institutions 10 5.3 Insurance 13 6.9 
Chemicals 3 1.6 Metals and Metal products 8 4.3 
Construction services and building materials 3 1.6 Non-profit 5 2.7 
Consumer products 2 1.1 Other 8 4.3 
Crown Corporation 4 2.1 Other financial institutions 14 7.4 
E-commerce 4 2.1 Other healthcare 4 2.1 
Education 2 1.1 Other manufacturing 4 2.1 
Electronics/Electrical equipment 2 1.1 Other service company 19 10.1 
Energy/Utilities 21 11.2 Professional services 10 5.3 
Entertainment/Hospitality 5 2.7 Publishing 1 .5 
Forest and Paper products 1 .5 Retail 3 1.6 
Healthcare product/Pharmaceuticals 7 3.7 Transportation/Distribution/Packaging 8 4.3 
Total: 188 
 
Table 10 – Survey Findings - Ownership of the Organizations 
 Number Percent 
Ownership   
     Government 25 13.3 
     Non-profit 52 27.7 
     Privately held 58 30.9 
     Publicly traded 52 27.7 




Respondents were also asked to identify some information about themselves. Respondents were first asked 
to identify their current role(s) on the board (Table 11). Please note that the total percent is greater than 100 
because respondents were able to select multiple roles on the board. Notably, 46.3% of the respondents 
indicated that they were outside directors. This reflects guidelines in the literature that recommend that 
boards composition consist of a large proportion of outside directors. In addition, only 0.5% and 2.1 % were 
CTOs and CIOs, respectively. This is characteristic of the small proportion of CTOs and CIOs that sit on 
boards (e.g. Burson-Marsteller, 2005). 
Table 11 - Survey Findings - Respondents’ Title on the Board 
Current title or Status with the board Number Percent 
Board Chairman 29 15.4 
President 11 5.9 
CEO 21 11.2 
General Counsel 7 3.7 
Vice Chairman 11 5.9 
CFO 7 3.7 
CTO 1 0.5 
CIO 4 2.1 
Corporate Secretary 18 9.6 
Academic 2 1.1 
Consultant 7 3.7 
Outside director / Independent director 87 46.3 
Inside director 16 8.5 
Other 8 4.2 
Missing 0 0 
 Total Percent 121.6 
 
As shown in Table 12, 78.4% of the respondents had served for more than two years on the board for 
which they were answering the survey. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that most of the 
respondents were familiar with their board’s approach to governance. Most of the respondents had little or 
no experience working directly in IT (less than two years) (66.8%). This relatively low level of director 
experience in IT roles is indicative of what has been found in previous studies (e.g. Burson-Marsteller, 2005; 
Huff et al, 2006). The respondents were split between those who had no or less than two years experience in 





Table 12 - Survey Findings - Respondents’ Board and IT Experience 
 Number Percent 
Number of Years on the Board   
     Less than 2 years  40 21.6  
     More than 2 years  145 78.4 
Total 185 100 
   
Number of Years in an IT Role   
     None 113 60.4 
     Less than 2 years 12 6.4 
     2 - 10 years 19 10.2 
     More than 10 years 43 23 
Total 187 100 
   
Number of Years of General Management of IT Experience   
     None 84 44.7 
     Less than 2 years 7 3.7 
     2 - 10 years 37 19.7 
     More than 10 years 60 31.9 
Total 188 100 
7.1.2 Missing Data 
In order to deal with missing data, pairwise deletion, which excludes cases from any calculations involving 
variables for which they have missing data, was used instead of listwise deletion, which excludes cases if 
there is a missing value on any of the variables. It is advantageous to use pairwise deletion over listwise 
deletion when there is a relatively small dataset; however, it is important to ensure that the missing data is 
missing at random so that you have a representative sample after removing the cases with missing values 
(Keith, 2006, p. 394). Examination of the missing data revealed that the subjects with missing values were 
not different than the subjects without missing values. Also, a comparison of the EFA results using listwise 
and pairwise deletion revealed negligible differences in some of the factor scores, but did not reveal any 
changes in the factors themselves. Therefore, pairwise deletion was used in the analysis. 
7.2 Measures 
This section discusses the measures for each of the variables in the theoretical framework. First the measures 
for the board IT governance variable are presented; this is followed by the measures for the board attributes, 
organizational factors, and firm performance. 
The measures are a combination of measured and latent variables. For the latent variables, EFA was used 
to analyze the sets of items that measure the constructs. EFA indicated that there was strong convergent and 
discriminatory validity in the data with the items included in each scale having moderate to very high factor 
loadings (all above 0.537). This indicated that the scales were measuring the intended concepts. In addition, 
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reliability analysis (Cronbach’s alpha) tended to indicate excellent reliability (0.692 to 0.943), thus 
suggesting that the items in each scale reflected the same construct. 
7.2.1 Board IT governance 
Drawing on the literature on IT governance, and consistent with the findings from the interviews conducted 
with directors, two dimensions of board involvement in IT governance were proposed: (1) the degree to 
which the board is involved in defensive IT governance activities, and; (2) the degree to which the board is 
involved in offensive IT governance activities. Board involvement in IT governance was measured by asking 
questions in the survey about the level of involvement in each of the two dimensions (refer to Appendix E - 
survey questions 18 and 19).  
EFA revealed that there are in fact two dimensions of board IT governance – offensive and defensive. 
This is in line with both the literature and what is proposed in this research. As can be seen in Table 13, the 
EFA extracted one factor each for the offensive and defensive dimensions.  The items included in each factor 
tend to have very strong factor loadings (all loadings over 0.669) and produce strongly reliable inter-item 
reliabilities with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.878 to 0.920.  
The separate defensive and offensive IT governance factors are used as independent variables, dependent 
variables, and controls to test some of the propositions. However, where overall IT governance (both 
defensive and offensive IT governance) is a dependent variable in the propositions (propositions 1 to 5, and 
8) one variable is needed since multiple regression requires only one dependent variable. Therefore, an 
overall level of involvement in IT governance measure was computed. As shown in Appendix G, an overall 
board involvement measure was created using EFA. One factor was extracted and the items have moderate 
to very strong factor loadings (all loadings over 0.656) and produce a strongly reliable inter-item reliability 




Table 13 - Survey Findings - Factor Analysis - Board IT Governance Involvement 
Analysis 1: Level of Involvement in Defensive IT Governance 
Maximum Likelihood Solution (One Factor Extracted) 
 Factor 1  
Defensive IT Governance 
Eigenvalue: 5.472 
Variance Explained: 60.802% 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.920 
  
Indicate the degree to which the board monitors the following 
issues or activities (scale 1 – 4): 
 
IT project governance/management methodologies 0.870 
Workforce planning and investment to ensure recruitment and 
retention of skilled IT staff 
0.837 
Training and development to ensure the needs are fully identified 
and addressed for all staff 
0.834 
Compliance with the agreed organizational risk profile of IT 0.824 
Organization’s progress or performance toward better IT 
governance 
0.799 
Compliance with IT to laws, regulations, industry standards and 
contractual commitments 
0.770 
Stakeholders' satisfaction with IT (e.g. measured through a 
survey and/or number of complaints) 
0.694 
IT risks to which the organization is exposed 0.691 
Contribution from IT to a competitive advantage 0.669 
  
Analysis 2: Level of Involvement in Offensive IT Governance 
Maximum Likelihood Solution (One Factor Extracted) 
 Factor 1 
Offensive IT Governance 
Eigenvalue: 3.366 
Variance Explained: 67.322% 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.878 
  
Indicate the degree to which the board is involved in the 
following activities (scale 1 – 4): 
 
Monitors that IT delivers against the strategy through clear 
expectations and measurement 
0.863 
Identifies possible IT threats and opportunities critical to the 
future of the organization 
0.830 
Advises during major IT decisions 0.818 
Shapes the business/IT strategic alignment 0.815 
Performs IT governance assurance and self-assessment 0.774 
 
7.2.2 Antecedents to Board IT Governance 
7.2.2.1 Board Attributes 
The board attributes proportion of insiders (Appendix E, survey questions 25 and 26) and board size 
(survey question 25) are common measures from the research literature. The proportion of insiders is the 
number of insiders divided by the total number of directors on the board, and the board size is the total 
number of directors. The measure for IT competency was created for this research and consists of the 
constructs IT expertise and IT governance mechanisms.  
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Although there are no existing measures of IT expertise and IT governance mechanisms in the context of 
board IT governance, there are several measures that provide a starting point. Basellier et al. (2003) 
developed IT expertise scales for business managers and I used these IT expertise scales as a basis for the 
measure of IT expertise of directors in this research. IT governance research has also pointed to the presence 
of IT governance mechanisms such as structures, processes and relational mechanisms as imperative to the 
proper governance of IT. Most of this research has focused at the managerial level; however, several studies 
have also been conducted at the board level (e.g. Boritz and Lim, 2007; DeHaes and VanGrembergen, 2005). 
Survey questions were crafted for each of the IT competency constructs – IT expertise (survey questions 
6(vi), 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35) and IT governance mechanisms (survey questions 6, 7, 8, 9, 11). The IT 
expertise and IT governance mechanisms measures in the literature were added to and modified, to ensure 
that all measures were appropriate for the board of directors in the context of providing IT governance. EFA 
was performed to create factors for IT expertise and IT governance mechanisms. 
IT Expertise: Using EFA iterative modifications were made to the items to measure IT expertise (see 
Appendix H for the details of the process). Any items that did not have strong convergent and discriminate 
validity were deleted from the EFA until satisfactory levels were reached. The final three-factor model is 
presented below in Table 14. The items in the final constructs show strong convergent and discriminate 
validity. In addition, the items included in each factor tend to have moderate to very strong factor loadings 
(all loadings over 0.537), and produce strongly reliable inter-item reliabilities with Cronbach’s alphas 
ranging from 0.840 to 0.914. 
The three factors comprising the level of IT expertise on the board represent three types of IT expertise. 
The first factor, internal knowledge, captures the extent to which board members are knowledgeable about 
IT policies, performance, budget, or other information within the organization. The second factor, external 
information, focuses on the extent to which board members are knowledgeable about information outside of 
the organization or technology in general. The third factor, experience and training, consists of the extent 
of experience and training of directors on the board.  
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Table 14 - Survey Findings - Factor Analysis - Level of IT Expertise 
Analysis 1: Level of IT Expertise on the Board 
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation 









Eigenvalue: 8.417 1.957 1.374 
Variance Explained: 46.760 10.872 7.632 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.914 0.885 0.840 
    
IT policies in the organization a .801 .270 .081 
Performance of IT a .791 .358 .092 
IT risks to which the organization is exposed a .789 .251 .092 
Overall IT budget of the organization a .788 .056 .049 
Overall IT strategy/vision of the organization a .782 .281 .195 
IT resources (people, systems, financials) in the organization a .775 .285 .190 
Existing IT used in the organization a .637 .366 .151 
IT or business people to contact within the organization as 
sources of information about IT a 
.551 .344 .190 
Indicate the degree to which information from management 
about the organization's IT operations and management practices 
is sufficient b 
.537 .107 .200 
    
Secondary sources of knowledge as source of information about 
IT a 
.277 .810 .210 
Applications in general (i.e. internet, electronic data interchange, 
e-commerce, Groupware) a 
.244 .797 .130 
IT or business people to contact outside of the organization as 
sources of information about IT a 
.213 .789 .181 
Technology in general (i.e. personal computer, client-server, 
LAN, imagery technology, multimedia technology) a 
.282 .721 .038 
Systems development in general (i.e. traditional systems 
development life cycle, end-use computing, prototyping, 
outsourcing, project management practices) a 
.224 .640 .333 
Other directors to contact as sources of information about IT a .309 .567 .333 
    
How many directors have worked directly in an IT role within an 
organization or as a consultant or academic (e.g. in areas such as 
IT development, IT implementation, participation or leadership 
in new IT projects, management of IT projects)? c 
.142 .173 .885 
How many directors have received formal training in IT (i.e. 
certificates, diplomas, undergraduate or graduate degrees)? c 
.111 .188 .837 
How many directors have experience in the general management 
of IT within an organization or as a consultant or academic (e.g. 
in areas such as participation in the creation of an IT vision 
statement, IT strategy, IT policies, or IT budgets)? c 
.237 .244 .743 
a 
The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about…(Scale 1: Not Knowledgeable  - 5: Very Knowledgeable) 
b 
Scale 1: Not Knowledgeable  - 5: Very Knowledgeable 
c 
Scale None, 1 director, 2-5 directors, more than 5 directors, don’t know 
  
IT Governance Mechanisms: Using EFA iterative modifications were also made to the items to measure 
the level of IT governance mechanisms present on the board (see Appendix I for the details of the process). 
As with the IT expertise construct any items that did not have strong convergent and discriminate validity for 
the IT governance mechanisms construct were deleted from the EFA until satisfactory levels were reached. 
The final two-factor model is presented below in Table 15. The items in the final constructs show strong 
convergent and discriminate validity. In addition, the items included in each factor tend to have moderate to 
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very strong factor loadings (all loadings over 0.528) and produce strongly reliable inter-item reliabilities 
(ranging from 0.828 to 0.846). 
The first factor, internal activities, captures the structures, processes and relational mechanisms that 
involve activities which include the consideration of IT inside the boardroom. The second factor, external 
activities, refers to the processes that occur outside of the boardroom. 
Table 15 - Survey Findings - Factor Analysis – Presence of IT Governance Mechanisms  
Analysis 1: Level of IT Governance Mechanisms Presence on the Board 
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation 




Eigenvalue: 4.283 1.176 
Variance Explained: 53.536 14.694 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.846 0.828 
   
IT is an item on the agenda of the board a 0.870 0.134 
The board encourages the inclusion of IT on the meeting agenda a 0.855 0.239 
The board works well with senior IT management b 0.753 0.213 
Some board members and IT management (including CIO) communicate 
between scheduled meetings b 
0.672 0.216 
The recruitment of board members includes consideration of IT expertise c 0.582 0.374 
   
The board gets independent assurance on the containment of IT risks a 0.144 0.910 
The board gets independent assurance on the achievement of IT objectives a 0.254 0.899 
There are regular sessions for outside directors to discuss IT a 0.486 0.591 
a 
Indicate the degree to which the following items describe the board's processes. Where 1 is "Not at all", 2 is "Not really", 3 is "To 
some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent". 
b 
Indicate the degree to which the following items describe the board's relationship and communication with management. Where 1 is 
"Not at all", 2 is "Not really", 3 is "To some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent". 
c 
Indicate the degree to which the following items describe the board/management structure. Where 1 is "Not at all", 2 is "Not 
really", 3 is "To some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent". 
7.2.2.2 Organization Factors 
As discussed in the previous section, the organization factors use common measures from previous research. 
Organization size (Appendix E, survey question 40) refers to the number of employees in the organization, 
organization age (survey question 41) refers to when the organization was founded, and role of IT refers to 
the strategic and operational reliance on IT in the organization (survey questions 14 and 15). 
EFA of the role of IT revealed factors that are consistent with those proposed by Raghunathan et al. 
(1999).  Another existing replication of their work was not found during the literature review. Raghunathan 
et al. (1999) proposed one factor with six items to capture the importance of current systems to the 
achievement of the organization’s operating objectives (operational reliance on IT), and three factors with 
seven items to capture the importance of planned IT to the future success of the organization (strategic 
reliance on IT). The EFA of the responses to the survey of the directors (Appendix J) revealed the same one 
and multi-dimensional measures for the operational and strategic reliance on IT respectively with high factor 
loadings and high inter-item reliabilities. 
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As Raghunathan et al. (1999) found, I also found that the items comprising the operational reliance on IT 
capture the importance of the organization’s current systems to the achievement of its current operations. 
Additionally, the three factors comprising the strategic reliance on IT represent three ways that new IT can 
have a future role in an organization. The first factor, which Raghunathan et al. (1999) coined managerial 
support, captures IT’s usefulness in aiding managerial decision making. The second factor, differentiation, 
focuses on the use of IT for differentiation. The third factor, enhancement, refers to activities related to the 
maintenance and enhancement of existing systems. 
The items in the two constructs – operational and strategic reliance on IT - show strong convergent and 
discriminate validity (Appendix J). In addition, the items included in each factor tend to have moderate to 
very strong factor loadings (all loadings over 0.576) and produce strongly reliable inter-item reliabilities with 
Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.692 to 0.917.  
7.2.3 Consequences of Board IT Governance 
Multiple measures of firm performance were used to assess the consequences of board IT governance. This 
section first describes the process by which the different measures were selected for use in this research, and 
then the EFA used to create the firm performance measures is explained. 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance has been widely investigated in the 
literature; however, in a review of the corporate governance research, Johnson et al. (1996) found that “there 
is no consensus on what constitute appropriate measures.” In fact, there is much debate regarding how to 
measure firm performance and it has been described as “one of the thorniest issues confronting the academic 
researcher today” (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986).   
There are two main categories of firm performance measures: (1) financial performance and (2) 
operational performance. Financial performance measures include outcome-based indicators such as growth, 
profitability, or earnings per share; whereas, operational performance measures include non-financial 
measures such as market share, product quality, or measures of operating efficiency. Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam (1986) advised the use of operational performance measures, in addition to financial 
performance measures in order to adequately measure firm performance. Therefore, this research includes 
both categories to measure firm performance, and each category is discussed in turn. 
Financial Performance Measures: Financial performance measures are the most widely used measures of 
firm performance in the corporate governance literature. Primarily such measures are from secondary 
sources (e.g. COMPUSTAT) and include a combination of some of the following: return on equity (ROE), 
earnings per share (EPS), net income, sales, return on assets (ROA) (e.g. Cochran et al., 1985; Daily and 
Johnson, 1997; Pearce, 1983; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Zahra and Stanton, 1988). It was not possible to use 
  
 80 
financial performance measures from secondary sources in this research because a large portion of the 
responding organizations are not publicly traded and therefore financial information is not publicly available. 
Therefore, this research uses subjective measures of financial performance. Such measures have been used in 
previous research (e.g. Burgeois, 1980; Croteau and Raymond, 2004; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984) and 
results similar to objective measures have been found. The subjective measures of financial performance 
used in this research are a self-report of growth and profitability (Appendix E, survey questions 21 and 22). 
These questions were developed by Venkatraman (1989) and used by Croteau and Raymond (2004) to 
measure the performance outcomes of strategic and IT competencies alignment.  
Operational Performance Measures: Operational performance measures have not been as widely used in 
the literature; however, as with financial performance measures there are both secondary and primary 
sources of such data. Since many of the respondents are from non-public organizations this research uses 
primary (subjective) sources of operational performance data. The operational performance measure used in 
this research is a self-report of the degree to which IT contributes to seven operational performance measures 
(Appendix E, survey question 23), they are: (i) return on investment (ROI), (ii) sales revenue increase, (iii) 
market share increase, (iv) cost savings, (v) operating efficiency, (vi) process improvement, and (vii) 
customer satisfaction. These operational performance measures have been derived in previous research. 
Initially, many of these operational performance measures were identified as important dimensions of IS 
performance in a delphi study by Saunders and Jones (1992). Next, Premkumar and King (1992) used a 
weighted average of five of these operational performance measures (ROI, sales revenue, market share, 
operating efficiency, and customer satisfaction) to determine the contribution of IS to operational 
performance. Finally, seven operational performance measures were used by Preston et al. (2008) in a study 
in which they asked CIOs and business executives to rate these measures on a five-point scale in order to 
study of the consequences of CIO strategic decision-making authority. I use Preston et al.’s measures (2008) 
in this research. 
In summary, this research recognizes that the contribution of IT to firm performance may be difficult to 
measure in terms of the traditional measures of financial performance measures– growth and profitability 
– and that IT’s contribution may be also measured in terms of operational performance measures. 
7.2.3.1 Financial Performance Measures 
Growth and profitability measures developed by Croteau and Raymond (2004) were used in the survey to 
measure financial performance. Examination of the survey data revealed that there were a large percentage 
of answers of “not applicable” for the growth and profitability variables. The three growth questions (survey 
question 21) had 42, 40 and 42 responses of “not applicable”, and the five profit questions (survey question 
22) had 45, 37, 47, 52 and 46 such “not applicable” responses. Crosstabs between the ownership and growth 
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and profit variables revealed that almost all of the “not applicable” responses belonged to non-profit and 
government organizations. Therefore, these organizations were eliminated from this growth and profit 
analysis and only privately held and publicly traded organizations were included (consisting of 110 
responses). Additionally, any remaining “not applicable” responses in the new reduced dataset were assigned 
as missing. Examination of the descriptive statistics for the complete dataset and this reduced dataset of 
private and public companies revealed that there were no significant differences between the two datasets.  
EFA of the growth and profitability constructs revealed factors that are consistent with those of Croteau 
and Raymond (2004). As can be seen in Appendix K, the EFA of the responses to the survey of the directors 
revealed the same one-dimensional measures for growth and profit with high factor loadings (all loadings 
over 0.735) and high inter-item reliabilities (Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.897 to 0.910.). The items in 
the two constructs show strong convergent and discriminate validity.  
Finally, since multiple regression requires one dependent variable, an overall financial performance 
measure was computed by summing the standardized scales of the growth and profit dimensions. A similar 
technique was used in the dissertation by Baack (2000). 
7.2.3.2 Operational Performance Measures 
Operational performance measures developed by Preston et al. (2008) were used in the survey. As with the 
previous measures of growth and profitability, examination of the survey data revealed that there was a large 
percentage of answers of “not applicable” for the operational performance variables for non-profit and 
government organizations. Therefore, these organizations were eliminated from this analysis and only 
privately held and publicly traded organizations were included (consisting of 110 responses) in this analysis. 
Additionally, any remaining “not applicable” responses in the new reduced dataset were assigned as missing.  
EFA of the operational performance construct (Appendix L) revealed that although Preston et al. (2008) 
found only one dimension for this construct, two dimensions are found in this research. However, the items 
show strong convergent and discriminate validity and the items included in each factor tend to have 
moderate to very strong factor loadings (all loadings over 0.655) and produce strongly reliable inter-item 
reliabilities with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from  0.880 to 0.882; therefore, this two-dimensional construct 
is used. In fact, the two-factor measure represents two dimensions of operational performance. The first 
factor captures the external performance metrics and the second factor captures the internal performance 
metrics. 
Finally, since multiple regression requires one dependent variable, an overall operational performance 




7.2.4 Control Variables 
In an effort to control for as much as possible the systematic variances not attributed to the independent 
variables, two control variables were planned to be included in the analysis of the antecedents to board IT 
governance involvement. These included: (1) duality (Appendix E, survey question 27) – a variable 
indicating shared CEO and board chair positions which has been shown to influence the board power (e.g. 
Mallette and Fowler, 1992), and has been found to be a significant control in two studies that examined the 
antecedents of board corporate governance (Baack, 2000; Westphal, 1999), and; (2) role of the respondent 
(survey question 1)  – inside or outside director – which was found to be a significant control in Baack’s 
study (2000).  However, analysis of the data revealed that it would not be possible to use these control 
variables. First, 86.6% of the respondents indicated that their board does not have duality (i.e. the CEO is not 
the Chair of the Board). Therefore, this variable would not be appropriate as a control. Second, analysis of 
the role of the respondent variable revealed that 41% of respondents did not indicate if they were an insider 
or outside director, therefore this control could not be used in the analysis. To test Propositions 6 and 7 the 
organizational factors size and age were included as control variables in the analysis. 
A review of prior literature revealed possible control variables for the consequences of board IT 
governance. First, examination of the self-report of firm performance measures (growth and profitability) 
revealed that the measures control for industry by asking the respondent to rate the growth and profitability 
relative to their principal competitor. Croteau and Raymond (2004) used the “built-in” control in these 
measures of firm performance in their analysis of the performance outcomes of strategic and IT 
competencies alignment. Therefore, no additional controls were added to this analysis of firm performance. 
Second, a review of the two studies which used the self-report measures of operational performance revealed 
mixed use of controls. Premkumar and King (1992) did not use controls, however Preston et al. (2008) did 
use controls and found that firm ownership was a significant control. They also examined firm size, firm age, 
geographic location and industry as possible controls, but found that none of them were significant. This 
research controls for ownership (private versus public), organization size and organization age in the 
relationship between board IT governance and operational performance. 
7.3 Data Analysis 
7.3.1 Data Transformations 
Using the SPSS package, the data were analyzed for frequencies. A number of transformations of the data 
were needed before the analysis could begin.  First, two of the independent variables were transformed.  
Board size is a continuous variable and proportion of insiders is calculated using the board size variable and 
the continuous variable for the number of outside directors on the board ((Number of Directors – Number of 
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Outside Directors) / Number of Directors). The board size and the proportion of insider variables were 
transformed by taking their natural log.  This logarithmic transformation was performed to adjust for the 
nonlinearity between the dependent and independent variables and thus to ensure that the regression of 
assumption of linearity was not violated.    
In addition, the categorical independent variables, organization size, organization age, and ownership were 
transformed into a set of nominal scales using dummy variables so that they were amenable to regression.   
7.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
7.3.2.1 Antecedents to IT Governance 
The descriptive statistics and Pearson bivariate correlations for the antecedents to IT governance are 
provided in Tables 16 and 17. Refer to Appendix M for the descriptive statistics of the independent and 
dependent variables that are contained in the factors for board IT governance, IT expertise, IT governance 
mechanisms and role of IT in the organization.  
Overall, the directors indicated moderate levels of involvement in offensive and defensive IT governance, 
and board IT governance demonstrated bivariate correlation with all of the independent variables except for 
proportion of insiders and number of directors, indicating that these constructs appear to be important in 
understanding board involvement in IT governance. 
In terms of the board attributes, the mean board size is 10.3 directors, and the mean proportion of insiders 
on the board was 24%. Furthermore, for the IT expertise construct, directors indicated a moderate level of 
internal and external knowledge, with the majority of boards having experience and training in IT.  
In terms of the organizational factors, organizations included in the survey tended to have 101 – 500 
employees (32.4%), less than 50 employees (19.7%), or 1001 – 5000 (19.7%). Furthermore, organizations 
tended to have been founded more than 40 years ago (32.1%), or 11 – 20 years ago (22.8%). Directors 
indicated that their organizations had a slightly higher operational versus strategic reliance on IT in the 
organization. In addition, it is important to note that the strategic reliance on IT factors are all correlated with 
the offensive and defensive IT governance factors; however, the operational reliance on IT factor is 
correlated with the offensive IT governance factor but not with the defensive IT governance factor. This is 
surprising given that prior literature would suggest that when IT is relied upon operationally and plays an 
important current role in the organization, the board will tend to practice more defensive IT governance. This 
relationship is investigated further in Proposition 6.  
For a detailed analysis of the descriptive and bivariate statistics refer to Appendix N. 
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Table 16 - Survey Findings - Descriptive Statistics of Antecedents to IT Governance 
Descriptive Statistics Mean Number Percent 
    
Board Attributes    
Board Size  10.13   
Proportion of Insiders 24%   
    
Organization Factors    
Organization Size (# employees)    
     Less than 50  37 19.7 
     51 – 100  14 7.4 
     101 – 500  61 32.4 
     501 – 1000  15 8.0 
     1001 - 5000  37 19.7 
     5001 - 10000  12 6.4 
     More than 10000  12 6.4 
Total  188 100 
    
Organization Age (when was organization 
founded) 
   
     Less than 5 years ago  20 10.9 
     5 – 10 years ago  27 14.7 
     11 – 20 years ago  42 22.8 
     21 – 30 years ago  23 12.5 
     31 – 40 years ago  13 7.1 
     More than 40 years ago  59 32.1 












Factor 1  
IT 
Expertise 
Factor 2  
IT 
Expertise 
Factor 3  
ITG 
Mechanisms 
Factor 1  
ITG 
Mechanisms 
















Factor 3  
Proportion of 
Insiders 
           
Number of 
Directors 
-.435**           
IT Expertise 
Factor 1 
.021 -.068          
IT Expertise 
Factor 2 
-.011 .011 .014         
IT Expertise 
Factor 3 








.104 .032 .325** .210* .103 -.008      
Operational 
Reliance on IT 
Factor 1 
-.120 .084 .260** -.137 -.071 .202* .073     
Strategic 
Reliance on IT 
Factor 1 
.026 .031 .220** .006 -.157 .151 .267** .284**    
Strategic 
Reliance on IT 
Factor 2 
-.117 .059 .354** .160 .244** .359** .150 .348** -.004   
Strategic 
Reliance on IT 
Factor 3 
-.081 .060 .229** .016 -.061 .293** -.067 .409** .001 -.002  
ITG -.163 .009 .641** .293** .239** .577** .422** .190* .307** .326** .182* 
Offensive ITG        .217** .270** .277** .171* 
Defensive ITG        .150 .301** .316** .181* 
Legend: ITG = IT Governance 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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7.3.2.2 Consequences of IT Governance 
The descriptive statistics for the controls used in the analysis of the consequences of IT governance are 
displayed in Table 18. The Pearson bivariate correlations for the consequences of IT governance are 
provided in Tables 19. The descriptive and bivariate statistics are on the reduced file of 110 respondents 
from private and public organizations. In addition, refer to Appendix M for the descriptive statistics of the 
firm performance variables that are contained in the factors for financial and operational performance.  
Overall, financial performance was reported to be at a moderate to high level for growth and profitability 
and financial performance demonstrated bivariate correlation with the defensive IT governance factor but not 
with the offensive IT governance factor.  
Operational performance was reported to be at a moderate level for external performance and a moderate 
to high level for internal performance. Overall operational performance demonstrated bivariate correlation 
with defensive and offensive IT governance. 
For a detailed analysis of the descriptive and bivariate statistics refer to Appendix N. 
Table 18 - Survey Findings - Descriptive Statistics of Controls for Consequences of IT Governance 
Descriptive Statistics - Controls Mean Number Percent 
Ownership    
     Private  58 52.7 
     Public  52 47.3 
Total  110 100 
    
Organization Size    
     Less than 50  23 20.9 
     51 – 100  8 7.3 
     101 – 500  34 30.9 
     501 – 1000  10 9.1 
     1001 - 5000  21 19.1 
     5001 - 10000  6 5.5 
     More than 10000  8 7.3 
Total  110 100 
    
Organization Age    
     Less than 5 years ago  17 15.5 
     5 – 10 years ago  20 18.2 
     11 – 20 years ago  24 21.8 
     21 – 30 years ago  14 12.7 
     31 – 40 years ago  4 3.6 
     More than 40 years ago  30 27.3 
     Missing  1 0.9 







Table 19 - Survey Findings - Correlations of Consequences of IT Governance 




























         
Defensive IT 
Governance 
.798**         
Board IT 
Governance 
.948** .948**        
Operational 
Reliance on IT 
Factor 1 
.353** .332** .375**       
Strategic Reliance 
on IT  
Factor 1 
.340** .338** .354** .317**      
Strategic Reliance 
on IT  
Factor 2 
.343** .354** .365** .432** .000     
Strategic Reliance 
on IT  
Factor 3 
.216* .192 .226* .405** .000 -.002    
Financial 
Performance 
.008 .242* .159 .130 .205* .147 -.122   
Operational 
performance 
.455** .411** .447** .410** .210* .485** .086 .302**  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 





7.3.3 Multiple Regression 
Ordinary Least Squares multiple regression was used to analyze the results. In order to test the 
propositions in group I, overall board IT governance was regressed on board attributes and 
organization factors, and board offensive and defensive IT governance were regressed on the 
operational and strategic reliance on IT respectively. Next, to test the first two propositions in group 
II, firm performance, both financial and organization performance were regressed on overall board IT 
governance, with and without the control variables. Then the remaining propositions in group II were 
tested by regressing financial and operational performance on: (1) offensive board IT governance 
while controlling for the strategic reliance on IT in the organization, and (2) defensive board IT 
governance while controlling for the operational reliance on IT in the organization. 
7.3.4 Confirmation (Disconfirmation) of Theoretical Framework 
As shown in Table 20, overall one-half of the propositions are supported.   
Regression diagnostics were performed to assess the model’s adherence to the regression 
assumptions and to identify any data problems. The analysis showed that the model supported the 
assumptions that underlie multiple regression such as linearity, independence of errors, 
homoscedasticity, and normality of residuals.  Furthermore, the analysis of the data problems 




Table 20 - Survey Findings - Summary of Findings 
 Proposition Prediction 






1 Proportion of Insiders → Board IT 
Governance 
21 ** (negative) contradictory 
2 Board Size → Board IT Governance 21 * (negative) supported 
3 IT Competency → Board IT 
Governance 
21 ** to ***  
(positive) 
supported 
4 Organization Size → Board IT 
Governance 
21 not significant not supported 
5 Organization Age → Board IT 
Governance 
21 ** (negative) supported 
6 Operational Reliance on IT → Board 
Defensive IT Governance 
22 + (positive) supported 
7 Strategic Reliance on IT → Board 
Offensive IT Governance 
23 * to *** 
(positive) 
supported 
Group I – 
Antecedents to 
IT Governance 
8 Overall Role of IT → Board IT 
Governance 
21 * to *** 
(positive) 
supported 
9 Board IT Governance → Financial 
Performance 
24 not significant not supported 
10 Board IT Governance → Operational 
performance 
25 *** (positive) supported 
11 Offensive Board IT Governance → 
Financial Performance 
(moderated by strategic reliance on IT) 
26 not significant  not supported 
12 Offensive Board IT Governance → 
Operational performance 
(moderated by strategic reliance on IT) 
27 not significant  not supported 
13 Defensive Board IT Governance → 
Financial Performance 
(moderated by operational reliance on 
IT) 
26 not significant  not supported 




14 Defensive Board IT Governance → 
Operational performance 
(moderated by operational reliance on 
IT) 
27 not significant  not supported 
+   p < .1, *   p < .05, **   p < .01, ***   p < .001 
7.3.4.1 Antecedents to Board IT Governance 
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to test the antecedents to board IT governance with the 
organizational factors entered first in the regression, followed by the board attributes. This allowed 
analysis of the impact of each group of variables on the model. The variables were entered in this 
order because the predominate IT governance literature suggests that organizational factors, 
predominately, the role of IT in the organization, have the largest influence on the level of board 
involvement in IT governance. By entering the well-grounded variables that have been proposed in 
past studies to be important, before entering the variables that will be first tested in this study, the 
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analysis model controls for those variables and allows the separate analysis of the impact of 
organization factors and board attribute variables on the board involvement in IT governance.   
Table 21 shows the model summary at each step in the hierarchical regression of board 
involvement in IT governance on organization factors and board attributes.  The first set of variables 
entered in the hierarchical regression, the organization factors, resulted in a statistically significant, 
explanation of variance (
2
R = 0.284, p < 0.001).  The second set of variables entered into the 
regression equation, board factors, explained a statistically significant increase in the board 
involvement in IT governance ( ∆
2
R = 0.394, p < 0.001), for a total explained variance of 
2
R = 
0.678, p < 0.001. This indicates that organization factors are insufficient in explaining board 
involvement in IT governance – explaining only 28.4% of the variance in board IT governance 
involvement - and that by also including board attributes approximately 68% of the variance is 
explained. 
The regression coefficients of the organization factors show that organization size is not 
statistically significant (Table 21); therefore Proposition 4 is rejected. It cannot be concluded that 
smaller organizations have higher levels of board involvement in IT governance.  
Organization age of 20 years or less was marginally significant and positively related to board 
involvement in IT governance at the 0.1 level (Table 21). Organizations that formed 20 years ago or 
less tended to have higher levels of board IT governance than organizations that formed more that 20 
years ago; therefore, organization age is negatively related to board IT governance, supporting 
Proposition 5. 
The operational reliance on IT factor is not statistically significant; however, the managerial 
support, differentiation and enhancement factors for the strategic reliance on IT are significant at the 
0.001, 0.001 and the 0.05 levels respectively (Table 21). Removing the operational reliance on IT 
factor from the regression reduces the overall 
2
R ; therefore, this factor is kept in the model and 
Proposition 8 is accepted. 
The regression coefficients of the board attributes show that the proportion of insiders is 
significantly and negatively related to board IT governance at the 0.01 level (Table 21). Therefore, 
Proposition 1 is rejected as it cannot be concluded that as the proportion of insiders on the board 
increases, so too does the level of board involvement in IT governance. In fact, the opposite was 
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found to be true, contradicting Proposition 1. Supplemental analysis was performed to investigate the 
contradictory finding.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the literature review revealed that the study of the relationship between 
insiders and board involvement in corporate governance has yielded mixed results. Therefore to 
investigate the contradictory finding for Proposition 1 I investigated two alternate arguments 
concerning the relationship between insiders and board involvement in governance.  
First, it has been argued that boards rely on outside directors to reduce agency costs associated with 
monitoring managerial decision making and performance. Whereas, insider directors are relied on as 
the main source of advice on strategic issues (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). To investigate whether 
this argument holds and whether it might help explain the negative relationship found between 
proportion of insiders and overall board IT governance, I analyzed the relationship between insiders 
and type of board IT governance – offensive versus defensive. According to Baysinger and Butler’s 
argument (1985) there should be a negative relationship between inside directors and defensive IT 
governance (involving the monitoring of management) and a positive relationship between inside 
directors and offensive IT governance (involving the provision of advice).  However, I found that 
insiders were significantly and negatively related to both defensive (
2
R = 0.025, p < 0.1, the 
regression coefficient for proportion of insiders was significant and negatively related at the 0.1 level) 
and offensive IT governance (
2
R = 0.029, p < 0.05, the regression coefficient for proportion of 
insiders was significant and negatively related at the 0.05 level) (refer to Appendix O – Analysis 1). 
Therefore, Baysinger and Butler’s argument (1985) does not appear to help explain the contradictory 
finding of Proposition 1.  
Second, I proposed an alternate argument that boards with a larger proportion of insiders may have 
more knowledge of IT management and have more comfort in IT management and thus do not feel as 
much of a need to be involved in IT governance as would boards with a smaller proportion of 
insiders. To examine this argument, board IT governance was regressed on proportion of insiders and 
various measures of level of comfort the board has in IT management. A cross-product term 
(Proportion of Insiders X Level of Comfort Measure) was added to the model to test the possible 
interaction between proportion of insiders and level of comfort (low and high levels for four types of 
comfort – competency, integrity, transparency and reliability) and their effects on board IT 
governance. The regressions resulted in statistically significant explanations of variance; however, the 
interaction terms were not statistically significant (refer to Appendix O – Analysis 2). This suggests 
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that the proportion of insiders has the same effect on board IT governance for both low and high 
levels of comfort in IT management. Possible explanations for this contradictory finding are 
discussed further in Chapter 8. 
The discussion now turns back to the discussion of the relationship between board attributes and IT 
governance. As can be seen in Table 21, board size is significantly and negatively related to board IT 
governance at the 0.05 level. Therefore Proposition 2 is accepted, smaller boards tended to have a 
greater involvement in IT governance.  
Finally, the coefficients of the IT competency constructs show that all but one of the coefficients is 
significantly and positively related to board IT governance (Table 21). The internal knowledge, 
external knowledge, experience and training, and external activities factors are significant at the 
0.001, 0.01, 0.01 and the 0.01 levels respectively. The IT governance mechanisms internal activities 
factor is not significant; however, removing this factor from the regression reduces the overall
2
R ; 
therefore, this variable is kept in the model. Proposition 3 is accepted as boards with higher levels of 
IT competency tend to have higher levels of involvement in IT governance. 
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Table 21 - Survey Findings – Regression –IT Governance on Board Attributes and 
Organization Factors 
Variables Propositions 4, 5 and 8 Propositions 1, 2 and 3 
Intercept .109 (.245) .498 (.412) 
Organization Size - Smalla -.268 (.315) -.286 (.223) 
Organization Size – Mediuma -.467 (.291) -.408+ (.205) 
Organization Size -Largea -.152 (.293) -.091 (.208) 
Organization Age – 20 years or lessb .307+ (.181) .167 (.137) 
Operational Reliance on IT -.119 (.109) -.002 (.079) 
Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 1 – 
Managerial Support 
.335*** (.093) .170* (.070) 
Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 2 - 
Differentiation 
.380*** (.093) -.003 (.076) 
Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 3 - 
Enhancement 
.221* (.096) .042 (.072) 
Proportion of Insiders  -.573** (.194) 
Board Size  -.785* (.369) 
IT Expertise Factor 1 – Internal 
Knowledge 
 .435*** (.095) 
IT Expertise Factor 2 – External 
Knowledge 
 .210** (.065) 
IT Expertise Factor 3 – Experience and 
Training 
 .218** (.072) 
IT Governance Mechanisms Factor 1 – 
Internal Activities 
 .146 (.098) 
IT Governance Mechanisms Factor 2 – 
External Activities 
 .185** (.074) 
Step 1   
F Value 4.962***  
Model R-Square .284***  
Adjusted R-Square .227***  
   
Step 2   
F Value  13.049*** 
Model R-Square  .678*** 
Adjusted R-Square  .626*** 
Change in R-Square  .394*** 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
+   p < .1, *   p < .05, **   p < .01, ***   p < .001 
a 
Dummy variable for organization size with “small” composed of those organizations with less than or equal to 100 
employees, “medium” composed of those with 101-500 employees, “large” composed of those with 501-5000 employees, 
and the contrast group is those with 5001 or greater employees. 
b
 Dummy variable for organization age with 0 = formed more than 20 years ago, 1 = formed 20 years ago or less. 
 
Hierarchical multiple regression was also used to test whether the role that IT plays in the 
organization – operational or strategic – was related to the type of IT governance practiced by the 
board – defensive or offensive. The organizational factors – size and age - were entered first in the 
regression, followed by the role of IT tested in the regression. Therefore, the analysis model controls 
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for those organization factors and allows the analysis of the impact of the specific role of IT on the 
specific type of board involvement in IT governance.   
Table 22 shows the model summary at each step in the hierarchical regression of board defensive 
involvement in IT governance on operational reliance on IT.  Model 1 presents the control variables 
for the regression, and Model 2 adds the independent variable, operational reliance on IT, 
representing the full model. The control variables entered in the first step of the hierarchical 
regression (Model 1) resulted in a slight statistically significant, explanation of variance (
2
R = 0.060, 
p < 0.05).  The operational reliance on IT variable entered in the second step of the regression 
equation (Model 2) explained a slight statistically significant increase in the board involvement in 
defensive IT governance ( ∆
2
R = 0.018, p < 0.1). This indicates that the operational reliance on IT 
results in a very small, 1.8%, increase in explanation of variance of board involvement in defensive 
IT governance. 
The regression coefficient of the operational reliance on IT shows that it is marginally significant 
and positively related to board involvement in defensive IT governance at the 0.1 level. Therefore, 
Proposition 6 is accepted as it can be concluded that as the operational reliance on IT increases, so too 




Table 22 - Survey Findings – Regression –Defensive IT Governance on Operational Reliance on 
IT 




Intercept .432+ (.220) .396+ (.219) 
Organization Size - Smalla -.733** (.274) -.654* (.276) 
Organization Size – Mediuma -.750** (.263) -.737** (.261) 
Organization Size -Largea -.459+ (.264) -.457+ (.262) 
Organization Age – 20 years or lessb .246 (.164) .264 (.164) 
Operational Reliance on IT  .140+ (.080) 
Step 1   
F Value 2.465*  
Model R-Square .060*  
Adjusted R-Square .036*  
   
Step 2   
F Value  2.610* 
Model R-Square  .078 
Adjusted R-Square  .048 
Change in R-Square  .018+ 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
+   p < .1, *   p < .05, **   p < .01, ***   p < .001 
a 
Dummy variable for organization size with “small” composed of those organizations with less than or equal to 100 
employees, “medium” composed of those with 101-500 employees, “large” composed of those with 501-5000 employees, 
and the contrast group is those with 5001 or greater employees. 
b
 Dummy variable for organization age with 0 = formed more than 20 years ago, 1 = formed 20 years ago or less. 
 
Table 23 shows the model summary at each step in the hierarchical regression of board offensive 
involvement in IT governance on strategic reliance on IT.  Model 1 presents the control variables for 
the regression, and Model 2 adds the independent variable, strategic reliance on IT, representing the 
full model. The control variables entered in the first step of the hierarchical regression (Model 1) 
resulted in statistically significant, explanation of variance (
2
R = 0.066, p < 0.05).  The strategic 
reliance on IT variables entered in the second step of the regression equation (Model 2) explained a 
statistically significant increase in the board involvement in offensive IT governance ( ∆
2
R = 0.166, 
p < 0.001). Therefore, the strategic reliance on IT explains almost 17% more variance of the board 
involvement in offensive IT governance. 
The regression coefficients of the strategic reliance on IT - managerial support factor, 
differentiation factor, and enhancement factor, shows that they are significant and positively related to 
board involvement in IT governance at the 0.001, 0.001 and 0.1 levels respectively. Therefore, 
Proposition 7 is accepted.  
 
 96 
Table 23 - Survey Findings – Regression –Offensive IT Governance on Strategic Reliance on IT 




Intercept .463* (.208) .208 (.195) 
Organization Size - Smalla -.702** (.259) -.333 (.251) 
Organization Size – Mediuma -.792** (.249) -.583* (.231) 
Organization Size -Largea -.623* (.249) -.380 (.232) 
Organization Age – 20 years or lessb .310* (.155) .357* (.144) 
Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 1 – 
Managerial Support 
 .264*** (.070) 
Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 2 – 
Differentiation 
 .289*** (.068) 
Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 3 – 
Enhancement 
 .163* (0.068) 
Step 1   
F Value 3.046*  
Model R-Square .066*  
Adjusted R-Square .044*  
   
Step 2   
F Value  7.339*** 
Model R-Square  .232 
Adjusted R-Square  .200 
Change in R-Square  .166*** 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
+   p < .1, *   p < .05, **   p < .01, ***   p < .001 
a 
Dummy variable for organization size with “small” composed of those organizations with less than or equal to 100 
employees, “medium” composed of those with 101-500 employees, “large” composed of those with 501-5000 employees, 
and the contrast group is those with 5001 or greater employees. 
b
 Dummy variable for organization age with 0 = formed more than 20 years ago, 1 = formed 20 years ago or less. 
7.3.4.2 Consequences of Board IT Governance 
Amount of Board IT Governance and Firm Performance - Table 24 shows the model summary of 
financial performance regressed on board IT governance. Board IT governance did not result in 
statistically significant explanation of variance. Therefore, Proposition 9 is rejected.  
Table 24 - Survey Findings – Regression –Financial Performance on IT Governance 
 Proposition 9 
Variables  
Intercept .000 (0.185) 
IT Governance .149 (.099) 
  
F Value 2.271 
Model R-Square .025 
Adjusted R-Square .014 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 




Table 25 shows the model summary at each step in the hierarchical regression of operational 
performance on board involvement in IT governance.  Model 1 presents the control variables for the 
regression, and Model 2 adds the independent variable, IT governance, representing the full model. 
The control variables entered in the first step of the hierarchical regression (Model 1) did not result in 
statistically significant, explanation of variance.  However, the board IT governance variable entered 
in the second step of the regression equation (Model 2) explained a statistically significant increase in 
operational performance ( ∆
2
R = 0.190, p < 0.001). Therefore, board IT governance explains 19% 
more variance of operational performance. 
The regression coefficient of board IT governance shows that it is significant and positively related 
to operational performance at the 0.001 level. Therefore, Proposition 10 is accepted.  
Table 25 - Survey Findings - Regression – Operational performance on IT Governance 
 Proposition 10 –  
Model 1 
Proposition 10 –  
Model 2 
Variables   
Intercept .197 (0.424) -.075 (.385) 
Ownershipa .567+ (0.325) .423 (.294) 
Organization Size - Smallb -.687 (0.626) -.192 (.573) 
Organization Size – Mediumb -.490 (0.569) .035 (.524) 
Organization Size - Largeb -.948 (0.547) -.587 (.497) 
Organization Age – 20 years or lessc .294 (0.366) .155 (.330) 
IT Governance  .337*** (.073) 
   
F Value 1.104 21.004*** 
Model R-Square .062 .251*** 
Adjusted R-Square .006 .197*** 
Change in R-Square  .190*** 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
+   p < .1, *   p < .05, **   p < .01, ***   p < .001 
a
 Dummy variable for ownership  with 0 = publicly traded, 1 = privately held.
 
b 
Dummy variable for organization size with “small” composed of those organizations with less than or equal to 100 
employees, “medium” composed of those with 101-500 employees, “large” composed of those with 501-5000 employees, 
and the contrast group is those with 5001 or greater employees. 
c 
Dummy variable for organization age with 0 = formed more than 20 years ago, 1 = formed 20 years ago or less. 
 
Appropriateness of Board IT Governance and Firm Performance – Table 26 shows the findings of 
the regression equations with financial performance as the dependent variable, to test Propositions 11 
and 13 - the moderating effect of role of IT on the relationship between appropriate board IT 
governance and financial performance.  
Financial performance was regressed on the two types of board IT governance – offensive and 
defensive - and the two types of organizational reliance on IT – strategic and operational. Cross-
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product terms (type of board IT governance X type of organizational reliance on IT) were added to 
the model to test the possible interactions between type of board IT governance and type of 
organizational reliance on IT (‘fit’) and their effects on financial performance. As shown in Table 26, 
the regressions did not result in statistically significant explanations of variance; and, the interaction 
terms were not statistically significant. This suggests that the level of IT governance (for both 
offensive and defensive) has the same effect on financial performance for both low and high levels of 
organizational reliance on IT (strategic and operational). Therefore, Propositions 11 and 13 are 
rejected because there is no support for the proposed moderating effect of role of IT on the 
relationship between appropriate IT governance and financial performance. 
Table 26 - Survey Findings - Regression – Moderating Effect of Role of IT on the Relationship 
between Board Involvement and Financial Performance 
 Proposition 11  Proposition 13 
Variables   
Intercept -.330 (.291) .045 (.290) 
High Strategic Reliance on ITa .433 (.401)  
Offensive IT Governance -.311 (.269)  
Offensive IT Governance and High Strategic 
Reliance on IT Interaction 
.515 (.406)  
   
High Operational Reliance on ITb  -.079 (.379) 
Defensive IT Governance  .450 (.280) 
Defensive IT Governance and High 
Operational Reliance on IT Interaction 
 -.030 (.387) 
   
F Value .943 1.786 
Model R-Square .030 .059 
Adjusted R-Square -.002 .026 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
+   p < .1, *   p < .05, **   p < .01, ***   p < .001 
a 
Dummy variable for strategic reliance on IT in the organization, composed of those responses with strategic reliance 
greater than or equal to the average strategic reliance on IT. 
b 
Dummy variable for operational reliance on IT in the organization, composed of those responses with operational reliance 
greater than or equal to the average operational reliance on IT. 
 
Table 27 shows the findings of the regression equations with operational performance as the 
dependent variable, to test Propositions 12 and 14 - the moderating effect of role of IT on the 
relationship between appropriate board IT governance and operational performance.  
Like the regression performed above to test the moderating effect on financial performance, 
operational performance was regressed on the two types of board IT governance – offensive and 
defensive - and the two types of organizational reliance on IT – strategic and operational. Cross-
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product terms (type of board IT governance X type of organizational reliance on IT) were added to 
the model to test the possible interactions between type of board IT governance and type of 
organizational reliance on IT (‘fit’) and their effects on operational performance. Control variables 
were not included in the regression because as seen above in Table 25, the control variables did not 
result in a statistically significant explanation of variance in operational performance. 
As shown in Table 27, the regressions did result in statistically significant explanation of variance 
(
2
R = 0.216, p < 0.001 and 
2
R = 0.237, p < 0.001); however, the interaction terms were not 
statistically significant. This suggests that, like with financial performance, the level of IT governance 
(for both offensive and defensive) has the same effect on operational performance for both low and 
high levels of organizational reliance on IT (strategic and operational). Therefore, Propositions 12 and 
14 are rejected because there is no support for the proposed moderating effect of role of IT on the 
relationship between appropriate IT governance and operational performance. 
Table 27 - Survey Findings - Regression – Moderating Effect of Role of IT on the Relationship 
between Board Involvement and Operational performance 
 Proposition 12 Proposition 14 
Variables   
Intercept -.117 (.213) -.312 (.210) 
High Strategic Reliance on IT a .244 (.293)  
Offensive IT Governance .520* (.197)  
Offensive IT Governance and High Strategic 
Reliance on IT Interaction 
.168 (.296)  
   
High Operational Reliance on IT b  .636* (.274) 
Defensive IT Governance  .763*** (.203) 
Defensive IT Governance and High 
Operational Reliance on IT Interaction 
 -.418 (.280) 
   
F Value 8.361*** 8.881*** 
Model R-Square .216*** .237*** 
Adjusted R-Square .190*** .210*** 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
+   p < .1, *   p < .05, **   p < .01, ***   p < .001 
a 
Dummy variable for strategic reliance on IT in the organization, composed of those responses with strategic reliance 
greater than or equal to the average strategic reliance on IT. 
b 
Dummy variable for operational reliance on IT in the organization, composed of those responses with operational reliance 
greater than or equal to the average operational reliance on IT. 
7.4 Summary 
The main findings of the survey can be summarized as follows. The first set of results examining the 
antecedents to IT governance found that six of the eight propositions were supported. However, the 
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second set of results examining the consequences of IT governance found that only one of the six 
propositions was supported. 
The results with respect to the antecedents to IT governance are discussed in terms of the board 
attributes and organizational factors. With respect to the board attributes, as proposed a significant 
negative relationship at the .05 level was found between board size and board IT governance 
(Proposition 2), a significant positive relationship at the .01 to the .001 levels was found between IT 
competency and board IT governance (Proposition 3); however, a higher proportion of insiders on the 
board did not result in a significant positive effect on board IT governance (Proposition 1). Instead the 
opposite effect was found – the lower the proportion of insiders on the board the more likely the 
board would be involved in IT governance, contradicting Proposition 1. As noted previously in this 
chapter, supplemental analysis was conducted to help interpret this result, and this finding is 
discussed further in Chapter 8. 
With respect to the organization factors, organization size was not a significant predictor of board 
IT governance (Proposition 4). However, the rest of the propositions with respect to the relationship 
between organization factors and IT governance were supported. Age was found to be significantly 
and negatively related to board IT governance at the .01 level (Proposition 5), a significant positive 
relationship at the .05 to .001 levels was found between overall role of IT in the organization and 
overall IT governance involvement (Proposition 8), and a significant positive relationship at the .1 
level was found between operational reliance on IT and board defensive IT governance (Proposition 
6), and between strategic reliance on IT and offensive IT governance (at the .05 to the .001 levels) 
(Proposition 7).  
Turning now to the consequences of board IT governance, Proposition 10 was supported - a 
significant positive relationship at the .001 level was found between board IT governance and 
operational performance (Proposition 10). However, the rest of the propositions were not supported. 
Further discussion and speculation on why Propositions 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 were not supported can 




Chapter 8  
Findings 
The overarching questions for this research were as follows: 
1. How do boards govern IT?  
2. What are the expertise areas, and governance mechanisms that represent board IT 
competencies? 
3. Are there systematic relationships between board attributes (proportion of insiders, size and 
IT competency), organizational factors (size, age and role of IT) and board IT governance? 
4. Is there a relationship between IT governance and firm performance? Is the relationship 
between board IT governance and firm performance moderated by the role of IT in the 
organization, such that the relationship is significant when there is a fit between the type of 
board IT governance practiced and the role of IT in the organization, and not significant 
when there is not a fit? 
The findings of this research are discussed in relation to each of these research questions. The 
discussion focuses on how the findings are supported by and contribute to the current literature. 
This research investigated these questions from two perspectives - qualitative and quantitative. On 
some research concepts, these research approaches revealed different findings, but overall there is 
complementarity and agreement. The discussion of the findings with respect to research questions 3 
and 4 pays specific attention to how the two research approaches converged and/or disagreed.  
8.1 Research Question 1 – Board IT Governance Construct 
This research explored how boards govern IT. This research is distinct in that it not only 
operationalizes board involvement in IT governance, but also operationalizes it in a way that 
measures distinct dimensions of board involvement. Thus, enriching the understanding of how boards 
govern IT.  
Based upon interview and survey data of boards’ actual behaviors and actions in IT strategic 
decision making and oversight of IT, two dimensions of board IT governance were identified: (1) 
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offensive IT governance, and (2) defensive IT governance. Activities such as: monitoring that IT 
supports business strategy; shaping the business/IT strategic alignment; identifying IT threats and 
opportunities; advising during major IT decisions, and; performing IT governance assurance and self-
assessment, form offensive board IT governance. Defensive IT governance is conceptualized as the 
extent to which the board monitors activities such as: IT project governance/management 
methodologies; workforce planning and investment; training and development; compliance; the 
organization’s IT governance; stakeholders’ satisfactions with IT; IT risks, and; contribution from IT 
to a competitive advantage. 
Measurement instruments for offensive and defensive board IT governance that have satisfactory 
levels of convergent and discriminate validity and reliability were developed using EFA. These two 
dimensions of board IT governance were originally proposed by Nolan and McFarlan (2005); 
however, based on the literature review, this appears to be the first operationalization of these 
constructs. This may be considered an advance for the field because these constructs can now be used 
with greater confidence in future studies to measure board IT governance involvement. Therefore, 
rather than relying exclusively on proxy variables as indicators of board IT governance, these 
objective criteria can be used. 
8.2 Research Question 2 – IT Competency Construct 
The push for IT governance at the board level has focused attention on the IT competency of 
directors, and prior literature has suggested the need to explore how IT competency contributes to 
board IT governance. However, the literature lacks an in-depth discussion of board-level IT 
competency and its measures. Therefore, this research explored the concept of IT competency and 
defined it as the extent to which a board has IT expertise and uses IT governance mechanisms to 
govern IT. It is proposed that while these concepts are separate, both are required for IT competency. 
This research contends that while IT expertise increases directors’ level of decision-making ability, IT 
governance mechanisms increase the capacity of the board to acquire, interpret and disseminate 
information, thus both increase the ability of the board to govern IT. 
EFA results showed that IT expertise has three factors representing three types of expertise: (1) 
internal knowledge, (2) external information, and (3) experience and training. While EFA results 
showed that IT governance mechanisms has two factors: (1) internal activities, and (2) external 
activities. Measures resulting from the analysis meet the requirements of convergent and discriminate 
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validity and reliability. With a better understanding of board-level IT competency and the 
development of measures for this construct, further investigation of these measures and the impact of 
IT competency is now possible. 
8.3 Research Question 3 – Antecedents to IT Governance 
Based on this research question, the interview and survey data was analyzed for the first eight 
propositions. The data suggested interesting implications. In this section, first the results of the 
analysis regarding board attributes as antecedents to IT governance are discussed, and then the 
discussion turns to the results of the analysis regarding the organization factors as antecedents to IT 
governance. 
8.3.1 Board Attributes 
This research used strategic choice theory to propose relationships between board attributes and board 
IT governance.  Although prior research has not applied this theory to board involvement in IT 
governance, it appears that it may be an appropriate theoretical lens through which to examine the 
impact of board attributes on IT governance. The data analysis seems to suggest that, as proposed, 
board composition may influence its involvement in IT governance.  
Contrary to what was proposed in Proposition 1, a negative relationship was found between the 
proportion of insiders and board IT governance. As discussed in the previous chapter, supplemental 
analysis performed to investigate this relationship did not resolve this contradictory finding. I 
suggested that perhaps the association between the proportion of insiders and IT governance would 
differ based on the type of IT governance, with insiders relied on for strategic issues (i.e. offensive IT 
governance) versus outsiders relied on to provide oversight (i.e. defensive IT governance). However, 
I found that insiders were significantly and negatively related to both types of IT governance, so this 
argument did not help to clarify the contradictory finding. I also suggested that boards with a larger 
proportion of insiders may have more comfort in IT management and thus would not feel as much of 
a need to be involved in IT governance as would boards with a smaller proportion of insiders. 
However, again, this argument was not supported. Therefore, it appears, as others have found in the 
corporate governance literature (Baack, 2000; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992), that there is a negative 
relationship between proportion of insiders and board involvement in governance. The reasons for 
this negative relationship are not clear. 
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The theoretical framework proposed that there is a negative relationship between board size and IT 
governance. However, my analysis of the interview data revealed that the relationship was opposite to 
that which was proposed - with a positive relationship existing between board size and IT governance 
for 73% (11/15) of the boards. However, as noted in Chapter 6, some comments from directors during 
the interviews indicated that the proposed negative relationship may hold for a larger sample. In fact, 
my analysis of the survey data confirmed the proposed negative relationship. Board size was found to 
be significantly and negatively related to board IT governance (Proposition 2). As proposed using 
strategic choice theory, it may be that the level of board involvement increases as the size of the board 
decreases because the smaller board size enhances the ability of the board to work together and 
contribute to deliberations. Given that this is the only study examining this relationship, the survey 
results are compelling evidence for the negative effect of board size on IT governance; however, 
further research is needed.  
The strong support for the positive relationship between IT competency (IT expertise and IT 
governance mechanisms) and board IT governance is important because it offers the first empirical 
support for this relationship. This finding confirms the conceptual IT governance literature on the 
importance of IT expertise and IT competency for board IT governance (e.g. Burson-Marsteller, 
2005; Huff et al., 2006; Jordan and Musson, 2004; ITGI, 2003; Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). Analysis 
of the interview data revealed that for 80% of the boards (12/15), the positive relationship between IT 
competency and IT governance was supported. Furthermore, the strong statistical significance of this 
relationship in the survey data confirmed the importance of directors’ IT competency in contributing 
to their involvement in IT governance. These findings support Proposition 3, which based on strategic 
choice theory proposed that competence may push back limits on the exercise of choice by decision-
makers and thus encourage board IT governance. Therefore, the argument that structures, processes 
and relational mechanism enable decision-makers to access relevant information in a timely fashion, 
and that expertise enables decision-makers to deal with the information when making strategic 
choices is supported. 
8.3.2 Organization Factors 
I used institutional theory to propose relationships between organization factors and board IT 
governance.  As a result of the focus on organization factors of size and age, in addition to the role of 
IT in the organization as antecedents to IT governance, this study contributes to the existing IT 
governance literature in several ways. 
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The proposed negative relationship between organization size and board IT governance was not 
supported in the survey data; however the interview data seemed to suggest that the negative 
relationship does exist (Proposition 4). The interviews revealed that for 67% of the boards (10/15), 
boards of smaller organizations tended to be more involved in IT governance than boards of larger 
organizations. Mixed results have also occurred in the literature. The relationship between 
organization size and corporate governance was examined by Baack (2000) in a study in which she 
found a positive relationship existed. However, the level of differentiation in an organization (I used 
organization size as a proxy for level of differentiation) was found to be negatively related to 
corporate governance (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). The mixed findings of the interviews and survey in 
this research and the conflicting findings from the literature with respect to board involvement in 
corporate governance indicate that future research is needed to investigate this relationship further. 
The analysis of the relationship between organization age and board IT governance yielded 
interesting insights. As proposed, the interview and survey data revealed that boards of younger 
organizations (20 years or younger) were more likely be involved in IT governance than boards of 
older organizations (Proposition 5). This is in-line with prior literature which has used institutional 
theory to suggest that organizational processes reflect the practices at the time of founding because 
the organization adopts the predominant practices in that time and because organizational processes 
are resistant to change (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1988; Stinchcombe, 1965; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).  
This research offers early, if not the first, empirical support for the normative literature regarding 
the role of IT in the organization and board IT governance (ITGI, 2003; Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). 
Specifically, prior research has proposed that a positive relationship would exist between operational 
reliance on IT and board defensive IT governance, and between strategic reliance on IT and board 
offensive IT governance. The interview and survey results indicated that these relationships do, in 
fact, hold (Propositions 6 and 7). Analysis of the association between the overall reliance on IT and 
overall IT governance (Proposition 8) revealed interesting findings. The interview results indicated 
that for only one-half of the boards was the overall role of IT in the organization positively related to 




8.4 Research Question 4 – Consequences of IT Governance 
There are two sets of propositions regarding the performance consequences of board IT governance – 
(1) amount of board IT governance and (2) appropriateness of board IT governance – each of these 
sets of propositions is discussed in turn. 
Examining the consequences of the amount of board IT governance it was found that one of the 
two propositions was supported. To my knowledge this is the first study that directly examined the 
performance consequences of board IT governance. As noted in Chapter 7, there is much debate 
regarding how to measure firm performance. I recognized that the contribution of IT to firm 
performance may be difficult to measure in terms of the traditional measures of financial performance 
measures and for this reason, I also used operational performance measures. The results of the survey 
are interesting because the proposed positive relationship between board IT governance and financial 
performance was not supported (Proposition 9); however, IT governance was found to be 
significantly and positively related to operational performance (Proposition 10). In fact, board IT 
governance explained 19 percent of the variance in operational performance.  
The results indicate that the selection of appropriate firm performance measures is important. 
However, at this point in time it remains unclear which measures of performance are better suited to 
studying the impact of board IT governance. Future research is needed in this area. It would also be 
interesting to conduct a longitudinal study in the future to examine the performance consequences 
because it may be that such a study would be more appropriate to capture the true effects of board IT 
governance on performance. Many board decisions are strategic in nature and may not have 
immediate impacts on performance, and therefore are not reflected in current financial performance 
measures. As noted in Chapter 4, Boritz and Lim (2007) found a positive relationship between 
proxies for board IT governance and financial performance measures that included growth measured 
as the percent change in sales from one year to the next. This suggests that there are financial 
consequences of board IT governance. In addition, in my interviews with directors they identified and 
discussed IT decisions with which they had been involved at the board level. Many of these decisions 
had operational and/or strategic impacts and included consequences such as negative reputational 
impacts, loss of information, increased risk exposure, project cost overruns, and failed projects. All of 




Examining the consequences of the appropriateness of board IT governance it was found that none 
of the propositions were supported (Propositions 11 to 14). This is significant because Nolan and 
McFarlan (2005) argue that boards should align their approach to IT governance (offensive versus 
defensive) with the role of IT in the organization (strategic versus operational reliance) in order to 
avoid unnecessary risk and improve its competitive position. This is the first empirical test of the 
performance consequences of this concept of ‘fit’ between approach to IT governance and role of IT 
in the organization. It remains unclear why none of these relationships were supported. It may be that 
a moderating effect is not the best explanation for the impact of the role of IT. A more mediating or 
intervening effect might be more explanatory. The unsupported findings may also have occurred 
because the measures of performance are at one point in time versus over a longer period. For all 




Chapter 9  
Contributions, Limitations and Future Directions 
This chapter discusses the theoretical and practical contributions, and limitations of this research. 
Areas of future research are also discussed. 
9.1 Contributions 
The research embodied in this dissertation has several contributions to theory and to boards’ practice 
of IT governance. The theoretical model developed and explored in this research is characterized as 
more exploratory than confirmatory and can be viewed as an early step toward understanding 
antecedents and consequences of IT governance. This somewhat limits the explanatory ability, thus 
while not offering a  prescriptive solution for all boards this research will help identify key 
antecedents and consequences that may be applicable in selected settings. The contributions to theory 
and practice are discussed in turn. 
9.1.1 Theoretical Contributions 
As stated in the introduction, the research agenda was to advance and test relationships predicated by: 
(i) strategic choice theory; (ii) institutional theory, and; (iii) Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, in 
order to better explain why and how boards become involved in IT governance and the consequences 
of this involvement. This research extends prior work in four ways: 
1. focuses on the board of directors’ role in IT governance; 
2. examines antecedents and consequences of board IT governance not previously studied in 
the literature by relying on guidance from corporate and IT governance literature, and with 
a multi-theoretic viewpoint;.  
3. develops measures of board IT governance and board IT competency that have not 
previously been studied, and;  
4. empirically assesses the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance. 
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First, this research makes a contribution to theory by responding to the recognized need for more 
research on board IT governance. 
The second contribution is the multi-theoretic viewpoint used to examine the antecedents and 
consequences of IT governance. From a theoretical perspective, the extant literature does not 
adequately describe and explain why some boards are involved in IT governance or why some firms 
with board IT governance appear to have superior firm performance. Using strategic choice theory, 
institutional theory and Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety to study antecedents to actual board 
governance of IT and its consequences this research investigated these questions.  
The first set of propositions in this research examined the direct board and organizational 
antecedents to board IT governance. Strategic choice and institutional theories appear to offer 
complementary views of why boards decide to become involved in the governance of IT. Board and 
organizational antecedents as strategic adaptations or institutional responses to IT governance needs 
are explored. Use of the two theories allowed the inclusion of antecedents to board IT governance 
which have not been investigated in prior research and therefore offer a richer view of board IT 
governance. The results of the survey showed that organizational factors explain 28.4% of the 
variance in board IT governance, and that board attributes explain 39.4% more of the variance, for a 
total explained variance in board IT governance of approximately 68%. Therefore, as proposed, each 
theory gives only a limited explanation of the whole phenomenon regarding the antecedents to board 
IT governance. Taken together organizational factors and board attributes provide a richer, more 
complex view of the antecedents to IT governance. This may encourage researchers of board IT 
governance to explore the impact of organizational factors in addition to role of IT on board IT 
governance, and to continue to explore the impact of board attributes on board IT governance. In 
addition, the results of the survey suggested a relationship contrary to the one proposed for proportion 
of insiders and board IT governance. The negative relationship found suggests that a theory other than 
strategic choice may be applicable. 
The second set of propositions examined the consequences of board IT governance using strategic 
choice theory and Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety. The survey confirms the positive impact of 
board IT governance on operational performance, explaining 19% of the variance in operational 
performance; however, the impact on financial performance can not be confirmed. Therefore, there is 
some evidence that strategic choice theory might provide a theoretical foundation on which to 
investigate the firm performance outcomes of board IT governance. However, the propositions 
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incorporating the concept of ‘fit’ between role of IT and board IT governance approach into the 
extent of performance consequences were unsupported. Therefore, further research is needed to 
investigate whether Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety offers an explanation of this concept. 
The third theoretical contribution is the conceptualization and measurement of two new constructs 
– board IT governance and board IT competency. 
This research explored the construct of board IT governance directly. This is important because a 
review of the governance literature did not find any empirical studies that examined board IT 
governance directly; in addition, it was found that the majority of prior research in corporate 
governance has focused on proxies for board processes rather than directly examining how boards 
conduct corporate governance. It has been suggested that this lack of attention to the processes of 
corporate governance may be why contradictions and unanswered questions appear in board research 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). To address this issue, I developed a board IT 
governance construct and generated its measures using actual directors’ behaviors and actions in IT 
strategic decision making and oversight of IT. This construct was well supported by the survey data. 
Future research could refine this construct and use it to empirically examine the antecedents and 
consequences of IT governance.  
A sound measurement instrument for director IT competency was developed in this research. The 
academic IT governance literature has stressed the importance of directors’ IT competencies; 
however this is the first attempt to my knowledge to define the IT competency construct, develop its 
measures and to test the validity and reliability. Further refinement of this construct could be 
conducted and the construct could be used to measure director IT competency and its impacts on 
board IT governance.  
The fourth theoretical contribution is the empirical assessment of the antecedents and consequences 
of board IT governance. As discussed, the survey results offer support for many of the antecedents 
and the operational performance consequences of board IT governance proposed in prior literature 
and in this research’s theoretical framework. Additionally, this research makes a contribution by 
being possibly the first to empirically test Nolan and McFarlan’s IT Strategic Impact Grid (2005). 
The survey results suggested that as Nolan and McFarlan (2005) proposed, the type of board IT 
governance is influenced by the role of IT in the organization. 
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This research also makes a methodological contribution by offering an additional approach to 
studying boards by opening up the black-box of board decision-making through the use of CDM to 
overcome the challenges to studying boards. 
9.1.2 Practical Contributions 
For practice, perhaps the greatest motivation for board involvement in IT governance is the 
significant contribution that board IT governance was found to have on operational performance for 
the survey respondents.  
On average the survey respondents rated their boards’ overall IT governance effectiveness at 53% 
(an average of 2.6 on a 5 point scale), therefore there appears to be much room for improvement in 
this area. Therefore, the significant relationship between board size, IT competency and IT 
governance may encourage boards to manipulate factors which are under their control in an attempt to 
increase their involvement in IT governance. For example, they could reevaluate the size of their 
board, or the level of IT competency on the board. Furthermore, the identification of director IT 
competencies as antecedents of board IT governance may encourage boards to recruit directors with 
formal IT training (42% of the survey respondents had no directors with formal IT training) or to 
enlist their board in IT governance training programs (86% of the survey respondents identified their 
board as not having received IT governance training). Moreover, the identification of specific IT 
competencies may help boards to identify the types of investments in board IT expertise or IT 
governance mechanisms that may be beneficial for their organization. This could be advantageous to 
boards or to educators for the development of training programs that provide guidance to boards on 
how to increase their involvement in IT governance. For example, training programs could be 
developed that not only focus on raising the level of IT expertise in specific areas, but also address IT 
governance mechanisms that influence board involvement. The identification of board IT 
competencies may also help boards when determining their director recruitment needs. 
The evidence obtained from the interviews and surveys offer practitioners a framework for 
understanding the conditions under which boards are involved in IT governance and the types of IT 
governance activities with which boards are involved. The evidence may also enable boards to 
understand when specific approaches to board IT governance are likely to be most effective – 
defensive IT governance when the organization relies operationally on IT, versus offensive IT 
governance when the organization relies strategically on IT. This may help boards to assess when and 
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under what conditions specific board IT governance activities should be encouraged and how they 
can change their IT governance activities to fit their organizational needs. 
9.2 Limitations 
There are some limitations in this exploratory research which should be mentioned. The limitations 
are discussed exclusively with respect to the survey as the interviews were conducted primarily to 
inform the creation of the survey. 
First, the relatively small sample and the inclusion of only members of the ICD in the sample limit 
the capacity to generalize the research findings. However, demographics of the respondents suggested 
that organizations from a variety of industries and ownership types were represented, and that the 
directors held a variety of positions on their boards. 
The second limitation is the possible response bias due to the fact that the survey relies on a single 
respondent. To assess validity and reliability it would have been preferable to obtain multiple 
respondents per board. However, given the difficulty of obtaining responses to surveys in field 
research and particularly with respect to board members, this was accepted as a limitation. 
The third limitation is the potential for bias in the data due to self-reporting. It would have been 
helpful to have correlated the self-report, especially the self-report of firm performance, with 
objective performance measures gathered from an independent source. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 7 it was not possible to use performance measures from secondary sources in this research 
because a large portion of the responding organizations were not publicly traded and therefore 
financial information was not publicly available. As noted in Chapter 7, the subjective measures of 
financial and operational performance have been used in previous research and results similar to 
objective measures have been found. 
The final limitation in this research is the cross-sectional versus longitudinal nature of this study. In 
particular, a longitudinal study of the effects of board IT governance on financial performance would 




9.3 Future Research Directions 
In response to the limitations in the research, future research efforts should increase the sample size 
and include multiple respondents per board; this would increase the generalizability and reduce the 
response bias of the survey. Future research should also use performance measures from secondary 
sources and conduct a longitudinal study; this may improve the confirmation of the consequences of 
board IT governance. 
Some research areas have emerged during the course of this research. As discussed, there was one 
proposition in this research for which a contradictory relationship was found - a negative relationship 
was found between the proportion of insiders and board IT governance. Supplemental analysis 
performed to investigate this relationship did not resolve this contradictory finding and it was 
suggested, as others have found in the corporate governance literature (Baack, 2000; Judge and 
Zeithaml, 1992), that there is a negative relationship between proportion of insiders and board 
involvement in governance. This negative relationship suggests that a theory other than strategic 
choice may be applicable; therefore, future research is needed to investigate the relationship between 
insiders and board IT governance. 
This research has attempted to model constructs of board IT governance and IT competency. 
Although the models are based on an examination of the IT governance and corporate governance 
literature, and appear to offer sound measurement instruments, because of the complexity of these 
constructs and the exploratory nature of this study, further research is needed to refine and develop 
these constructs. 
Only one of the propositions regarding the consequences of board IT governance was accepted. 
Strategic choice theory and Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety were proposed to explain the 
relationship between IT governance and performance; however, with unsupported propositions 
regarding appropriate IT governance and firm performance it may be that these rational arguments of 
Ashby’s Law do not apply, and that instead institutional theorist arguments such as normative or 
mimetic pressures may influence board IT governance. To investigate this further, future research 
could include deterministic, in addition to, non-deterministic theories in the exploration of IT 
governance performance outcomes. Another argument is that Ashby’s Law does apply and that the 
control mechanisms and factors lie deeper beneath the surface and require a different style of research 
to be uncovered – such as a longitudinal ethnographic study. 
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Other areas for future research have also emerged during the course of this research. This research 
focused exclusively on IT governance at the board level. Future research could investigate how IT 
governance fits within the greater board role of corporate governance. Furthermore, future research 
could expand the scope of investigation to the management level. For example, researchers could 
explore the IT competency construct more completely by examining the knowledge that when shared 
among the board of directors and top business/IT executives contributes to appropriate board IT 
governance. In addition, one area that was mentioned throughout many of my interviews with 
directors was the importance of trust that the board has in IT management with respect to how the 
board governs IT. For reasons of scope this concept was not included in this research; however, future 
research is needed to explore the activities that build trust between the board and IT management, and 
the impacts of the level of trust. Finally, the normative IT governance research has recommended the 
use of board-level IT Strategy Committees to aid decision making; however, as other studies have 
found (e.g. DeHaes and VanGrembergen, 2005; Ernst & Young, 2006; Huff et al., 2006) I also found 
that most boards do not have such committees - 91 percent of the survey respondents indicated that 
their board did not have such a committee. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 6, during my interviews, 
some of the directors were strongly opposed to an IT Strategy Committee. Future research could 






The exact questions asked depended on the conversation between the participant and researcher. 
Below is a general overview of the CDM method and sample questions. 
 
Participant no: __________________   Date: ____________________ 
Time: (start) _________ (end) __________ 
 
Thank you for meeting with me. As you know, I am conducting this research as part of my PhD at the 
University of Waterloo. Before we begin, I would like to thank you for taking time out of your 
schedule for this interview.  
Let’s start by reviewing the information letter and consent form. 
Have signed consent form? _____YES   _____NO 
I will start the interview by giving you some background information on Information Technology 
Governance (ITG). ITG is defined as: the responsibility of the board of directors and executive 
management. It is an integral part of enterprise governance and consists of the leadership and 
organizational structures and processes that ensure that the organization’s IT sustains and extends 
the organization’s strategies and objectives.  
ITG is the provision of oversight of:  
• Oversight of business/IT strategic alignment – ensure strategic integration between the 
current and future IT organization and the current and future organization; 
• IT value delivery – ensure on-time and within-budget delivery of appropriate quality; 
• IT resource management – ensure optimal investment, use and allocation of IT resources, 
including: people, applications, technology, facilities, and data; 
• IT risk management – ensure the safeguarding of IT assets and disaster recovery; 
• IT performance management – ensure project delivery and IT services are monitored. 
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The format of the interview will be focused and somewhat structured and take place in three steps:  
Step 1: Your general background and experience. 
Step 2: A critical ITG incident with which you were involved and where director decision making 
altered the outcome. 
Step 3: The board’s general approach to IT Governance 
You can take your time to collect your thoughts and respond and I may ask follow-up or clarifying 
questions based on your response. The interview will take approximately one hour and a half and you 
will have the opportunity to provide general comments, thoughts and feedback both throughout the 
interview and at the end. 
Step 1: Your general background and experience. 
Board Experience 
What boards are you a member of?  
What is your role on these boards? (chairman, CEO, executive director, non-executive director, audit 
committee member, etc)  
How many years have you served on these boards? 
How many years have you served on boards?  
How many boards have you served on? 
Work Experience 
What is your usual work or occupation (What do you do for a living)? 
Approximately how many years of total work experience do you have? 
Are you now or have you ever been employed by any of these companies (other than as a director)? If 
so, in what capacity? For how many years? 
Have you worked in an IT organization before? What role? How many years? 
Have you worked in an IT role in an organization before? What role? How many years? 
Education 




Step 2: Discuss a critical ITG incident with which you were involved and where director 
decision making altered the outcome using the CDM. 
The discussion of the critical incident will take place in four phases, or sweeps: 
1. Incident Identification 
2. Timeline Verification 
3. Deepening 
4. “What it” Queries 
We will discuss an ITG decision in which director decision making altered the outcome, in which 
things would have turned out differently had the director(s) not been there to intervene, or in which 
the director’s skills were particularly challenged.   
The incident must have taken place in the last two years. The incident must involve your own lived 
experience as decision maker. You should bypass incidents that are memorable for tangential reasons 
and incidents that are memorable but did not involve you in key decision-making roles. 
Sweep 1: Let us begin with identifying and selecting the incident. 
Ask: 
Can you think of an ITG incident in which director decision making altered the outcome?  
Can you think of a time when the board’s skills were really challenged in ITG? 
Tell me about the last unexpected or novel ITG incident that occurred. 
Can you think of an ITG decision when the directors’ skills really made a difference – maybe things 
would have gone differently if those directors were not involved in the decision? 
Listen For: 
An incident that is an ITG decision that took place in the last two years. 
An incident where the directors’ decision making had a direct impact on the outcome. 
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Is the Director is struggling to come up with an incident? If so, I will repeat the background and add a 
bit of description, or rephrase my opening query in a slightly different way, and again give him/her 
time to produce something for me. 
Does the incident not seem to fit the criteria of an ITG decision? If so, I will say “That sounds 
interesting, but we are looking more for incidents that involve …” and I will restate my criteria with 
some rephrasing. “Could you think of one that has more of that flavour to it?” 
Do I need to move the Director along to get through the initial account of the incident? If so, I will 
keep the Director on track by saying, “We’re very interested in that, and I’d like to talk more about it 
in a bit; for now, can you give me a quick overview of this particular incident, so I have a sense of 
what happened from beginning to end?” 
 
If the Director is not able to identify an appropriate IT Governance decision after all of the above 
prompts, then, a semi-structured interview will be conducted with the Director to get an 
understanding of the board’s general approach to IT Governance.  
If the Director is able to identify an appropriate IT Governance decision then I will continue the 
interview. 
 
Sweep 2- Timeline Verification and Decision Point Identification 
Ask:  
Will you give me a quick run through the incident telling me the approximate time of key events? 
Go through the incident saying it back to the Director exactly as it was told to me. Ask, “Do I have 
the sequence and the details right so far?” 
As I draw the sequence diagram I will ask “Do I have this right? About where on the timeline should 
we put _____?” 
Listen For: 
Decision points, shifts in situation assessment, places to probe, gaps in the story, gaps in the timeline, 




Sweep 3 – Deepening 
Using the timeline and working from notes of the interview, the interviewer takes the participant back 
to the beginning of the incident and moves through it once again, taking the story one segment at a 
time. For each segment, the interviewer probes for additional detail. Some of the probes are identified 




What were you noticing at that point? 
What were you seeing and hearing? 
What information did you use in making this decision? 
How did you get this information? 
What knowledge was necessary or helpful in this situation or at this point? 
Information 
What information did you use in making this decision and how was it obtained? 
What did you do with the information? 
Analogues 
Were you reminded of any previous experience? 
What about the previous experience seemed relevant for this case? 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Does this case fit a standard or typical scenario?  
Does it fit an event you were trained to deal with? 
Goals 
What were your specific goals and objectives at the time? 




What other courses of action were considered or were available? 
How was this option chosen or others rejected? 
Was there a rule that you were following in choosing this option? 
Mental modeling 
Did you imagine the possible consequences of this action?  
Did you imagine the events that would unfold? 
Did you create some sort of picture in your head? 
Experience 
What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in making this decision?  
Decision making 
What let you know that this was the right thing to do at this point in the incident? 
How much time pressure was involved in making this decision?  
How long did it take to actually make this decision? 
Situation Assessment 
If you were asked to describe the situation to someone else at this point, how would you summarize 
the situation?  
What was it about the situation that let you know what was going to happen? 
What was it about the situation that let you know what to do? 
What led up to this decision? 
What were your overriding concerns at that point? 
How would you summarize the situation at this point? 
Guidance 
Did you seek any guidance at this point in the incident? 





Critical decisions, cues and their implications, ambiguous cues, strategies, anomalies/violated 
expectations. 
When a probe doesn’t elicit the information expected, ask the same question in a variety of ways. 
 
Sweep 4 - "What If" Queries 
Ask: 
Did you consider other alternatives? 
Might someone else in the same position have done it differently? 
Could you have reasonable taken any other action? 
Would you have made the same decisions at an earlier point in your career? 
Would this incident have turned out differently if you, or someone with your level of skill/experience, 
had not been there? Would they have noticed Y? Would they have known to do X? 
If the decision was not the best, what training, knowledge, or information could have helped? 
What mistakes are likely at this point?  
Did you acknowledge if your situation assessment or option selection were incorrect?  
How might a novice have behaved differently? 
If a key feature of the situation had been different, what difference would it have made in your 
decision? 
What training, knowledge, or information might have helped? 
Was trust important to making this decision? 





Other possible courses of action, other potential interpretations, expert-novice differences, potential 
errors. 
 
Follow-up on Decision 
Ask: 
What has happened since this decision was made? 
 
Listen For: 
Long-term outcome of decision. 
Impact on other areas of governance? 
 
Step 3: The board’s general approach to IT Governance 
 
Board IT Governance 
Is the board regularly briefed on IT risks to which the enterprise is exposed? 
Is IT a regular item on the agenda of the board and is it addressed in a structured manner? 
Does the board have a clear view on the major IT investments from a risk and return perspective? 
Does the board obtain regular progress reports on major IT projects? 
Is the board getting independent assurance on the achievement of IT objectives and the containment 
of IT risks? 
What does the whole board do versus a committee? 
Is IT Strategy Communicated Separately or as part of the business strategy? 
Is the board knowledgeable about the IT strategies in the organization? 
IT Governance Effectiveness 
How would you describe the overall effectiveness of the board’s IT governance? (1-5) 
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Anything that could be done to improve IT governance?  
How would you rate….? (1-5) 
• The fit or alignment between your IT strategy and your organization’s overall business 
strategy  
Effectiveness of Corporate Governance 
How would you rate the overall effectiveness of the board’s corporate governance? 
How would you rate the overall effectiveness of the board in shaping long-term strategy? 
Board Experience, Education and Access to Information 
Access to Information 
To what degree does the board receives sufficient information to carry out its IT Governance 
responsibilities? 
Board Experience and Education 
Discuss each of these statements according to how much it describes the general knowledge level of 
the board.  
• We are knowledgeable about IT. 
• We are knowledgeable about the existing IT used in the business. 
• We are knowledgeable about how competitors use IT to support business areas. 
• Has the board received any training in IT Governance? If so, please describe the training. 
(Who initiated the training?) 
Role of IT 
How strongly would you agree or disagree that IT investments have created value for your company? 
With regard to IT, how would you describe your company’s philosophy? (Innovative or 
Conservative) 
Thinking about your overall corporate strategy or vision, how important do you consider IT to be to 
the successful delivery of this strategy or vision?  
How important do your consider IT to be to the successful operations of your organization? 
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Why is board IT Governance different for different companies? 
IT Governance Mechanisms 
Who is the key champion/sponsor for IT governance within your organization? 
Does the CIO attend all board meetings? 
Indicate whether the board currently has the following practices: 
• Regular executive sessions for outside directors to discuss IT 
• Portfolio management (including business cases, information economics, ROI, payback) 
IT governance assurance and self-assessment  
Corporate governance assessment 
Discuss whether the following items describe the board: 
• The board reviews IT budgets and plans on a regular basis 
• Independent information channels provide useful information about company operations and 
management practices 
• The board evaluates members of senior IT management 
• The board evaluates the CIO 
• The board members and IT management (including CIO) communicate between scheduled 
meetings 
• The board influences IT on the meeting agenda 
• The IT competency of overall board meets the strategic needs of the company and the board 
• The recruitment and tenure policy includes consideration of IT competency 
• There is IT leadership on the board 
What sources of decision information does the board typically rely on as information sources in a 
board meeting? 
Do you have an IT Strategy Committee at the level of board of directors? 




Interview Data Coding Methodology 
The interviews were coded using the methodology described below and outlined in the figure on the 
following page. The figure includes the categories and sub-categories for all of the variables in the 
theoretical framework; however, for purposes of illustration, the codes, interview questions and 
possible answers are only shown for the IT Governance Mechanisms variable. 
First, categories were developed for each variable, then, where necessary, sub-categories were 
developed. The sub-categories were developed for the latent (unmeasured) variables. Codes were 
developed for each sub-category and the interview data was coded and assigned to the categories. 
Next, the coded data for each respondent was organized according to the appropriate sub-category 
and category, and this data was used to assign an answer to each question used to measure the 
variables. Finally, each interview question was give a range of possible answers and those answers for 
all respondents are what are displayed in the tables in Appendix C. 
This process is illustrated with the IT Governance Mechanisms variable in the figure on the 
following page. The sub-category IT Governance Mechanisms within the IT Competency latent 
variable is broken down into three sub-categories: structure, processes and relational mechanisms. 
Then codes were developed for each of these sub-categories. For example, three codes – CHAMP, 
RECRUIT, and CMT – were developed for the sub-category structures. The transcribed interview 
data was then coded using these codes. Finally, the coded data was assigned to the appropriate 
interview question (e.g. all of the data coded as CHAMP was organized as answers to the interview 
question “Key champion of IT on the board”), and one of the possible answers was assigned to the 
question for each director (e.g. the name of the position identified as the champion of IT or in the case 
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Interview Data Analysis 
Table 1 - Interviews – Offensive IT Governance 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Offensive IT governance 
IT strategy is adequately 





No No Yes No Yes 
No 
No 
Yes Yes Yes 











Yes Yes Yes 






No No No No No 
No 
No 
No No No 
 
Table 2 - Interviews – Overall Level of Offensive IT Governance 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Overall level of offensive IT 
governance 





M M H M H 
M 
L 
H H H 
Coding Scheme: 
Overall Offensive level of IT governance – The first two questions in Table 1 were used to assess the overall level. The third 
question, “Perform IT governance self-assessment”, was eliminated from the calculation because no boards performed such 
an assessment. An answer of “Yes” to both of the questions was assigned a level of High to the “overall level of offensive IT 
governance”, an answer of “Yes” to one of the questions was assigned a Medium, and an answer of “No” to both questions 





Table 3 - Interviews – Defensive IT Governance 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Defensive IT governance 




Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes Yes No 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No 
No 
Yes Yes No 











Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 4 - Interviews – Overall Level of Defensive IT Governance 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Overall level of defensive IT 
governance 





M L H M H 
L 
L 
H H L 
Coding Scheme: 
Overall Defensive level of IT governance – The questions in Table 3 were used to assess the overall level.  An answer of 
“Yes” to all questions was assigned a level of High, an answer of “Yes” to two questions was assigned a Medium, and an 
answer of one “Yes” or no “Yeses” to the questions was assigned a Low. 
 
Table 5 - Interviews – Overall Level of IT Governance 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Overall level of IT governance 





M M-L H M H 
M-L 
L 
H H M 
Coding Scheme: 
Overall level of IT governance – The questions in Table 2 and 4 were used to assess the overall level.  An answer of “High” 
to both questions was assigned an overall level of High. An answer of “High” to one question and a “Medium” to the other 
question was assigned an overall level of Medium-High. An answer of “High” to one question and a “Low” to another 
question, or “Medium” to both questions was assigned a Medium overall. An answer of or a “Medium” to one question and 






Table 6 - Interviews – Overall Level of IT Governance Effectiveness 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Overall IT governance effectiveness 






E E VE E VE 
E 
NE 
E E E 
 
Table 7 - Interviews – Overall Level of Corporate Governance Effectiveness 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Overall corporate governance effectiveness 






VE VE VE E VE 
E 
E 
VE VE E 
 
Table 8 - Interviews – Proportion of Insiders and Board Size 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Proportion of Insiders 






Low High Low Low Low 
Low 
Low 
High High Low 
Board Size 





Large Small Large Large Small 
Large 
Large 





Table 9 - Interviews – IT Expertise 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
IT Expertise 




Yes No No No Yes 
No 
No 
No Yes Yes 




Yes No No No Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No Yes Yes 




No No Yes No Yes 
No 
No 
No Yes Yes 
Training in IT governance No No 
No 
No 
No No No No No 
No 
No 
No No No 
 
Table 10 - Interviews – Overall IT Expertise 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Overall IT 
Expertise 
(L - Low, M 






M L L L H 
L 
L 
L H H 
Coding Scheme: 
Overall IT Expertise – The questions in Table 9 were used to assess the overall level. The fourth question, “Training in IT 
governance”, was eliminated because no boards any training. An answer of “Yes” to all questions was assigned a level of 
High, an answer of “Yes” to two questions was assigned a Medium, and an answer of one “Yes” or no “Yeses” to the 





Table 11 - Interviews – Presence of IT Governance Mechanisms 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
IT Governance Mechanisms 
Structures 























Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
No 
No 
No No Yes 
IT Strategy Committee No No No No No No No No No No 
Processes 






Yes No Yes No Yes 
No 
No 
Yes No Yes 
Regular sessions for 





Yes No No No Yes 
No 
No 
Yes Yes No 
Relational Mechanisms 
Directors and IT 
management communicate 





Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
No 
No 
No Yes No 






Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
No 
No 





Table 12 - Interviews – Overall Presence of IT Governance Mechanisms 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Overall use of 
IT governance 
mechanisms 
(L - Low, M – 






H M H M H 
L 
L 
M M M 
Coding Scheme: 
Overall usage of IT Governance Mechanisms – The questions in Table 11 were used to assess the overall level. If a “Key 
champion of IT on the board” was identified this was treated as a “Yes”; however, if nobody was identified this was a “No”. 
The third question under Structure, “IT Strategy Committee”, was eliminated from the calculation of “overall usage of IT 
governance mechanisms” because no boards had such a committee. An answer of “Yes” to at least five questions was 
assigned a level of High, an answer of “Yes” to two to four of the questions was assigned a level of Medium, and an answer 
of “Yes” to one or no questions was assigned a Low. 
 
Table 13 - Interviews – Overall IT Competency 
 Director 




























Overall level of IT Competency – The questions in Table 10 and 12 were used to assess the overall level.  An answer of “High” to both 
questions was assigned an overall level of High. An answer of “High” to one question and a “Medium” to the other question was assigned 
a High-Medium. An answer of “High” to one question and a “Low” to another question, or “Medium” to both questions was assigned a 
Medium overall. An answer of “Medium” to one question and a “Low” to another question was assigned a Medium-Low.  An answer of 
“Low” to both questions was assigned a Low. 
 
Table 14 - Interviews – Self-assessed IT Competency Meets the Strategic Needs 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 






Yes No Yes No Yes 
No 
No 







Table 15 - Interviews – Organization Size and Age 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Organization Size 





Large Large Large Large Small 
Large 
Large 
Small Small Small 
Organization Age 





Old Old Old Old New 
Old 
Old 
New New New 
 
Table 16 - Interviews – Role of IT in the Organization 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Operational reliance on IT 
How important do your consider IT to be to the successful operations of your 
organization? 





H H H H H 
H 
H 
H L L 
Strategic reliance on IT 
Thinking about your overall corporate strategy or vision, how important do 
you consider IT to be to the successful delivery of this strategy or vision?  





H H H H H 
L 
L 
H L L 
 
Table 17 - Interviews – Overall Role of IT in the Organization 
 Director 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Overall Role 
of IT in the 
Organization 
(L - Low, M – 






H H H H H 
M 
M 
H L L 
Coding Scheme: 
Overall role of IT in the organization – The questions in Table 16 were used to assess the overall level.  An answer of 
“High” to both questions, or an answer of “High” to one question and a “Medium” to the other question was assigned an 
overall level of High. An answer of “High” to one question and a “Low” to another question, or “Medium” to both 
questions, or a “Medium” to one question and a “Low” to another question was assigned a Medium overall. An answer of 





Pre-Test Survey Re-Design 
Extensive pre-testing of the survey was conducted with two corporate directors, two leading 
researchers in IT governance, and an expert in survey design. Similar pre-testing of surveys by a 
combination of researchers and intended survey participants was conducted by Raghunathan et al. 
(1999) – pre-test by two IS researchers and two IS executives – and by Premkumar and King (1992) – 
pre-test by three students, three faculty, and three executives. 
During the pre-test participants were asked to respond to the survey questions and give feedback on 
any of the items and any other issues they wished to share. The pre-test revealed comments on the 
survey layout, wording of the questions, and length of the survey.  
The comments from each successive pre-test were incorporated into the survey until the final 
version of the survey was created and an electronic survey (refer to Appendix E) was administered to 
the membership of the ICD. 
First, interviews with the pre-test participants resulted in a redesign of the survey layout.  For 
example, the questions that require identifying specific information on the organization, such as the 
industry, ownership structure, or number of employees were moved to the end of the survey. 
Additionally, instead of starting the survey with questions on the role of IT in the organization, which 
are more difficult and technical questions, some of the questions that were considered easier to 
answer were moved to the beginning of the survey. For example, the directors were first asked about 
their own experience and then their board’s involvement in corporate governance. These questions 
were considered easier to answer by the participants in the pre-test because all directors would know 
about their own experiences (rather than their board’s general level of experience which is asked in a 
later section). Also, the interviews conducted in phase one and the conversations with directors in the 
pre-test revealed that directors were likely to score their boards positively on the corporate 
governance questions. It was thought that answering positively to such questions would encourage 
directors to continue to complete the rest of the questions in the survey. 
Second, the pre-test yielded rewording of some of the questions. For example, all references to 
company or business were changed to organization in order to have consistent wording throughout 
the survey. Also, some questions were reworded to reduce ambiguity, for example the wording 
“information channels” was changed to “information from management”. 
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Third, the pre-test revealed that the survey was too long, sometimes tedious, and sometimes the 
questions were repetitive. To reduce the time to complete the survey to 15 minutes and to hopefully 
increase the response rate, some questions were eliminated from the survey and some possible 
categories of answers were reduced. One of the biggest changes was to eliminate a section of question 
on the board IT Strategy Committee. This was considered an acceptable way of reducing the number 
of questions because the interviews in phase one revealed that very few boards have such committees. 
Also, questions were eliminated throughout the survey if it was determined that the information was 
already being captured in another question, or if the pre-test participants indicated that they did not 
understand the question. For example, the following questions were deleted because their meaning 
was difficult to interpret and because the experience of directors is captured in other questions: “How 
many years have you served on boards of organizations that considered IT to be important to the 
successful delivery of the strategy or vision?”, and; “How many years have you served on boards of 
organizations that considered IT to be important to successful operations?” Finally, some of the 
categories in the answers were reduced to simplify the questions, while still capturing the different 






























































































Identification of Influential Outlier 
Examination of the regression diagnostics revealed the response had high leverage and distance. 
Finally, high influence of the response was revealed through performing the regression with and 
without the response. It was revealed that the significance of six of the regression coefficients 
changed. 
Equality of variance - The plot of residuals by predicted values (ZPRED and ZRESID) indicates that 








Normality of Residuals – Review of the histogram of the standardized residuals again revealed that 
there was an outlier in the dataset. 
 
 
Data Problems – Examination of the standardized versions of residuals – the standardized residuals, 
the studentized residuals – to see if there were any values with absolute value greater than 2, thus 
indicating distance, revealed that case 86 had a standardized residual of 4.29 and a studentized 
residual of 4.79.   
Examination of the data for case 86 showed that it appeared reasonable and that it did not appear to be 
coded incorrectly.  No problems with data entry were identified so the analysis continued to 
determine if the outlier was influential and thus, if removed, would change the regression results.  
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Comparison of the multiple regression of organization factors and board attributes on board IT 
governance involvement results with and without case 86 revealed that removal of the case changed 
the significance of six of the regression coefficients. Therefore it was concluded that case 86 was an 
influential outlier and it was deleted from the dataset. 
 
Variables Regression Results With 
Case 86 
Regression Results 
Without Case 86 
Change in Significance? 
Intercept .373 (.451) .498 (.412)  
Organization Size - Smalla -.214 (.244) -.286 (.223)  
Organization Size – Mediuma -.313 (.224) -.408+ (.205) Change 
Organization Size -Largea -.075 (.228) -.091 (.208)  
Organization Age – 20 years or 
lessb 
.135 (.150) .167 (.137)  
Operational Reliance on IT -.030 (.086) -.002 (.079)  
Strategic Reliance on IT – 
Factor 1 – Managerial Support 
.212** (.076) .170* (.070) Change 
Strategic Reliance on IT – 
Factor 2 - Differentiation 
.069 (.081) -.003 (.076)  
Strategic Reliance on IT – 
Factor 3 - Enhancement 
.100 (.078) .042 (.072)  
Proportion of Insiders -.439* (.211) -.573** (.194) Change 
Board Size -.597 (.403) -.785* (.369) Change 
IT Expertise Factor 1 – 
Internal Knowledge 
.372*** (.104) .435*** (.095)  
IT Expertise Factor 2 – 
External Knowledge 
.163** (.072) .210** (.065)  
IT Expertise Factor 3 – 
Experience and Training 
.202* (.079) .218** (.072) Change 
IT Governance Mechanisms 
Factor 1 – Internal Activities 
.135 (.108) .146 (.098)  
IT Governance Mechanisms 
Factor 2 – External Activities 
.185* (.081) .185** (.074) Change 
    
F Value 9.863*** 13.049***  
Model R-Square .611*** .678***  
Adjusted R-Square .549*** .626***  
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
+   p < .1, *   p < .05, **   p < .01, ***   p < .001 
a 
Dummy variable for organization size with “small” composed of those organizations with less than or equal to 100 
employees, “medium” composed of those with 101-500 employees, “large” composed of those with 501-5000 employees, 
and the contrast group is those with 5001 or greater employees. 
b







Equality of variance - The plot of residuals by predicted values (ZPRED and ZRESID) indicates that 







Normality of Residuals – Review of the histogram of the standardized residuals again revealed that 




Data Problems – Examination of the standardized versions of residuals – the standardized residuals, 
the studentized residuals – to see if there were any values with absolute value greater than 2, thus 
indicating distance, revealed that two cases had values slightly higher than 2.  Since these values were 




EFA of Overall Board IT Governance 
Survey Findings - Factor Analysis - Overall Board IT Governance Involvement 
Analysis 1: Level of Overall Involvement in IT Governance 
Maximum Likelihood Solution (One Factor Extracted) 
 Factor 1 
Overall IT Governance 
Eigenvalue: 8.058 
Variance Explained: 57.554% 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.943 
  
IT project governance/management methodologies a 0.827 
Training and development to ensure the needs are fully 
identified and addressed for all staff a 
0.806 
Compliance with the agreed organizational risk profile of ITa 0.804 
Workforce planning and investment to ensure recruitment 
and retention of skilled IT staff a 
0.796 
Monitors that IT delivers against the strategy through clear 
expectations and measurement b 
0.787 
Performs IT governance assurance and self-assessment b 0.779 
Organization’s progress or performance toward better IT 
governance a 
0.772 
Compliance with IT to laws, regulations, industry standards 
and contractual commitments a 
0.764 
Identifies possible IT threats and opportunities critical to the 
future of the organization b 
0.756 
Shapes the business/IT strategic alignment b 0.740 
Stakeholders' satisfaction with IT (e.g. measured through a 
survey and/or number of complaints) a 
0.706 
Contribution from IT to a competitive advantage a 0.703 
Advises during major IT decisions b 0.702 
IT risks to which the organization is exposed a 0.656 
a 
Indicate the extent to which the board monitors the following issues or activities. (Scale 1: Not at all - 4: To a large extent, 
N/A) 
b 





Iterations for EFA of IT Expertise 
Initial Model (E1 - 19) 
Factor loadings for item E19 was very low (0.255). Further analysis also revealed that 85.1% of the 
respondents indicated that their board did not receive any training in IT governance. Therefore this 
item was dropped from the next iteration.  
 
Iteration 1 (E1 - 18) 





IT Expertise Items: 
  Scale 
E1 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about IT policies in the organization A 
E2 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about the performance of IT A 
E3 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about the IT risks to which the organization is 
exposed 
A 
E4 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about the overall IT budget of the organization A 
E5 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about the overall IT strategy/vision of the 
organization 
A 
E6 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about the IT resources (people, systems, 
financials) in the organization 
A 
E7 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about existing IT used in the organization A 
E8 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about IT or business people to contact within 
the organization as sources of information about IT 
A 
E9 Indicate the degree to which information from management about the organization's IT operations and 
management practices is sufficient 
A 
E10 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about secondary sources of knowledge as 
source of information about IT 
A 
E11 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about applications in general (i.e. internet, 
electronic data interchange, e-commerce, Groupware) 
A 
E12 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about IT or business people to contact outside 
of the organization as sources of information about IT 
A 
E13 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about technology in general (i.e. personal 
computer, client-server, LAN, imagery technology, multimedia technology) 
A 
E14 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about systems development in general (i.e. 
traditional systems development life cycle, end-use computing, prototyping, outsourcing, project 
management practices) 
A 
E15 The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about other directors to contact as sources of 
information about IT 
A 
E16 How many directors have worked directly in an IT role within an organization or as a consultant or 
academic (e.g. in areas such as IT development, IT implementation, participation or leadership in new IT 
projects, management of IT projects)? 
B 
E17 How many directors have received formal training in IT (i.e. certificates, diplomas, undergraduate or 
graduate degrees)? 
B 
E18 How many directors have experience in the general management of IT within an organization or as a 
consultant or academic (e.g. in areas such as participation in the creation of an IT vision statement, IT 
strategy, IT policies, or IT budgets)? 
B 
E19 Has the board received any training in IT Governance? C 
Scale: 
A: 1: Not Knowledgeable  - 5: Very Knowledgeable 
B: None, 1 director, 2-5 directors, more than 5 directors, don’t know 





Iterations for EFA of IT Governance Mechanisms 
Initial Model (RM1 – 5, P1 – 7, S1 – 5) 
Before performing the EFA, a couple of actions were taken to ensure that all items should be included 
in the analysis. 
Firstly, items with a large number of “not applicable” responses were removed from the EFA. Cross-
tabulations with items RM4 (15.3% not applicable), RM5 (15.5%), P4 (17.1%) and S3 (16.5%) and 
the question “How long has the CIO been in the position” (Survey question 44) revealed that those 
organizations that did not have a CIO answered “not applicable” on the aforementioned items. 
Therefore, it was determined that since questions which specifically asked about the CIO had a large 
number of “not applicable” responses they were removed from the EFA. 
Secondly, examination of items S4 and S5 revealed that 96.3% have a champion of IT and that 91.4% 
do not have an IT Strategy Committee. Therefore, it was determined that inclusion of these items in 
the EFA would not be beneficial to the analysis. 
 
Iteration 1 (RM1 – 3, P1, P2, P3, P5, P6, P7, S1, S2, S4, S5) 
EFA on the items revealed that factor loadings for item S2 was very low (0.367). Therefore this item 
was dropped from the next iteration.  
 
Iteration 2 (RM1 – 3, P1, P2, P3, P5, P6, P7, S1, S4, S5) 
EFA on the items revealed that factor loadings for item P2 was at a moderate to low level and was 
equal for factor 1 and factor 2 (0.509 and 0.510). Therefore, it was determined that this item did not 
load strongly on either factor, and this item was dropped from the next iteration.  
 
Iteration 3 (RM1 – 3, P1, P3, P5, P6, P7, S1, S4, S5) 
EFA on the items revealed that item RM3 loaded strongly on factor 3 (0.923) by itself (no other items 
loaded on factor 3). Examination of this item revealed that the responses to this item were highly 
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skewed to the right with the almost all of the responses (96.3%) falling in the 3 (to some extent) and 4 
(to a large extent) response categories. Therefore, it was determined that inclusion of this item in the 
EFA would not be beneficial to the analysis and it was dropped from the next iteration.  
 
Iteration 4 (RM1, RM2, P1, P3, P5, P6, P7, S1, S4, S5) 
The resulting 8 item model had satisfactory factor loadings; therefore no further modification was 
done. 
 
IT Governance Mechanisms Items: 
RM1 – 5, P1 – 7, S1 – 5 
 
Relational Mechanisms - Indicate the degree to which the following items describe the board's relationship and 
communication with management. Where 1 is "Not at all", 2 is "Not really", 3 is "To some extent", and 4 is "To a large 
extent". 
 
RM1 Some board members and IT management (including CIO) communicate between scheduled meetings 
RM2 The board works well with senior IT management 
RM3 The board works well with senior business management 
RM4 The CIO participates in board meetings 
RM5 The CIO participates in Audit Committee meetings 
 
Processes - Indicate the degree to which the following items describe the board's processes. Where 1 is "Not at all", 2 is 
"Not really", 3 is "To some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent". 
 
P1 IT is an item on the agenda of the board 
P2 IT is an item on the agenda of the Audit Committee 
P3 The board encourages the inclusion of IT on the meeting agenda 
P4 If necessary, the board members voice opinions that conflict with the CIO’s view 
P5 The board gets independent assurance on the achievement of IT objectives 
P6 The board gets independent assurance on the containment of IT risks 
P7 There are regular sessions for outside directors to discuss IT 
 
Structures - Indicate the degree to which the following items describe the board/management structure. Where 1 is "Not at 
all", 2 is "Not really", 3 is "To some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent". 
 
S1 The recruitment of board members includes consideration of IT expertise 
S2 The IT expertise of the overall board meets the needs of the company and the board 
S3 The CIO reports to the CEO and/or COO 
S4 There is a key champion/sponsor for ensuring that IT is well managed within my organization (Yes/No) 





EFA of Role of IT 
Survey Findings - Factor Analysis - Role of IT in the Organization 
Analysis 1: Operational Reliance on IT in the Organization 
Maximum Likelihood Solution (One Factor Extracted) 
 Factor 1 
Eigenvalue: 4.258 
Variance Explained: 70.973% 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.917 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements as they relate to the existing IT in 
the organization. Where 1 is “Disagree Strongly” and 5 is “Agree Strongly”: 
IT breakdown will critically affect one or more of our 
functional departments 
0.890 
Organization relies heavily on IT for efficient operation 0.875 
IT is vital to our organization 0.864 
IT breakdown for extended periods will affect 
organizational activities severely 
0.863 
IT breakdown will affect our database access 0.796 




Analysis 2: Strategic Reliance on IT in the Organization 
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation 







Eigenvalue: 4.227 1.24 1.033 
Variance Explained: 46.965% 13.782% 11.482% 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.841 0.785 0.692 
Please indicate the significance of the following items as components of your portfolio of planned IT projects. Where 1 is 
“Very Unimportant” and 5 is “Very Important”: 
Projects whose primary benefit is providing new decision 
support information to top management 
0.850 0.175 0.165 
Projects whose primary benefit is providing new decision 
support information to middle and lower levels of 
management 
0.837 0.149 0.055 
Projects which enable development of new administrative 
control and planning processes 
0.728 0.221 0.248 
Projects which offer significant tangible benefits through 
improved operational efficiencies 
0.601 0.328 0.450 
    
Projects which will allow the organization to develop and 
offer new products or services for sale 
0.113 0.915 0.058 
Projects which appear to offer new ways for the 
organization to compete 
0.235 0.861 0.112 
Projects involving application of new technologies 0.312 0.576 0.291 
    
Projects focusing on routine maintenance to meet 
evolving business needs, new regulatory or legal 
requirements 
0.069 0.154 0.861 





EFA of Financial Performance 
Survey Findings - Factor Analysis - Financial Performance 
Analysis 1: Financial Growth 
Maximum Likelihood Solution (One Factor Extracted) 
 Factor 1 
Growth 
Eigenvalue: 2.493 
Variance Explained: 83.104% 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.897 
  
Please rate your organization’s level of growth. Where 1 is 
"Very Low" and 5 is "Very High". 
 
The market share gains relative to our principal competitors 
are 
0.921 
My satisfaction with sales growth rate is 0.908 




Analysis 2: Financial Profit 
Maximum Likelihood Solution / (One Factor Extracted) 
 Factor 1 
Profit 
  
Eigenvalue: 3.733   
Variance Explained: 74.666%   
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.910   
    
Please rate your organization’s level of profitability. Where 
1 is "Very Low" and 5 is "Very High". 
   
My satisfaction with the return on corporate investment is 0.930   
The net profit position relative to our principal competitor is 0.897   
The return on corporate investment position relative to our 
principal competition is 
0.875   
My satisfaction with return on sales is 0.870   
The financial liquidity position relative to our principal 
competitor is 





EFA of Operational performance 
Survey Findings - Factor Analysis - Operational performance 
Analysis 1: Operational performance 
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation 
 Factor 1 -  
External 
Performance  




Eigenvalue: 4.389 1.101  
Variance Explained: 62.705% 15.735%  
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.882 0.880  
    
Please assess the extent to which IT has contributed to the 
following seven areas of organizational performance. 
Where 1 is "Contribution is minimal" and 5 is "IT has 
contributed to a very great extent". 
   
Sales Revenue Increase .943 .172  
Market Share Increase .917 .244  
Customer Satisfaction .676 .488  
Return on Investment (ROI) .655 .355  
    
Process Improvement .225 .892  
Operating Efficiency .244 .883  





Descriptives for Variables Contained in Factors 
Board Involvement in IT Governance 
Defensive IT Governance 
Indicate the degree to which the board monitors the following issues or activities. Where 1 is “Not at 










50 54 61 17 3 3 188 
Workforce planning and 
investment to ensure 
recruitment and retention of 
skilled IT staff 
2.7 
(1.015) 
51 53 66 13 3 2 188 
Training and development to 
ensure the needs are fully 




51 57 62 12 3 3 188 
Compliance with the agreed 




34 42 77 27 6 2 188 
Organization’s progress or 




44 50 69 18 3 4 188 
Compliance with IT to laws, 
regulations, industry standards 
and contractual commitments 
2.45 
(1.167) 
37 44 64 36 5 2 188 
Stakeholders' satisfaction with 
IT (e.g. measured through a 




52 56 55 15 8 2 188 
IT risks to which the 
organization is exposed 
2.88  
(1.017) 
15 33 82 53 3 2 188 








Offensive IT Governance 
Indicate the degree to which the board is involved in the following activities. Where 1 is “Not at all”, 




1 2 3 4 N/A Missing Total 
Monitors that IT delivers 
against the strategy through 




45 63 55 21 3 1 188 
Identifies possible IT threats 
and opportunities critical to 
the future of the organization 
2.25 
(1.002) 
42 61 65 16 3 1 188 




40 40 63 40 4 1 188 




47 55 62 19 4 1 188 
Performs IT governance 
assurance and self-assessment 
2.01 
(1.029) 
61 61 48 13 4 1 188 
 
IT Competency of Board 
IT Expertise 
Factor 1 – Internal Knowledge Factor 
Please indicate the extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about ….  




1 2 3 4 5 Missing Total 
IT policies in the organization 2.46 
(1.031) 
37 62 58 27 4 0 188 
The performance of IT 2.76 
(1.015) 
23 49 74 35 7 0 188 




21 43 58 53 12 1 188 




16 51 50 60 10 1 188 




26 49 58 43 12 0 188 
The IT resources (people, systems, 
financials) in the organization 
2.83 
(1.049) 
22 43 79 31 12 1 188 
Existing IT used in the organization 2.89 
(0.959) 
13 50 77 40 8 0 188 
IT or business people to contact within 
the organization as sources of 
information about IT 
3.20 
(1.145) 





IT Expertise Continued 











3 – To 
some 
extent 
4- To a 
large 
extent 
N/A Missing Total 
Indicate the degree to which 
information from management 
about the organization's IT 
operations and management 
practices is sufficient 
2.6 
(1.027) 
19 55 77 33 4  188 
 
Factor 2 – External Knowledge Factor 
Please indicate the extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about ….  




1 2 3 4 5 Missing Total 
Secondary sources of knowledge as 
source of information about IT 
2.48 
(0.993) 
30 70 58 23 5 2 188 
Applications in general (i.e. internet, 




7 53 76 42 10 0 188 
IT or business people to contact outside 
of the organization as sources of 
information about IT 
2.55 
(1.011) 
28 65 64 23 7 1 188 
Technology in general (i.e. personal 
computer, client-server, LAN, imagery 
technology, multimedia technology) 
3.04 
(0.930) 
7 47 74 51 9 0 188 
Systems development in general (i.e. 
traditional systems development life 
cycle, end-use computing, prototyping, 




24 72 55 32 5 0 188 
Other directors to contact as sources of 
information about IT 
2.83 
(1.159) 




IT Expertise Continued 
Factor 3 – Experience and Training Factor 
 None 1  2-5  More 




How many directors have worked 
directly in an IT role within an 
organization or as a consultant or 
academic (e.g. in areas such as IT 
development, IT implementation, 
participation or leadership in new IT 
projects, management of IT projects)? 
64 55 54 4 11  188 
How many directors have received 
formal training in IT (i.e. certificates, 
diplomas, undergraduate or graduate 
degrees)? 
78 43 34 7 26  188 
How many directors have experience in 
the general management of IT within an 
organization or as a consultant or 
academic (e.g. in areas such as 
participation in the creation of an IT 
vision statement, IT strategy, IT policies, 
or IT budgets)? 
41 49 81 5 11  188 
 
IT Governance Mechanisms 
Factor 1 – Internal Activities Factor 
Indicate the extent to which the following items describe the board’s activities. Where 1 is “Not at 




1 2 3 4 N/A Missing Total 




48 53 49 33 4 1 188 
The board encourages the 




47 43 56 35 6 1 188 
The board works well with 
senior IT management 
2.41 
(1.331) 
16 44 81 30 16 1 188 
Some board members and IT 





34 62 58 25 9 0 188 
The recruitment of board 
members includes 
consideration of IT expertise 
2.12 
(1.215) 






IT Governance Mechanisms Continued 
 
Factor 2 – External Activities Factor 
Indicate the extent to which the following items describe the board’s activities. Where 1 is “Not at 




1 2 3 4 N/A Missing Total 
The board gets independent 
assurance on the containment 
of IT risks 
1.87 
(1.263) 
66 53 32 23 12 2 188 
The board gets independent 
assurance on the achievement 
of IT objectives 
2.06 
(1.249) 
56 48 49 24 10 1 188 
There are regular sessions for 
outside directors to discuss IT 
1.69 
(1.182) 
84 51 23 18 11 1 188 
 
Role of IT 
Operational Reliance on IT 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements as they relate 




1 2 3 4 5 Missing Total 
IT breakdown will critically 




3 10 17 61 96 1 188 
The organization relies heavily 
on IT for efficient operation 
4.24 
(0.906) 
3 6 23 66 90 0 188 
IT is vital to our organization 4.37 
(0.964) 
5 5 20 43 115 0 188 
IT breakdown for extended 





5 6 17 43 117 0 188 




2 7 22 59 98 0 188 
IT breakdown will affect 








Strategic Reliance on IT 
Factor 1 – Managerial Support Factor 
Please indicate the significance of the following items as components of your portfolio of planned IT 




1 2 3 4 5 Missing Total 
Projects whose primary 
benefit is providing new 
decision support information 
to top management 
3.26 
(1.041) 
8 38 60 60 21 1 187 
Projects whose primary 
benefit is providing new 
decision support information 




12 32 66 62 16 0 188 
Projects which enable 
development of new 




5 28 60 75 20 0 188 
Projects which offer 
significant tangible benefits 




7 16 53 69 43 0 188 
 
Factor 2 – Differentiation Factor 
Please indicate the significance of the following items as components of your portfolio of planned IT 




1 2 3 4 5 Missing Total 
Projects which will allow the 
organization to develop and 




31 31 40 48 38 0 188 
Projects which appear to offer 




22 30 47 48 40 1 188 
Projects involving application 
of new technologies 
3.40 
(1.098) 




Strategic Reliance on IT Continued 
 
Factor 3 – Enhancement Factor 
Please indicate the significance of the following items as components of your portfolio of planned IT 




1 2 3 4 5 Missing Total 
Projects focusing on routine 
maintenance to meet evolving 
business needs, new 




6 14 47 85 36 0 188 












1 2 3 4 5 N/A Missing Total 
The return on corporate 
investment position relative 




2 12 28 48 15 5 0 110 
My satisfaction with the 




5 21 27 43 11 3 0 110 
My satisfaction with return 
on sales is 
3.04 
(1.483) 
6 17 32 35 13 7 0 110 
The net profit position 




3 11 35 33 20 7 1 110 
The financial liquidity 
position relative to our 
principal competitor is 
3.51 
(1.525) 









1 2 3 4 5 N/A Missing Total 
The sales growth position 




4 3 36 36 25 6 0 110 
My satisfaction with sales 
growth rate is 
3.26 
(1.482) 
6 11 31 36 20 6 0 110 
The market share gains 




5 9 31 39 20 6 0 110 
 
Operational performance 
Factor 1 - External Performance Metrics 
Please assess the extent to which IT has contributed to the following seven areas of organizational 





1 2 3 4 5 N/A Missing Total 
Sales Revenue Increase 2.65 
(1.529) 
16 15 40 21 10 8 0 110 
Market Share Increase 2.66 
(1.540) 
15 20 31 27 9 8 0 110 
Customer Satisfaction 2.98 
(1.622) 
10 7 38 29 16 9 0 110 








Factor 2 - Internal Performance Metrics 
Please assess the extent to which IT has contributed to the following seven areas of organizational 





1 2 3 4 5 N/A Missing Total 
Process Improvement 3.37 
(1.248) 
4 14 30 43 16 3 0 110 
Operating Efficiency 3.47 
(1163) 
3 7 34 49 14 3 0 110 
Cost Savings 3.12 
(1.254) 




Analysis of Descriptive and Bivariate Statistics 
Board IT governance: Board IT governance is the self-reported level of involvement in offensive 
and defensive board-level IT governance activities. The survey respondents reported their board’s 
involvement in offensive IT governance using a 5-item scale (scored from 1 to 4). The mean ranged 
from 2.01 to 2.49 for the items indicating a moderate level of involvement in offensive activities. The 
boards’ involvement in defensive IT governance was measured using a 9-item scale (scored from 1 to 
4), and the mean was also at a moderate level (ranging from 2.05 to 2.88) with the highest value 
greater than the measures for offensive IT governance. Board IT governance demonstrated bivariate 
correlation with all of the dependent variables except for proportion of insiders and number of 
directors. 
Board Attributes: Mean board size is 10.3 directors, with the smallest board having 3 members and 
the largest board having 25 members.  Bivariate correlations indicate that board size is related to the 
proportion of insiders, and the IT expertise experience and training factor (factor 3). 
The mean proportion of insiders on the board was 24%, with the proportion of insiders ranging 
from 0%, no insiders on the board (38 boards), to 100%, all board members were insiders (7 boards).  
Proportion of insiders is correlated with the number of directors and the IT governance mechanisms 
internal activities factor (factor 1). 
The IT expertise construct is composed of 3 factors. The first factor, internal knowledge, is 
composed of a 9-item measure and a 1-item measure. The mean per-item score of the nine-item 
internal knowledge measure ranged from 2.46 to 3.20 on a 1 to 5 scale indicating boards’ moderate 
level of knowledge of IT internal to the organization. The 1-item internal knowledge measure (scored 
from 1 to 4) showed that the majority of the boards (59%) rated themselves a 3 or 4, indicating that 
they receive sufficient information from management about the organization's IT operations and 
management practices. 30% rated themselves a 2, and 10% rated themselves as not receiving 
sufficient information from management at all. The second IT expertise factor, external knowledge, is 
composed of a 6-item measure with means ranging from 2.48 to 3.04 on a 1 to 5 scale. The third IT 
expertise factor, experience and training, is composed of a 3-item measure that indicates the number 
of directors who have IT experience and training (scored from none, 1 director, 2-5 directors, and 
greater than 5 directors). 60% of the boards have 1-5 directors who have worked directly in an IT role 
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within an organization and 34% have no directors with such experience. Similarly, 70% of the boards 
have 1-5 directors who have received formal training in IT and 22% have no directors with such 
training. Finally, 41% of the boards have 1-5 directors with experience in the general management of 
IT and 42% with no such experience. 
The IT governance mechanism construct is composed of 2 factors. The first factor, internal 
activities, is composed of a 5-item measure (scored from 1 to 4) with means ranging from 2.12 to 
2.41. This indicates a moderate level of use of processes and relational mechanisms inside the 
boardroom that involve the consideration of IT. The second factor, external activities, is composed of 
a 3-item measure (scored from 1 to 4) with means ranging from 1.69 to 2.06. This indicates a low to 
moderate level of involvement in processes that occur outside of the boardroom. 
All the IT expertise and IT governance mechanisms factors are correlated with the board 
involvement in IT governance factor, indicating that these constructs appear to be important in 
understanding board involvement in IT governance. Additionally, the IT expertise internal knowledge 
factor is correlated with all the IT governance mechanisms factors, the IT expertise external 
knowledge factor is correlated with the IT governance mechanism external activities factors, and the 
IT expertise experience and training factor is correlated with the number of directors and the IT 
governance mechanism internal activities factor.  
Organization Factors: Organizations included in the survey tended to have 101 – 500 employees 
(32.4%), less than 50 employees (19.7%), or 1001 – 5000 (19.7%). Furthermore, organizations tended 
to have been founded more than 40 years ago (32.1%), or 11 – 20 years ago (22.8%).  
The survey respondents indicated their organization’s role of IT on two dimensions – operational 
and strategic reliance. The respondents reported their perceptions of the operational reliance on IT 
with a construct measured using a 6-item scale (scored from 1 to 5). The mean for the items ranged 
from 3.99 to 4.39 indicated a moderate to strong operational reliance on IT. The respondents reported 
their perceptions of the strategic reliance on IT in the organization with a construct measured using 3 
scales. The first scale, the managerial support factor, was a 4-item scale (scored from 1 to 5) and the 
mean scores ranged from 3.2 to 3.66. The second scale, the differentiation factor, was a 3-item scale 
(scored from 1 to 5) and the mean scores ranged from 3.16 to 3.4. Finally, the third scale, the 
enhancement factor, was a 2-item scale (scored from 1 to 5) and the mean scores were 3.68 and 3.70. 
These results indicate that organizations had a slightly higher operational versus strategic reliance on 
IT in the organization. Bivariate statistics indicate that the operational reliance on IT factor is related 
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to all of the strategic reliance on IT factors. In addition, it is important to note that the strategic 
reliance on IT factors are all correlated with the offensive and defensive IT governance factors; 
however, the operational reliance on IT factor is correlated with the offensive IT governance factor 
but not with the defensive IT governance factor.  
Financial Performance: Financial performance is the self-reported level of growth and profit 
relative to the respondent’s principal competitor. Growth is reported using a 3-item scale (scored from 
1 to 5) the mean ranged from 3.26 to 3.46 indicating a moderate to high level of growth. Profit was 
measured using a 5-item scale (scored from 1 to 5), and the mean was also at a moderate to high level 
(ranging from 3.04 to 3.51). Financial performance demonstrated bivariate correlation with the 
defensive IT governance factor and the strategic reliance on IT managerial support factor (factor 1). 
Operational performance: Operational performance is the self-reported level of performance along 
two dimensions – external performance and internal performance. The external performance metric is 
reported using a 4-item scale (scored from 1 to 5) with the mean ranging from 2.65 to 2.98 indicating 
a moderate level of external performance. The internal performance metric is reported using a 3-item 





Supplemental Analysis – Proportion of Insiders and IT Governance 
Supplemental Analysis 1 – Effects of Proportion of Insiders on Type of IT Governance 
 Defensive IT Governance Offensive IT Governance 
Variables   
Intercept   
Proportion of Insiders -.442+ (.252) -.475* (.238) 
   
F Value 3.088+ 4.001* 
Model R-Square .025+ .029* 
Adjusted R-Square .017+ .021* 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
+   p < .1, *   p < .05, **   p < .01, ***   p < .001 
 
Supplemental Analysis 2 – Effects of Proportion of Insiders and Level of Comfort in IT 
Management on Board IT Governance 












Variables     
Intercept -.469 (.318) -.666 (.426) -.744+ (.397) -.531 (.350) 
High Level of Transparency a .396 (.402)    
High Level of Competency b  .624 (.516)   
High Level of Integrity c   .737 (.473)  
High Level of Reliability d    .508 (.431) 
Proportion of Insiders -.155 (.407) -.422 (.584) -.472 (.575) -.177 (.480) 
Proportion of Insiders and High Level of 
Transparency Interaction 
-.362 (.555)    
Proportion of Insiders and High Level of 
Competency Interaction 
 -.001 (.742)   
Proportion of Insiders and High Level of 
Integrity Interaction 
  .220 (.692)  
Proportion of Insiders and High Level of 
Reliability Interaction 
   -.243 (.609) 
     
F Value 5.754*** 5.458** 4.440** 6.041*** 
Model R-Square .127*** .121** .101** .132*** 
Adjusted R-Square .105*** .099** .078** .110*** 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
+   p < .1, *   p < .05, **   p < .01, ***   p < .001 
a 
Dummy variable for level of transparency of IT management, composed of those responses with transparency rated 4 or 5 
on a five point scale. 
b 
Dummy variable for level of competency of IT management, composed of those responses with competency rated 4 or 5 on 
a five point scale. 
c 
Dummy variable for level of integrity of IT management, composed of those responses with integrity rated 4 or 5 on a five 
point scale. 
d 
Dummy variable for level of reliability of IT management, composed of those responses with reliability rated 4 or 5 on a 
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